Can China challenge US imperialism as a military power? 

The election of Trump as US president is accelerating the already existing trends towards global economic recession, multi-national polarity in geopolitical relations and increasing military tensions. Despite being elected promising to disengage US involvement in international wars like Ukraine, Trump, in reality, will increase military expenditure, with China’s sphere of influence in the East China Sea and South China Sea in particular a concern for US imperialism. 

Capitalist governments internationally are also turning to beefing up their military apparatuses. Labour prime minister Starmer in the UK has pledged to increase defence expenditure by an additional £13.4 billion a year. Donald Tusk, the Polish premier, has called on Poland to become a nuclear power. Germany, France, Canada etc. are all planning billions more in arms spending. Starmer has stated that if a Ukraine deal is to be struck, he is “ready and willing” to put British ‘boots on the ground’.

In the context of this increasingly disordered capitalist world, the recent advances being made by state capitalist China in military technology pose yet another threat to US imperialism. In this article, Lence Law asks the question; Is China able to challenge US imperialism as a military power? 

On 26^th of November, 2024, two types of new military aircraft were shown flying over Chengdu and Shenyang. These aircraft were larger in size than China’s current most advanced “fifth-generation” fighter jet, J-20, with a pair of broad delta wings and a distinctive “tailless” stealth design. Although the Chinese government has not made any official statements, their overall design is similar to the “next-generation fighter” model unveiled by China at the 2023 Airshow China in Zhuhai. They are also similar to the conceptual images released by the US military for the “NGAD” (Next-Generation Air Dominance) program.

As a result, the two aircraft that took their maiden flights on that day were widely regarded by most military media and observers as prototypes of a “sixth-generation fighter”. This marks the first time that the Chinese Air Force has ‘taken the lead’ over the United States in terms of technological experimentation, as the latter has yet to reveal any physical aircraft for its NGAD program.

Later in December, China also unveiled their new heavy Amphibious assault ship, and a new type of “air early warning” (AEW) aircraft. If we also take into account China’s rise in electric vehicle manufacturing, the new energy industry, and the recently released DeepSeek artificial intelligence, it seems that China’s technological ascent is becoming increasingly aggressive.

Geopolitical and military expansion of China 

China’s military development has progressed alongside its rapid economic growth, but its long-term strategic planning generally began after the influence of the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Gulf War in the 1990s. Before that, during the wave of privatization and capitalist reforms in the 1980s, the CCP government had abandoned or put on hold a large amount of military and technology development projects. As a result, when the crisis happened, Chinese society once again found itself under threat of being invaded and defeated by the vast military alliance system formed by the United States, NATO, and its Western Pacific allies, for example Japan.

From the late 1990s to the early 21st century, Jiang Zemin’s reforms paused further economic neo-liberalization, reorganized the strength of the capitalist bureaucrats, and restored control over state-owned industries. This period marked the beginning of China’s efforts to catch up with Western military-technological advantages. Many military projects that came to completion after the 2010s—exemplified by the “Liaoning” aircraft carrier, the first aircraft carrier of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, which was purchased from Ukraine and modified, as well as the “fifth-generation” stealth fighter jet J-20 program of the PLA Air Force—were initiated and researched during 1990s to 2000s.

As China’s economy grew and government budgets expanded, Beijing maintained a steady military spending at a level of slightly below 2% of GDP, for example 1.4% in 2010. Although the proportion was relatively low—significantly lower than that of military powers such as the United States (4.9% in 2010) and Russia (4.0% in 2010) during the same period, the rapid growth of China’s economy led to a substantial increase in the total amount of military spending. Since 2009, Chinese military spending became the second largest in the world, reflecting the economic rise of China.

In the 2010s China began to exhibit a clear ambition of catching up with and challenging the United States in both military technology and geopolitical competition, which is strongly related to the economic changed relations and the interests of the Chinese ruling class. They started to become dissatisfied with the lower position in the global production chain. The US ruling class started to take a more hostile opinion toward Chinese economic development, rather than “welcoming the rise of China” as stated by the Obama government in 2012.

Chinese military development was also accelerated as a reaction to political challenges. This was reflected not only in the commissioning of new military equipment but also in the overall modernization of the PLA, including its mechanization and informatization. As the military strength improved, the geopolitical position of China turned to a more assertive form.

This was particularly evident in China’s military and geopolitical influence in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. For example, facing the tensions with Japan when Tokyo’s attempt to “purchase” the Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese) Islands, Beijing not only encouraged strong protests, but also started the normalization of Chinese naval and aerial patrols around the islands. Additionally, China began to assert claims over the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, which had been effectively controlled by multiple countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines.

The United States launched its “Pivot to Asia” strategy in 2011, aimed at reinforcing its military presence in the region. As part of this policy, the US planned to deploy 60% of its forces in the area of the Asia-Pacific, mainly the first and second island chains to counterbalance China’s growing military capabilities and to intervene in potential conflicts in China’s periphery. What’s interesting is that, this strategy was announced one year earlier than its “welcoming the rise of China” statement. It reflected that the geopolitical clash between China and US was complex and contradictory and gradually changed, rather than a sudden shift to hostile stance.

China’s strategy of confronting the US has been described as “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) strategy, which remains a core component of its military strategy even today. The essence of this approach is to leverage “asymmetric advantages” – such as the ability to deploy a significant number of land-based, medium and long-range missiles and maintain a strong air force presence on the mainland – against the US, whose military deployments in Asia-Pacific are more geographically constrained.

China’s naval fleet still cannot match the full strength of the US Navy, but its integrated regional military capabilities, not only naval power, allow it to challenge the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific. This “zone of military advantage” initially centred around mainland China and a maritime and airspace close to the mainland, but has gradually expanded to cover the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Till now, this area of “A2/AD” could now include the entire area of first island chain, which includes Taiwan.

Since 2016, China’s military strength has continued to grow, and in multiple dimensions, it has gradually reached the same “generational level” as the US, in terms of technology. For example, in 2017, China’s “fifth-generation” stealth fighter, J-20, was officially commissioned, and in 2024, its second stealth fighter, the J-35, was also operational. This made China and the US the only two countries in the world to obtain two types of fifth-generation fighters. In terms of naval power, from 2012 to 2022, the total amount of the Chinese Navy’s ship built, in term of water displacement tonnage, increased five times. During this period, China expanded its fleet at a rate of 100,000 to 150,000 tons of water displacement per year.

Not only strengthening its military presence in closer regions, China has also attempted to expand its power projection on a global scale. By 2024, China had two operational aircraft carriers and had completed the construction of its third carrier. Additionally, in 2022, China signed a security cooperation agreement with the Solomon Islands, making China able to extend its influence outside the first and second island chains, raising concerns among countries such as Australia and Japan.

Although China is still not a superpower with a global power projection like the US, its growing military influence is now capable of challenging the US from intervening in any conflicts that happen within the “first chain of Islands”, which are the naval area from Japan to the South China Sea. The increasing possibility of China’s military operating around Australia and the Indian Ocean also reflects that China is not satisfied with its current regional geopolitical influence. The growing imperialist role of China is gradually becoming the goal of China’s military development.

How much does it cost?

Since 2009, China and the United States have been the two largest military spenders in the world. However, while the US still maintains a military budget larger than the combined total of the next nine highest-spending countries, it has not established absolute dominance over the rest of the world. Instead, China has rapidly caught up in both technology and scale.

In 2024, the official US military budget amounted to $806 billion, while China’s official defence spending was 1.67 trillion yuan, equivalent to around $231.4 billion. But, it is important to note that a significant portion of the US military budget is allocated to maintaining its global military presence, including nuclear weapons maintenance, global troop deployments, and air defence systems in Europe, as well as military and security operations in Iraq and other regions.

The operational costs of overseas deployments are substantially higher than those of domestic forces. As a result, the cost-effectiveness of US military spending could be lower than Chinese spending, which remains focused on homeland defence and area denial. And there could be a larger cost on military technology investment, as China has largely played ‘catch up’, which brings less cost on technological exploration.

However, despite massive investments in programs such as the DDG-1000 destroyer, the F-35 fighter jet, and the NGAD initiative, the US military has repeatedly faced budget overruns, project delays, and even cancellations. Additionally, corruption and inefficiencies in weapon purchasing further weakens the overall effectiveness of its defence spending.

In April 2024, during a congressional hearing on the US defence budget for fiscal year 2025, the Secretary of the Air Force was questioned by a congressman about why the Air Force had purchased a bag of ordinary metal bushings for $90,000, when the market price was only around $100. Such instances of “sky-high” purchase costs are not an isolated case. In 2018, Popular Mechanics reported that the US Air Force spent $32,000 on 25 steel coffee mugs, with an average price of over $1,200 each, simply because their plastic handles frequently broke, and military purchase procedures did not allow for purchasing replacement handles separately. Following a public backlash, the Air Force switched to an alternative solution of 3D printing coffee mugs, significantly reducing costs.

The rising costs of US military equipment in recent years are mainly under the manipulation by the “military-industrial complex” (MIC). This was a term coined by US President Eisenhower in the early 1960s that admits the vested interests that sections of the capitalist class have in high levels of military spending due to it increasing demand for their products and ultimately boosting their profits. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration started an initiative of merging the companies of the US defence industry. Lockheed Corporation merged with Martin Marietta, Northrop merged with Grumman, and Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas. At the time, the US government argued that larger defence companies would “eliminate unnecessary management expenses” and provide lower-cost products.

However, the outcome was the opposite of what was intended. Today, the US Air Force’s fighter jet market is effectively monopolized by Lockheed Martin, bombers are only produced by Northrop Grumman, and major US Navy contracts for aircraft carriers and destroyers are divided between Huntington Ingalls Industries and General Dynamics. In this monopolistic environment, the Pentagon lacks the ability to negotiate prices, while the ‘MICs’ use political lobbying to pressure the US government into approving additional emergency budgets or financial support for delayed development and manufacturing.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that China’s actual defence spending in 2024 may exceed the official budget by 25% to 50%, potentially reaching over $300 billion. Research from the RAND Corporation and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) suggesting that certain expenditures related to the military and defence—such as security costs, subsidies for military-civil fusion enterprises, veteran affairs, defence research and development—are not fully reflected in the official defence budget. Instead, these expenses are often distributed across research institutions and local governments.

However, even with a potential 25% to 50% increase, China’s military spending as a percentage of GDP remains relatively low, from 1.7% raised to 2.6%, compared to the US, where defence spending accounts for 3.4% of GDP. This indicates that despite its increasing defence budget, China’s overall spending is still significantly lower than that US. As a result, according to RAND Corporation, China’s “advanced weapons equipment rate” is only about 40% of that of the US.

Beyond differences in military budget calculations, China has significantly reduced defence costs in various ways, making its expenditures far lower than those of the US and other Western countries. For instance, China’s defence procurement is state-controlled, avoiding the lobbying by ‘MICs’. In China, state-owned military enterprises operate under government-regulated profit margins, ensuring stable pricing.

China also developed the world’s largest industrial system and a highly integrated supply chain, allowing its defence industry to domestically produce nearly all key components for major weapons systems.

According to Jane’s Defense Weekly, China’s military supply has achieved a localization rate exceeding 90%. In contrast, many advanced US weapons systems still rely on foreign supply chains. For example, critical components of the F-35 fighter jet are sourced from Japan, the U.K., and Italy, as for J-20, except for its initial models that used imported Russian engines, the rest of the produced jets rely entirely on domestically produced components. This high degree of supply chain autonomy not only reduces production costs but also enhances strategic security.

China’s large-scale manufacturing capabilities further lower unit costs, particularly in naval shipbuilding. By the end of 2025, China’s shipbuilding industry is expected to account for nearly 70% of global ship production. With a giant civilian shipbuilding sector as its foundation, China has significantly lower material costs for military ship construction, including shipyard infrastructure, gantry cranes, and specialized steel production.

Additionally, China has a greater number of shipyards capable of building large military vessels than the US. This disparity is deeply tied to America’s neo-liberal economic policies and de-industrialization. In the 1970s, the US had 26 shipyards capable of building large naval vessels, but by 2017, that number had down to 4. In contrast, China maintains 8 dedicated military shipyards, along with 15 large civilian shipyards capable of handling warship contracts.

Overall, while China’s actual military spending may well exceed official reports, factors such as state owned military industry, a domestically integrated supply chain, and a strategic focus on cost-effective military development may give it a much higher defence spending efficiency than the US In contrast, the American ‘military-industrial complex’ leads to widespread financial waste, making US defence expenditures significantly less cost-effective.

Through its vast industrial scale and state-controlled defence enterprises, China has managed to sustain rapid military modernization despite a comparatively lower defence budget. This model has positioned China as one of the few nations capable of directly challenging the traditional military superiority of the United States.

Power struggle

The military game between the two nations is essentially a struggle between the US imperialist system and a Chinese bureaucratic state capitalism that is increasingly playing an imperialist role. It is a reflection of inter-capitalist state competition and the broader crisis of global capitalism.

This rivalry does not represent genuine progress, nor should it be misinterpreted as a righteous cause of “national rejuvenation”, in the case of China or “defending the free world”, in the case of the US. Rather, it is a power struggle within the capitalist nation state system on a global scale, driven by national ruling classes seeking to maximise their own interests.

Regardless of which side gains advantage, ordinary workers will not gain real peace or prosperity. The resources consumed in building war machines could have been used to improve people’s lives and enhance social welfare, yet instead, they are funnelled into expanding armaments and strengthening the state’s machine of violence.

For those who genuinely care about the liberation of the global working class, the crucial issue is to give no support to the military expansion of either side but recognizing the fundamental nature of this conflict as an imperialist military rivalry which is an inevitable consequence of the capitalist system.

Only by transcending this system and establishing a new order based on the interests of workers can we prevent the continued waste of worker’s value on war machines, which designed solely for destruction rather than socially useful production to meet human need. A democratically run socialist planned economy would do just that.

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