Following the death of the former president of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a helicopter crash on May 19th, this year, the second round of voting to choose his successor took place in early July but with just 49.68% of the total electorate participating.
This vote, higher than the just under 40% turnout in June’s first round, was probably due to the fact that many voters wanted to prevent “worse”, namely Saeed Jalili, by voting for Massoud Pezeshkian, the ‘reformist’ candidate. Nevertheless, the abstention rate remained above half of the registered voters, plus over 600,000 people; nearly 2% of those who went to the voting stations, spoilt their ballots. The main reason for not participating, or damaging their ballots, was a complete loss of confidence in the theocratic regime and saw all those involved in the election as puppets of the regime.
The first round’s 39.93% turnout, the lowest on record, was in line with the trend of the last parliamentary and presidential elections. However, there was one difference to the last presidential election in 2019, and that was that the “Guardian Council”, the state body that decides who can be a candidate in elections, eventually allowed Pezeshkian, a candidate from the so-called ‘reformist’ wing of the elite, to stand.
Pezeshkian stands for an opening to the Western imperialist powers. For a time, he studied in Harvard in the US, something not unheard of within the Iranian elite. Pezeshkian, who was involved in the negotiation of the 2015 “nuclear deal”, wants to achieve this by starting negotiations on a new “nuclear deal”. In domestic politics, he also stands for the relaxation of dress codes for women, for example.
There may be hopes that a new “nuclear deal” will lead to an improvement in daily lives, but this is far from certain. The recent increase in tension in the region, especially after recent Israeli assassinations and the seeming no end to the Gaza war, again sharply poses the possibility of a wider regional confrontation. Iran would be particularly threatened by this given the historic tension between the Iranian and Israeli regimes, sharpened by the killing in Tehran of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, shortly after the presidential election.
Despite some popular hopes amongst Iranians that the 2015 “nuclear deal” would lead to an improvement in everyday life, this did not materialise. Trump in his 2017-2021 presidency retightened western sanctions. The original deal, reflecting the interests of the Western imperialist powers, contained sanctions that massively complicated the lives of Iranian workers and impoverished masses. And the possible re-election of Trump could mean another US turn of the screw against Iran.
Domestically it is very unlikely that Pezeshkian will significantly improve the harsh laws against women, unless the regime is threatened with overthrow. Generally, the history of the theocratic regime in Iran has shown that the situation of the majority of the population has worsened, not improved, especially under so-called reformists, something which then led to the election victories for regime hardliners of different types. Already, in reaction to the number of conservatives in Pezeshkian’s government, one of his vice presidents, Javad Zarif a former foreign minster who played a prominent role in his election campaign, has resigned.
Pezeshkian will walk a tightrope between the regime hardliners and his new supporters. In the election, on the basis of his reputation and past statements, such as that the arrest and death of Mahsa Amini was “ unacceptable”, Pezeshkian was especially able to mobilize young people who had not participated in the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ revolutionary youth movement that erupted after Mahsa Amini’s death in police custody in 2022. This statement led to Pezeshkian being barred from standing in this election. But then this decision was reversed leading to speculation that this was “a carefully orchestrated election” designed by the circle around the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, the religious head of the state, to buy the regime time to stabilise itself. This is a gamble which the working class can exploit so long as it develops and maintains a clear opposition to the theocratic regime’s continuation and towards capitalism.
However, in the first round, neither Pezeshkian nor his opponents from the conservative wing of the regime – Saeed Jalili and Ghalibaf – were able to secure a majority.
That’s why it came to the second round. Unlike previous elections, the candidates of the conservative wing could not agree to jointly oppose the ‘reformist’ in the second round.
Opposing Pezeshkian was the ultra-conservative Saeed Jalili. Politically, he stood for a further intensification of repression, especially by tightening the dress codes for women, and for a further escalation of opposition to the Western imperialist powers and especially with Israel.
In the end Saeed Jalili received 13.5 million votes in the second round of the presidential elections, losing to the ‘reformist, Massoud Pezeshkian’s 16.35 million votes.
The second round illustrated the depth of the crisis in which the so-called conservative wing of the theocratic regime finds itself. This was particularly evident in the fact that parts of the so-called conservative wing openly defected to Pezeshkian before the second round election just to prevent Jalili. In addition, this crisis was expressed in the fact that Ghalibaf’s supporters, possibly with support from the Supreme Leader’s grouping, began sharp attacks on Jalili immediately after the elections. For example, they accused him of being incapable of winning these elections under any circumstances. Although Pezeshkian’s vote significantly increased from 10.4 million to nearly 16.4 million as the turnout rose between the two rounds, the role of Ghalibaf and his camp, which included some key IRGC generals, and the nearly 3.4 million votes, 14.1%, he then won was significant.
The youth are divided. Most of those who participated in the revolutionary youth movement stayed away from the elections while a majority of those who did not participate in that movement voted. But this did not mean that those who voted all support the current system; many did not really believe that Pezeshkian will fundamentally change the policy of the regime. They were more concerned with voting against Jalili and thus preventing an even worse outcome.
Nevertheless, there should be no illusions about Pezeshkian. While possibly being pushed to grant limited reforms, his main aim will be to try to stabilise the regime. This is in line with the record of the previous so-called ‘reformist’ presidents, Khatami and Rouhani, that does not include democratic rights, equal rights for women or substantial economic improvements for the workers and impoverished masses of Iran.
How should the organized working class and the left intervene in the situation?
The high degree of dissatisfaction with the entire theocratic regime, which is also expressed in this despite a slight increase in voter participation, and reports, for example, that there are repeated protests when women are arrested by the “morality police”, some of which led to their rapid release.
Since 2017 there has been a general revival of a nascent workers’ movement and one of the recent examples was the June 9th protests by retired teachers who were demanding:
- Payment of retirement bonus that has been delayed by one year.
- Payment of salary arrears related to their employment years.
- An accurate, complete and quick implementation of the rules for calculating pensions.
- Payment of arrears related to their retirement period.
- Paying arrears of rank changes during employment.
- Applying the change of rank in pension and payment of arrears related to it.
Such protests need international support especially because worker activists, along with others, sometimes face brutal repression. A recent brutal example was on July 3 when Sharifeh Mohammadi, a nationally known female worker activist who campaigns for workers’ rights and in particular supports workers in organising independently of the theocratic regime, was sentenced to death on charges of “armed rebellion against the state”.
Cases like those of Sharifeh Mohammadi will show whether or not Pezeshkian is driving exactly the same murderous line as his predecessor Raisi when it comes to the unionisation of workers and persecution of activists. The call for solidarity with Sharifeh Mohammadi and demand for the release of her and all political prisoners in Iran has already had a wide echo which needs to be continued.
These developments show that renewed larger movements, including mass movements, are inherent in the concrete situation in Iran itself. As we have been saying for some time, despite oppression and some inevitable weaknesses, the organised labour movement and the left in Iran needs to prepare for the eruption of such movements.
A key development has been the widening divisions in the regime, symbolised in Pezeshkian being allowed to run and then win the presidency. This is a serious change in the regime’s tactics.
In 1915 Lenin asked “What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary situation?” and answered “when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the ‘upper classes’, a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for ‘the lower classes not to want’ to live in the old way; it is also necessary that ‘the upper classes should be unable’ to live in the old way.” (‘The Collapse of the Second International’)
Iran is approaching this situation, although the exact form and timing of the regime facing an existential crisis cannot be predicted. However, the question for activists is how to prepare for such events.
Pezeshkian’s election brings to the fore the question of how to relate to the so-called reformist wing of the theocratic regime. Certainly, concrete demands, like the release of prisoners, democratic rights etc., must be placed upon them. But it needs to be recognised that these ‘reformist’ elements, even if they break with the theocratic regime, will still base themselves on capitalism and, in the event of the regime falling, will attempt to build a more ‘normal’ capitalist state.
In turn this leads to the question of the working class attitude to any provisional government formed after a regime collapse. There will tremendous pressures for “unity”. Marxists would argue ‘yes’ to unity in action against counter-revolution but ‘no’ to unity with pro-capitalist forces whether they be ‘reformists’ from the old regime, ‘democratic capitalists’ or Monarchists etc. Workers’ organisations should not join a government in which pro-capitalists would be in a majority or which followed pro-capitalist policies. Instead, they should explain why a break with capitalism is necessary and for a workers’ and poor government that can carry that programme out.
The struggles in Iran over recent years have provided much experience and lessons for those who have been involved. A common ground could be an organized discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, the experiences of different workers’ struggles and the “Charter of minimum demands of independent trade union and civil organizations of Iran”, which was published in early 2023 by 20 independent trade unions and social organizations.
In such discussions Marxists would, for example, argue for strengthening the Charter by correcting its objective weaknesses (see ‘Charter’ of independent unions & civil organizations a step forward, but consistent anti-capitalist, socialist approach required). Such a debate can also create concrete organizational approaches to the struggle and enforcement of their demands. The independent workers’ organisations can play a central role in this by bringing into the discussion their experiences about building and preserving self-organized structures with roots in the working class and broader parts of the population.
Such debates must also be used to show that today’s ‘reformists’ are an integral part of the theocratic regime and in what ways they are concretely connected, for example, with repressive organs such as the so-called Revolutionary Guards and the Basji militia subordinate to them. Educational work in this direction is necessary so that worker and other activists are clear on this and can begin the necessary broad propaganda work of stressing the need for workers, youth and impoverished masses to independently organise themselves.
In addition, in the context of a discussion about the role of the so-called Revolutionary Guards within the theocratic regime, one should also discuss how they can defend future movements against expected repression by them and other pro-regime forces. This requires democratically organized self-defense structures in which the population must be able to participate directly and which concretely decide from situation to situation how to deal with repression. Such structures can also contribute to the fact that the protests arrests of women against the “moral police” described above can take place in a more organised way and thus increase the chances of arrests being prevented.
These demands are only integrated into a broader programme that unites democratic, economic, social and demands for equal treatment of women and LGBTIQ+ people in all areas and prepares the workers and impoverished masses of Iran for a break with the theocratic regime and the entire rotten capitalist system.
A key part of this is necessary that the existing independent trade unions and left-wing to communist groups enter into a joint discussion on the founding of a workers’ party, or alliance at first, on the basis of a clear programme that raises the demands of workers and the oppressed. This discussion should also be used to deepen existing links and develop joint political activities. The development of a common, democratic procedural basis is also necessary for this.
Within such an organisation, Marxists would argue for programmatic cornerstones that focus on the central role of the working class and questions of nationalisation of key economic sectors under workers’ control and administration, alongside a clear strategy of how to win support for these policies. Such structures could show the workers and impoverished masses of Iran that they are fundamentally striving for maximum, but not unprincipled, unity and action.
The CWI offers all those who are open to such proposals and ideas outlined in this article an open discussion on the building of both a broad workers’ party and a Marxist organization in Iran.
