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Taming the beast or changing the system? ‘Capitalism and its Critics’, by John Cassidy: Review by Niall Mulholland

There is growing and widespread dissatisfaction with capitalism worldwide. Economic models that dominated the post-WW2 decades — Keynesian social democracy and later neoliberal globalization — are seen as having run aground. The system today is failing to meet the basic needs of many working-class people. This crisis has fuelled both right and left populist movements.  Economic nationalism, authoritarianism and inequality are resurgent.

It is with this background that John Cassidy explores, in a timely fashion, the critics of capitalism and the alternatives they advocate in Capitalism and its Critics – A Battle of Ideas In The Modern World. By mapping out critiques and alternatives over the centuries, the book provides ideas against which Marxists can sharpen their own analysis of capitalism’s structural flaws and the need for systemic change.

Cassidy has written an engaging and novel book on capitalism and its history from the point of view of critics, well known and relatively obscure. Cassidy writes in a brisk, analytical style, honed as a journalist for over 40 years, mainly at The New Yorker magazine. He blends economic theory, historical narrative, and social critique, offering a fascinating panoramic view of capitalism’s critics, from Enlightenment thinkers to modern-day economists. 

The book covers the last 250 years of capitalism told through the eyes of over thirty individuals, with vastly different perspectives. Adam Smith is associated with laissez-faire capitalism, while the most searing critics of the system, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and Rosa Luxemburg, championed its overthrow.

Many of the profiles may be, as Cassidy writes, figures as part of a long tradition of dissent. From a Marxist perspective, many of the thinkers discussed represent reformist or partial critiques of the system that fail to challenge the class foundations of capitalism and the need to change society fundamentally.

Cassidy begins with noting how early capitalist development was fuelled by slave-based wealth and colonial extraction. This echoes Karl Marx’s view that capitalism emerged not from peaceful trade, but through brutal “primitive accumulation”. Marx wrote that capitalism’s birth was marked by force, theft, and dispossession. By stripping people of land and tools, they were forced to sell their labour to survive, creating the modern working class. Concentration of capital saw wealth accumulated in the hands of a few, creating the conditions for monopoly capitalism.

East India Company

Cassidy shows that capitalism has taken many forms – laissez-faire, Keynesian, neoliberal, and now supposedly digital – but its core logic of profit and accumulation remains. He writes: “From the nineteenth-century ideal of free trade and small government that was pioneered by Britain; to the autarkic capitalism of Nazi Germany; to the Keynesian managed capitalism of the post-war era; to the globalized hyper-capitalism of the late twentieth century; to the Chinese state capitalism that some observers see as the winning model for the twenty-first century – there have been many varieties of capitalism.”

In the opening chapter, we learn about William Bolts, a whistle-blower from the East India Company, who returned to London in 1770 to expose its brutal practices. Cassidy describes the company as a proto-multinational corporation, headquartered in London, with relevance to today’s global capitalism.

The East India Company thrived on monopolies, protectionism, and slavery. Cassidy emphasizes that the slave trade was integral to mercantile capitalism. 

In Capital, Volume I, Marx wrote about the violent and coercive means by which capitalism was born: “If money, according to Augier, ‘comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek,’ capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt.”

Bolts condemned the Company’s exploitation, noting that its shareholders, mostly aristocrats and MPs, profited from a private army in India used to suppress local populations and protect their interests. The Company’s costly conflicts with indigenous rulers eventually led to a bailout from Parliament, facilitated by the overlapping interests of Britain’s ruling class.

John Cassidy notes that Adam Smith, often celebrated by capitalist advocates, was in fact a critic of mercantile capitalism. Smith was not opposed to capitalism but represented a wing of the ruling class that opposed protectionism and sought ‘freer’ markets. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith condemned slavery, monopolies, and the East India Company, advocating instead for free trade and competitive markets. 

The early chapters of Capitalism and its Critics explore the British Industrial Revolution, highlighting how artisan workers, like handloom weavers, were displaced by new technologies. The Luddite movement organised opposition to mechanized looms and knitting frames, which allowed factory owners to hire unskilled laborers at lower wages, undermining the artisans’ economic security.

Their peaceful petitions to Parliament were ignored, as the system served an oligarchy. From 1810 to 1815, protests escalated into riots, met with brutal repression. Luddite leaders were hanged, imprisoned, or exiled.

There are parallels to today’s workers facing displacement from AI and automation. Unions and the working class must demand public, democratic control of new technologies. Under socialism, these innovations could play an important role in facilitating a democratically run, planned economy that serves society as a whole.

Cooperatives and early socialists

Cassidy highlights William Thompson as a pioneering Irish “proto-socialist” who developed early theories on wealth distribution and “human happiness”. Thompson, an Irish landlord from Cork, devoted his life to the working class and is credited with coining the term “surplus value,” later used by Marx.

Thompson critiqued industrial capitalism: “How comes it… that a nation abounding more than any other in the rude materials of wealth… should still pine in privation?” And in answering his own question, Thompson wrote: “The rigid dividing line between propertyless ‘producers’ of wealth… and the property-owning elite of ‘capitalists’.”

Cassidy notes Thompson’s role in the cooperative movement, alongside Robert Owen, who founded a cooperative community at Lanark in Scotland. Owen’s fame often overshadows Thompson’s role, but his contributions were grounded in utilitarian ethics and early socialist thought. Thompson critiqued Owen’s reliance on elite patronage, warning it could undermine genuine worker and cooperative community autonomy. He developed detailed plans for cooperative societies based on equal participation, including proposals for cooperative education and governance structures.

Marx and Engels, though critical of what they termed the ‘utopian socialism’, argued that cooperative labor—or “associated labor”—could represent a higher form of social organization, but only if it replaced the exploitative structures of capitalism.

In his Inaugural Address to the International Working Men’s Association (1864), Marx wrote: “Like slave labor, like serf labor, hired labor is but a transitory and inferior form, destined to disappear before associated labor plying its toil with a willing hand, a ready mind and a joyous heart.”

Marx and Engels saw that cooperatives, while valuable, could not transform society on their own, as they were dominated by the capitalist market economy and prone to adaptation to it. They needed to be part of a broader revolutionary movement to abolish class divisions and democratise the economy.

Cassidy draws a thread from early socialist and cooperative thinkers to J.C. Kumarappa, a 1930s Indian economist who championed “Gandhian economics”—a vision of self-sufficient village life, minimal consumption, and well being over material wealth. His ideas were later eclipsed by Indian prime minister Nehru’s industrialisation policy, which was influenced by a Stalinist-style model but did not break decisively with capitalism and semi feudalism in India . Subsequent neoliberal policies under successive governments in India have deepened inequality. 

Cassidy also highlights Thompson’s collaboration with Anna Wheeler, an upper-class Irish progressive. They co-authored Appeal of One Half the Human Race, Women, Against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to Retain Them in Political, and Thence in Civil and Domestic, Slavery (1825). This collaborative feminist and early socialist critique responded to liberal bourgeois economist James Mill’s dismissal of women’s political rights. The book argued that liberal rhetoric masked female subjugation, marriage under capitalism was civil slavery, and gender equality was crucial for a just society.

In this vein, Cassidy also discusses Flora Tristan, a Franco-Peruvian feminist who linked women’s rights with labour struggles.  And sometimes unwaged labour takes a different form. Cassidy writes that domestic work “typically has been unpaid and carried out by women”. The profit system “couldn’t operate”, without this huge army of free labour, Cassidy notes, in discussing the Italian-American immigrant activist Silvia Federici.

Marx and Engels

Cassidy’s analysis covers Karl Marx and Frederick Engels’ economic writings, including the Communist Manifesto. The book covers Marx’s ideas on economy regarding the exploitation of workers, profit-driven accumulation, wealth concentration, economic crises, alienation, and historical change.

Cassidy explains Marx’s view that history is driven by material conditions and class struggle. Marx saw capitalism as a stage in historical development, marked by the conflict between the bourgeoisie (owners of capital) and the proletariat (workers).

Marx argued that labour is the source of all value. Cassidy highlights Marx’s concept of surplus value, that is, the idea that the capitalists profit by paying workers less than the value they produce. Cassidy declares this essential part of Marx’s theory “can’t be entirely dismissed”, which is at least an improvement on many contemporary bourgeois economists.

Cassidy emphasizes Marx’s insight into capitalism’s internal contradictions. The profit system generates immense wealth but concentrates it in the hands of a few people. It increases productivity but leads to alienation and inequality. Capitalism is dynamic and innovative but prone to crises and instability.

Cassidy also presents aspects of Marx’s psychological and social critique of capitalism, including his ideas on ‘alienation’: under capitalism workers are alienated from the products of their labour, the process of production, and their own human potential.

But in one-sided and determinist fashion, Cassidy argues that Marx believed that capitalism would eventually collapse under the weight of its contradictions, paving the way for socialism and eventually communism, a classless, stateless society.

To his credit, Cassidy takes Marxism seriously, presenting its relevance to modern economic issues. However, his view of Marx as a prophetic analyst who had a determinist view of history neglects Marx and Engel’s emphasis on class struggle and collective action as essential factors to realising social transformation.

A significant American critic of capitalism in the 19th century was Thorstein Veblen, who, in his book The Theory of Business Enterprise, condemned the so-called robber barons of his time. Veblen defended small producers and artisans who genuinely created goods, contrasting them with what he termed the “pecuniary class”—a layer of parasitic financiers and speculators. Cassidy notes that Veblen was one of the earliest critics of Wall Street, whose activities he saw as divorced from productive labour. These ideas, Cassidy contends, find a modern echo in the criticism of the extreme financialisation of today’s global economy.

Imperialism and its critics

Cassidy examines John A. Hobson’s critique of imperialism, which linked it to finance capital. Hobson’s ideas influenced figures like Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, with Lenin drawing heavily from his work in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Hobson argued that advanced capitalist economies sought foreign investment due to overproduction and surplus capital, leading to the 19th-century “Scramble for Africa” and imperialist partitioning of continents as the major economic powers competed for colonies and resources.

Cassidy devotes a chapter to Rosa Luxemburg’s theories of imperialism, outlining her argument that capitalism’s expansion depends on the continual incorporation of non-capitalist regions. In her 1913 book The Accumulation of Capital, Luxemburg argued that capitalism could not sustain itself within a purely capitalist system. She claimed that capitalist accumulation requires non-capitalist markets, i.e. capitalism needs to constantly expand into pre-capitalist regions (colonies, peasant economies, etc.) to sell its surplus goods and realise profit because the working class could not consume all the goods produced in the more developed capitalist countries. For Luxemburg, imperialism was therefore driven by the need to find external markets beyond capitalism itself. She predicted that once these non-capitalist areas were exhausted, capitalism would enter an unavoidable and catastrophic crisis.

Lenin and Trotsky both greatly admired Luxemburg but critiqued her economic explanation for imperialism. Lenin rejected the idea that capitalism necessarily required non-capitalist markets to survive. Imperialism was a stage of capitalism characterized by monopoly, finance capital, and the export of capital, not merely a response to underconsumption.

Trotsky echoed these criticisms, adding that Luxemburg’s theory was too rigid and not fully taking into account the internal contradictions of capitalism, including capitalism’s uneven development. 

Despite their theoretical differences, the three great Marxists’ approaches converged, in practice, amidst early 20th-century events like the inter-imperialist First World War, which helped give birth to workers’ revolutions. While all led revolutionary struggles, the lack of a cohesive party in Germany, unlike the Bolsheviks in Russia, played a key part in the German revolution’s failure. Luxembourg and the other outstanding leader of the German revolution, Karl Liebknecht, were brutally murdered by the forces of reaction in Berlin in 1919.

Capitalism’s ‘long waves’?

Another Marxist economist whom Leon Trotsky took issue with was Nikolai Kondratiev. Cassidy expresses agreement with aspects of Kondratiev who advanced what later became known as the theory of long waves. Kondratiev proposed that capitalism develops through extended cycles of expansion and contraction lasting roughly 50 to 60 years. These long waves,  Kondratiev argued, were largely driven by technological innovation, which stimulated a period of growth and investment before eventually giving way to stagnation and crisis.

Trotsky was critical of Kondratiev’s interpretation, particularly the implication that these cycles were an objective, self-correcting feature of capitalism. He argued instead that capitalist development is shaped by social and political factors, and economic, above all by class struggle and the actions of the working class. For Trotsky, the rise and fall of capitalism could not be explained solely by technological or economic rhythms, but by the intervention of class struggles and the contradictions inherent in the capitalist system itself.

On Trotsky’s polemic against Kondratiev, Cassidy remarks: “In a long 1923 letter to the editors of a socialist academic journal, [Trotsky] described Kondratiev’s theory that long cycles existed and evolved with the same ‘rigidly lawful rhythm’ as minor cycles as ‘an obviously false generalization from a formal analogy.’ Whereas short cycles were generated by the internal dynamics of the capitalist economy, Trotsky wrote, the long-term evolution of the system was largely determined by ‘external conditions,’ such as colonialist land grabs, conflicts between the imperialist nations, and political insurrections. ‘The acquisition by capitalism of new countries and continents,’ Trotsky wrote, ‘the discovery of new natural resources, and, in the wake of these, such major facts of ‘superstructural’ order as wars and revolutions, determine the character and replacement of ascending, stagnating, or declining epochs of capitalist development.’ Any effort to supplant this broad historical approach with ‘the methods of formalism,’ as Kondratiev had done, amounted to ‘splitting empty abstractions, ‘ Trotsky’s letter went on.”

Unfortunately, in his discussion of Kondratiev, Cassidy appears to conflate Bolshevism with Stalinism. He acknowledges that Kondratiev was able to develop and expound his ideas freely in Russia during the early years of the Bolshevik government. But in describing the later Stalinist purging of Kondratiev, Cassidy combines the Stalinist terror with the early workers’ state, treating them as if they were part of a single, unbroken regime.

From a left-reformist viewpoint, Cassidy fails to grasp the fundamental difference between Bolshevism and Stalinism, the latter emerging as a reactionary, chauvinist, bureaucratic response to the Russian Revolution’s isolation. This reaction found ideological expression in the erroneous and non-Marxist “socialism in one country” theory, which Trotsky and the Left Opposition opposed. Stalinism drowned workers’ democracy and freedom of expression in mass purges and executions. Understanding 1920s-30s Soviet economic debates requires differentiating the early Soviet Union from Stalinist degeneration, which suppressed workers’ democracy and genuine debate. 

Keynesian policies

Cassidy highlights John Maynard Keynes, an Edwardian liberal, who believed state intervention could counter capitalism’s instability. His vision of regulated capitalism, marked by public spending and deficit financing, shaped the post-Second World War era in Western Europe. 

After WW2, capitalism entered a rare period of sustained growth. The economic upswing was not a triumph of the system, but a temporary recovery driven by war destruction, US aid, and expanded global markets. The devastation had cleared outdated capital, allowing reinvestment and modernisation. 

Reformists in the labour movement mistook this for long-term stability, but capitalism’s contradictions and crisis, alongside inequality, and class struggle, would inevitably return. 

Cassidy notes that capitalism has needed significant state intervention to survive crises like the Great Depression, the 2008 crash, and COVID-19. For Marxists this underscores the argument that the “free market” is a myth, and the state’s role is to stabilise capitalism.

Keynes’s critics, including Joan Robinson, who favoured socialist planning, are covered by Cassidy. 

While Keynes promoted government spending for market stability, Marxists argue this merely delays capitalism’s inherent contradictions, leading to inflation, falling profits, and class conflict. Government spending, reliant on capitalist profits and taxation, cannot resolve systemic issues. The stagflation and industrial unrest of the late 1960s and 1970s were evidence that Keynesian policies only masked capitalism’s structural flaws. 

Keynesian policies cannot eliminate capitalism’s boom-bust cycle. Public spending and deficit financing, as advocated by Keynesian economists in the post WW2 decades, were temporary and partial fixes, not solutions to capitalism’s fundamental problems.

Are capitalism and democracy compatible?

The final third of the book deals with the rise and fall of neoliberalism. Cassidy references Karl Polanyi, a social theorist rather than an economist, who began his career as an economic journalist. Polanyi lived in ‘Red Vienna’ during the 1920s, before he was forced in 1933 to flee Austria then under ‘Austro-fascist’ rule and eventually settled in the United States, where he wrote The Great Transformation, a book that became well known in its time.

Polanyi raised the fundamental question of whether capitalism and democracy are compatible in the long run. Cassidy notes that, in the post-WW2 period, this issue seemed to fade into the background. However, the end of Keynesianism and the contradictions produced by decades of neoliberalism and hyper-globalisation have led to extreme inequality and austerity. 

From a Marxist perspective, an absence of a strong socialist opposition and weakened trade unions in many countries, has created fertile ground for figures such as Donald Trump and other right-wing populist politicians to exploit the common misery of austerity, stagnant wages, a housing crisis and collapsing public services and infrastructure.

Globalisation has deepened inequality, enriched a small elite while leaving billions in poverty or economic insecurity. Many traditional industrial and manufacturing jobs in the advanced capitalist countries have been outsourced, while workers in the neo-colonial nations have been subjected to low wages and poor conditions. Globalisation has made the world economy more vulnerable to crises, as seen in the 2008 financial crash and the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The environment has also suffered greatly under deregulated global capitalism, with climate change and ecological destruction accelerating. Cassidy includes in his portraits ecological critics of capitalism, like Georgescu-Roegen, who challenge the ideology of endless growth under capitalism. 

Marxists agree that capitalism’s drive for accumulation is incompatible with ecological sustainability, and add that only a planned, socialist economy can address the climate crisis.

As living standards stagnated or declined, nationalist and right-wing populism has grown, leading to the coming to power of reactionary figures like Donald Trump in the US, and assaults on democratic rights and even on bourgeois institutions, like universities, by populist right-wing governments. In many ways, Polanyi’s ideas have resurfaced. Yet, from a Marxist standpoint, there is nothing fundamentally new in his analysis of capitalism and democracy. 

Marx and Engels believed that in capitalist society, the state—including its formally democratic institutions—ultimately serves the interests of the bourgeoisie. Even in the most democratic republics, they argued, the economic power of capital dominates political life. Elections, parliaments, and constitutions may give the appearance of popular rule, but real power lies with those who control the means of production.

In The Communist Manifesto (1848), they wrote: “The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”

Marx and Engels believed the working class could achieve democratic gains via mass struggle, but these would always be vulnerable, especially during economic crises. For instance, the current right-wing Labour government in Britain is suppressing Gaza protests and plans further repressive laws, which history shows will also be used against the workers’ movement.

The “Chicago Boys”

General Pinochet’s brutal overthrow of Salvador Allende’s socialist government in Chile in 1973 allowed the country to become a testing ground for neoliberalism, Cassidy writes. The “Chicago Boys,” students of Arnold Harberger and Milton Friedman, both discussed in Cassidy’s book, advised Pinochet on “shock treatment,” implementing deregulation, privatisation, and dismantling workers’ rights in Chile. This served as a model for Thatcher and Reagan’s 1980s campaigns against organised labor, for privatisation, and for rolling back working-class gains.

These chapters of Cassidy’s book are informative, though they necessarily limit discussion of the political and social forces involved, given that his focus is primarily economic. The deeper lessons of the Chilean experience—and the defeat of Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity (Unidad Popular) government  —must therefore be sought elsewhere. Chile: How and Why the Revolution Was Crushed, by Tony Saunois, secretary of the Committee for a Workers’ International, examines the revolutionary process in Chile from 1970 to 1973. He argues that while the Chilean working class displayed immense courage and revolutionary energy, the leadership of the movement failed to take the decisive steps necessary to overthrow capitalism and establish a socialist society.

Cassidy explores the link between slavery and capitalism through the views of Caribbean intellectuals C.L.R. James and Eric Williams. James, who was a Trotskyist for a period, detailed the Haitian Revolution against French rule in The Black Jacobins, highlighting imperial exploitation, revolutionary fervor, and complex class dynamics within the independence movement.

Eric Williams, in Capitalism and Slavery (1944), argued that profits from the Atlantic slave trade and plantation slavery fueled British industrial capitalism. He also showed how newly independent African and Caribbean nations, post-decolonisation, remained dependent on powerful capitalist states like Britain, the US, and France, limiting their ‘independence’ due to scarce capital and subordinate global economic positions. From 1962, as Trinidad and Tobago’s first Prime Minister, Williams sought a “middle way” between the Soviet Union and Western capitalist systems but grew pessimistic about genuine development for new independent states within capitalism.

Permanent revolution

It is unfortunate that Cassidy overlooks Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, which is crucial for understanding neo-colonial revolutionary movements. Trotsky argued that in such nations, the weak bourgeoisie could not achieve democratic reform, national unification, or industrialisation in the manner historically of the emerging capitalists in advanced capitalist nations, leaving them economically tied to imperial powers even after independence.

The incredible economic growth of China in recent decades could not have happened without the consequences of the revolution. China’s economic growth was rooted in its post-1949 planned economy, not capitalism. Nationalisation and land reform enabled rapid development, but bureaucratic control stifled efficiency and crushed workers’ democracy. Pro-capitalist ‘reforms’ in the 1980s introduced market elements that revived capitalist contradictions like inequality and exploitation. China’s form of state capitalism today has seen huge growth and development but also worsening inequalities and low wages and unemployment and worsening workplace exploitation for many millions. Only democratic workers’ control and management of society can unlock China’s full potential.

The book concludes with a review of the ideas of current economist thinkers, like Joseph Stiglitz and Dani Rodrik, who criticized globalisation and financialisation, advocating for more ‘inclusive’ and regulated economic systems. Cassidy also examines the arguments of Thomas Piketty, author of a best-selling work on inequality. 

Piketty argues that the post-war economic boom and reformist policies led to a significant decline in inequality, a trend that continued until around 1979, when the rise of Thatcher and Reagan marked a shift in economic policy. Since then, inequality has largely returned to levels similar to those seen before 1914.

While making a correct prognosis, Piketty’s solutions are reformist, not revolutionary; he proposes progressive taxation to reduce inequality. Marxists argue this does not challenge capitalism’s exploitative foundations. And Piketty’s focus on income and wealth inequality overlooks class struggle and the structural dynamics of capitalism.

Cassidy concludes his panoramic work with the view that capitalism may continue to adapt rather than collapse: “So far, history has falsified [Marx’s] prediction, partly because of something that few foresaw in the nineteenth century: the rise of big government.”

However, Marx did not predict that capitalism would collapse automatically. While he identified deep contradictions within the capitalist system, such as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, overproduction, and recurring crises, Marx consistently emphasised that capitalism would only be overthrown through conscious class struggle.

In the Communist Manifesto and later works, Marx and Engels argued that the working class must organise itself as a political force to challenge and ultimately replace the capitalist system. “The emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself.”
(Marx, Rules of the First International (1864))

So, while Marx foresaw capitalism’s instability and potential for breakdown, he rejected fatalism. He believed that only organized revolutionary action by the working class could bring about socialism.

Regarding the role of ‘big government’, Marxists view state intervention as a temporary role that cannot overcome capitalism’s inherent contradictions and crises or abolish exploitation.

Cassidy’s cautious solutions

Cassidy correctly highlights capitalism’s ability to reinvent itself: “Capitalism has a remarkable knack for reinventing itself and adapting to historical circumstances in order to survive.”

But his conclusion is cautious and imprisoned within the capitalist market system. Cassidy writes: “Fixing the capitalist system… requires not only political will but also the ability to act at the right time. This often means mobilizing a political movement in the midst of a crisis.”

Hopes for significant and lasting reforms are misplaced. The post-WW2 era of prolonged economic upswing and reforms is over. We are in a period of bare-knuckle capitalism, akin to pre-WW1 and inter-war years. 

Marxists fight for reforms not as ends in themselves, but as part of a strategy to transform society. We support demands like better wages, housing, or healthcare as important gains for the working class, while linking these to exposing the deeper contradictions of capitalism. Reforms won through struggle can expose the system’s limits and raise class consciousness and the struggle to transform society.

We need to build strong workers’ organisations and revolutionary socialist forces to not just defend basic workers’ rights today, but to also fundamentally change society, not merely tinker with a failing system.

Cassidy’s book, while a valuable historical account of capitalism’s critics, avoids advocating for systemic change. He finds capitalism adaptable albeit increasingly questioned. From a Marxist perspective, this adaptability is finite. Capitalism’s inherent contradictions, such as, labour versus capital, the potential of the means of production that is in the straitjacket of the profit motive and capitalist nation-state, environment versus accumulation, are intensifying. Social, economic, and political polarisation and new catastrophic wars and ecological destruction are on the order of the day under this system. History shows that societies and ‘civilisations’ can regress, breakdown and collapse. Only united working-class movements and revolutionary socialist transformation can find a lasting solution to this decaying and destructive capitalist system.

Despite its limitations, Capitalism and Its Critics is a panoramic, sharp, and accessible work. It provides an unrelenting exposure of capitalism’s structural crises and an indictment of a system whose contradictions are hurtling humankind towards ever greater disasters.

Capitalism and Its Critics: A Battle of Ideas in the Modern World by John Cassidy, published in hardcover by Allen Lane

Jean-Luc Mélenchon‘s ‘Now the people – revolution in the 21st century’ – character, programme and methods of the new radical left. Review By Tony Saunois

This year has seen France plunged into one of the most serious political and social crises since the founding of the 5th Republic by Charles De Gaulle in 1958, when a ‘soft’ coup installed the former military leader as President with wide powers. In true Bonapartist fashion, this republic concentrated powers in the hands of the Presidency at the cost of the National Assembly.

The current turmoil is a product the underlying crisis of French imperialism and capitalism. A central component of it is the erosion of the social base of all the traditional parties in France, both the left and the right. President Emmanuel Macron, in the last two years of his second term, has seen his support and base crumble. Recent polls put his standing at no more than 17% and some as low as 7%. This institutional crisis of the Fifth Republic is reflected in the departure of five Prime Ministers within two years.

In the most recent saga, the new Prime Minister, Sebastien Lecornu, resigned a few days after his appointment only to be reinstated on the following Friday. Macron, fatally called elections to the National Assembly in the summer of 2024. This was an attempt to firm up his support following strengthening support by both the far- right Rassemblement National (RN) and left movement La France Insoumise (LFI) (translated as ‘France Unbowed’). It proved to be a miscalculation which backfired spectacularly. The new National Assembly was hopelessly split three ways. This reflected the massive polarisation which has unfolded in French society.

A decisive political factor in the situation is the crucial role played by the radical left La France Insoumise (LFI, France Unbowed) led by the veteran left leader Jean–Luc Mélenchon.  LFI and Mélenchon are of crucial importance for the left not only in France but internationally. They are currently seen as the standard bearers of the ‘new left’ which is developing in some countries, including by the leadership of the emerging ‘Your Party’ in Britain (a potential party whose birth pains are excruciatingly drawn out and protracted due to the weakness of the leading forces and individuals involved).

The importance of LFI and the role of Mélenchon means that it necessary for Marxists and the politically active layers of the working class to analyse and grasp the nature of what it signifies politically. La France Insoumise and Mélenchon reflect important international processes unfolding in the new radical left.

Mélenchon, in his recently translated book, ‘Now the people – Revolution in the 21st century’ outlines how he and LFI view the new era of global capitalism. It includes the tasks which, in his view, which are now posed, including the character, programme and methods of the new radical left forces.

In this he partly reflects his own political history and the tradition of French philosophy as opposed to the empiricism which has been more dominant in the Anglo-Saxon world. Mélenchon’s analysis of the current era of capitalism, and the dystopian future it offers, attempts to give a theoretical justification for the character of the revolution in France and elsewhere, and of the movement he leads, LFI.

Organisational form reflects political content. Therefore, an understanding of the political foundation of Mélenchon and La France Insoumise is essential to grasp the form LFI takes. However, this goes beyond France to other countries where ‘new left’ movements have emerged in the past or are currently developing in others. As Mélenchon says, this book, “is my contribution to these movements of resistance, wherever they may be in today’s globalised world. It puts forward a political theory”.

Mélenchon correctly argues we need to “fully understand before we move to act”. He draws upon the resistance and revolutionary movements that have taken place globally in the Arab spring, Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, Sri Lanka and elsewhere. His conclusion is that we are now in a new era of global capitalism. Something that we would not disagree with. What conclusions are to be drawn from this are another matter. In a wide-ranging historical summary of society Mélenchon briefly deals with the development of human civilisation from the emergence of cities, (in 1950, only 20% of the world’s population lived in cities but by the year 2000 it was 80%), and the significance of population growth on changes in the social system. Mélenchon comments on the impact of modern communications, AI, and the relationship between modern capitalist consumerism and the environmental catastrophe that is unfolding. Mélenchon and LFI lay heavy emphasis on this critical issue. In this review it is not possible to adequately comment on all the issues Mélenchon raises, all of which are crucial for Marxists to address in the new era of capitalism.

Devastating condemnation of capitalist society

As one would expect, Mélenchon uses material that gives a devastating condemnation of capitalist society, especially on the effects it is having on human existence, and the consequences of global polarisation which has taken place. During the COVID-19 pandemic a new billionaire was created every 36 hours while one million more plunged into poverty. Twenty-six billionaires have as much wealth as four billion people! The consequences of modern capitalism on all aspects of life are a devastating critique of it as a social system. Around 250 million people on the verge of starvation. And there are 12,000 deaths a year because of noise pollution. The explosion in night work, often flowing from “just in time” production, results in less sleep for millions of workers. In France, four million employees work at night – one in five employees, twice as many as in 1990. It has led to workers having a higher chance of contracting multiple illnesses from cancer to cardiac decease. And12 million people in France cannot adequately heat their homes. Over 2,000 people die on the streets every year in France. In the US, in 2023, one million people experienced homelessness for the first time. In the US, suicide rates amongst nurses are twice the national average due to stress and pressures of the work. Globally nine million deaths per year are due to air pollution. One can conclude as he does that “capitalism is unsustainable”.   

The material Mélenchon draws on regarding the climatic and environmental crises is apocalyptic. By 2030, 50% of the world’s population will be living in regions facing water shortages. Already two billion people have no secure access to drinking water. Six billion have access to a mobile phone but only 4.5 billion have access to a toilet. In France, two million people have difficulty accessing drinking water due to rising bills. Water wars, mass migration of millions are all poised to surge.

Mélenchon poses the need for a revolution. However, there are numerous holes in his bucket. He does not explain the social character of the revolution necessary to replace capitalism. Crucially, he diminishes the central role of the working class in the revolution or what character a revolution needs to assume to defeat and replace capitalism. Mélenchon wrongly asserts that the struggle between “proletarians and bourgeois has been fought”. Thus, by implication it is over. Historically it has and is being fought but not yet to a conclusion.

Today, Mélenchon asserts, is the era of “the people”. This is leading or has led to “citizens” revolutions. The struggle is between “them and us”. In this argument, Mélenchon reverts to the terminology of the bourgeois democratic revolution in France in 1789. Tellingly, Mélenchon takes pride quoting one of his heroes, Maximilien Robespierre, (leader of the Jacobins in the bourgeois revolution) rather than drawing on others, for example, Gracchus Babeuf and the ‘Conspiracy of Equals’ (1796) which attempted an uprising of plebians against the rising bourgeoisie. Mélenchon quotes from Robespierre’s speech to the Jacobin Club in 1792, “I am of the people, I have never been anything but that, I want to be nothing but that; I despise anyone who purports to be something more”. Mélenchon has tried to follow this example, he says. He has been congratulated by commuters on the Paris Metro for travelling by public transport.

In Mélenchon’s only reference to socialism in the book, he claims the “citizens” revolution, “Does not mean the old socialist revolution. A term that can longer be mentioned in case anyone gets frightened.” Although Mélenchon concedes that some of the issues and tasks in today’s “citizens” revolutions are the same.

Mélenchon does not exclude the working class, or deny its existence, but sees it as only one component of “the people”. Central to his conclusion is the changed composition of the working class. He points to the growth of the “precariat” and that the working class has become “dispersed”. Thus, he concludes, it constitutes “the people” and he draws wrong conclusions from this.

At first glance this may appear correct given the massive concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the 1%, as opposed to the rest of society; the growth of the precariat; and increased exploitation of large sections of the petty bourgeoisie. Yet “the people” is not a homogeneous group. Within it are many layers and varied classes.

The issue is which class within “the people” can play the decisive, leading role to overthrow capitalism, take society forward and establish an alternative social system – socialism. It is the working class, with its cohesion and collective class consciousness. This is the case even when it is in a minority, as it was in the 1917 Russian revolution. It is the working class, with the support of others exploited by capitalism, which can play this role.

Behind Mélenchon’s idea here is the crucial question of the weakened position of the traditional industrial proletariat, and the changed composition of the working class especially in Europe, Latin America and the US. He does not comment on the explosive growth of the industrial working class in other areas of the world, such as some parts of Asia, especially China, India, Indonesia and some other countries.

These are critical questions that Marxists must address in this era. It is undeniable that the de-industrialisation that has taken place in most of Europe, the USA and Latin America have consequentially weakened, in some countries substantially, the traditional industrial proletariat. There has also been the growth of the precariat and the emergence of semi-working-class layers from former petty bourgeois sections of society. This has impacted the political situation and the organisations of the working class, especially the trade unions.

This has been combined with the effects of the collapse of the former Stalinist states, which led to a throwing back of political consciousness of the working class and ideological collapse of the ‘left”. Apart from a small minority, the idea of socialism as an alternative social system to capitalism has largely been absent.

This has taken place precisely at the time when capitalism has entered a new era of intense crisis and polarisation; its protracted death agony. We have been in a period where the ruling classes felt themselves unchallenged. This is now changing, as recent struggles and uprisings have shown. The ruling classes today are terrified of any challenge to it from the left, even a relatively soft left as currently exists. They fear the potential of the mass movement behind such left formations, which can threaten ruling class interests and eventually its existence. The ruling class therefore takes every step to attempt to discredit and defeat even relatively mildly left forces for fear of what they may unleash.

“The era of the people”

An explosive but complex situation exists globally. Yet what Mélenchon fails to address in his theory of “the era of the people” is that whilst the traditional industrial proletariat has been weakened, a rapid process of proletarianization of large sections of the middle class and petty bourgeois has also taken place. This has been reflected in former layers of the middle class resorting to strike action and other forms of struggle that previously had been the preserve of the traditional working class in general.

However, this process is still unfolding.  These newly formed layers of the working class or semi working-class have yet to fully develop and embrace the collective class consciousness and methods of struggle of the working class. From this, a socialist political consciousness can develop. The emergence of these layers poses important challenges for the workers’ movement, especially the trades unions, of how to organise them. It poses above all the need to transform the trades unions into fighting combat organisations. 

At the same time, those sections of the traditional working class that remain, although weakened, can still play a decisive role. Potentially they remain a very powerful force even with diminished numbers. For example, sectors of workers in transport, health, utilities and some industries that still exist in some countries.

The new layers of the working class, the precariat, and other semi-proletarianised layers (which is very sizable in major cities like London or Paris) reflect a certain plebian character, at this stage, for example amongst sections of “self-employed” workers. New challenges are posed of how to organise these layers. The character of these sections of society has been reflected politically.

These layers along with parts of the petty bourgeoisie, have tended to dominate the new “radical left” that emerged, for example, in PODEMOS in Spain, Syriza in Greece, La France Insoumise in France or the Corbynistas in Britain. This, combined with the character of the leadership of these movements, most of which had previously collapsed ideologically and abandoned raising the issue of socialism, is reflected in the programme and methods of organisation of these movements. In the main, they have not actively involved, at this stage, large layers of the organised working class.

These movements are extremely significant and important. But it is essential to recognise their limitations and what their character. They can be a part of the process of rebuilding the political organisations of the working class but are unfinished and it has been, and is, uncertain how they will develop. Some like PODEMOS or Syriza have, in effect, been absorbed into acting as managers of capitalism.

The development of these organisations reflects a growing polarisation and anger in society. A mood against the elite, the oligarchs, neo-liberalism and sometimes against capitalism itself, exists in many countries. A burning anger about the state of the world is reflected with a hatred of the ruling elite in many countries. Yet thus far, these organisations politically have mainly reflected radical left populist ideas. In organisational form they have been more of a “movement” rather than a party. They have not yet been mass workers’ parties with a socialist programme. They have reflected the social character of those involved and the leadership. Mélenchon is clear about this. He is opposed to a “party.” He defends the building of a looser, more amorphous “movement”. This is not something totally new in France and some other countries. Amongst some layers in the past, the idea that the mass movement is everything has existed. It is all powerful! With the programme and polices and how a the left is organised to struggle has been brushed aside as secondary.  

The idea of a movement rather than a party can appears very democratic and is often a reaction to the decay of the old organisations, namely their lack of democracy, and the careerism, corruption and selling out to the capitalist order. But movements without real democratic structures, not just occasional referenda, can in fact give the ‘leader’ or leadership unfettered powers if the ‘movements’ rank and file have no means to democratically debate and decide issues while controlling what is done. On-line plebiscites and comment are not a substitute for real debate and discussion in meetings where a full exchange of ideas can take place.

These trends are a part of the era recently which has thus far ideologically been dominated by populism, of the left and the right. Mélenchon reflects this. Through experience of struggle – industrially, socially and politically – this period of populism will change. Possibly very quickly. However, the historical processes cannot be truncated; there are no short cuts, particularly in revolutionary politics.

The current political process in France has many lessons for the international situation which are reflected in Mélenchon’s ideas. The recent mass protests and strikes, involving millions against the government, show how Macron’s regime has little or no social base to rest upon. The polarisation in French society is reflected in the paralysis in the National Assembly. It is currently split three ways between the hard right-wing Rassemblement National (RN), led by Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, the left led by La France Insoumise, and the rump of supporters of Macron’s increasingly lame duck Presidency.

The new government has been compelled to postpone Macron’s pension reform and survived a vote of no confidence as the Partie Socialiste (PS) social democracy split and a section of it propped up the fragile government. For how long remains to be seen. Not surprisingly many commentators now conclude that France is now “ungovernable.” In other words, bourgeois democracy is no longer able to provide a stable, reliable government for the ruling class. This is part of a revolutionary process.

Threat from Rassemblement National 

The current political crisis is the culmination of an unfolding process in France like what has taken place in many other countries. In France, in a sense, it began at the beginning of the century. The first indication of what was to come was in 2002 when Jean-Marie Le Pen from the far- right FN (Front National, now known as the Rassemblement National since its 2018 rebranding) reached the run- off in the Presidential elections. Then Le Pen was overwhelmingly defeated as millions held their noses and voted for the bourgeois candidate, Jacques Chirac, to defeat Le Pen. In the run-off, Chirac won 82% of the vote in round two.  Yet it was a warning. When Jean-Marie Le Pen’s daughter, Marine Le Pen, leading RN, reached the second round in 2022, she won 41% of the vote!

However, the 2002 elections were also marked by another aspect of the process. The traditional parties of the French left, the bourgeoisified Partie Socialiste, and the Parti Communiste Francais, were humiliated. The PS scrambled together 16.8% of the vote and the PCF 3.37%! These two parties, it must be remembered, had been the two solid pillars of the left in France since the end of the second world war. Until the late 1970s, the PCF was winning between 20% and 25% of the vote. In 1980 it still had 500,000 members.

The PCF’s rigid Stalinist programme and methods allowed the PS, after a makeover in 1969, to develop as the larger of the two. By the late 1970s, the PS, led by Francois Mitterand, had swung to the left, forming the ‘Union of the Left’ with the PCF. This alliance swept to power in 1981 with Mitterrand’s election to the Presidency on a radical left reformist programme. Amongst other things, the Mitterrand government promised to take over large sections of the economy and a “rupture with capitalism”.

The rupture with capitalism never came. Confronted with a flight of capital, attacks from the bond markets, and a furious campaign by the French bourgeoisie, the government capitulated. It declared a “parenthesis” – a “temporary holt” in its radical reform. Yet “temporary” became permanent and its radical left programme was abandoned.

Although wining a second term in 1988, Mitterrand returned to the Elyse Palace on a far less radical programme. Following this betrayal, the PS and the PCF shifted further to the right. Over a period, their historic base of support was eroded.

The international process of the bourgeoisification of the former bourgeois workers’ parties like the PS rapidly took place and was accelerated by the collapse of the former Stalinist states in 1991/2. This eventually resulted in the decimating of the PS and the PCF as the main parties of the French left.

2002 however was not only marked by the FN getting into the second round. The thirst for a radical socialist alternative to the left of the PS and PCF was also reflected in this election. While the PS was reduced to a mere 16.17%, eight other left or Green parties combined won 29% of the vote. Amongst them was 5.72% won by the Trotskyist Arlette Laguiller of Lutte Ouvriere and 4.24% for the USFI French section, the Ligue Communiste Revolutionaire, headed by Olivier Besancenot. These forces were however incapable of capitalising on this opportunity due to a combination of ultra-leftism and opportunism and the complex world objective situation at that time.

The traditional parties of both left and right saw an erosion of their social base. This opened a massive political vacuum and social chasm. This was couple with economic de-industrialisation and destruction of entire communities, especially in northern France, which were once bastions of the PCF.

The FN, and then as the revamped RN, were able to step into the vacuum, appealing to some of the most oppressed layers of the French working class, often using rhetoric previously used by the left, as well as fostering racism. The obliteration of the PS was reflected in the 2017 elections. Its presidential candidate won a mere 6% of the vote. By 2022, this fell even further to a humiliating 2% of the vote! Macron capitalised on the situation and took 66% of the vote against Le Pen in the run-off in 2017. Today Macron’s approval ratings stand at between 7 and 17%!

The LFI also gained from the collapse of the PS and traditional French left. Enter Jean-Luc Mélenchon. He was born in Tangiers, in today’s Morocco, in 1951, of Spanish and Sicilian decent. He moved to France in 1962. There Mélenchon joined a Trotskyist group, Organisational Communiste Internationaliste, led by Pierre Lambert. This group conducted “deep entryism” within the PS, generally hiding Marxist politics. Parts of this grouping is now in the La France Insoumise.  Mélenchon maintains links with the OCI’s successor organisations, recently attending one Congress of theirs. Yet this does not mean that today Mélenchon ever speaks of ‘socialism’. When he joined the PS, he became associated with the Mitterrand wing of the party. The party later lurched to the right, and Mélenchon eventually split and formed the parti de Gauche (PG), the Left Party, in 2009, following the global financial crisis of 2008.

Mélenchon concluded that social democracy was historically finished, and he eventually launched La France Insoumise (LFI) in 2016. Having launched the parti de Gauche, Mélenchon has taken a step back when launching the LFI. He insists the LFI is not a party but a “movement” reflecting the new “era of the people” and the “citizens” revolution. He draws upon the experience not only of PODEMOS in Spain but also of the movements in Latin America, especially in Ecuador and Venezuela. This was at the early stage of the revolutionary process of Hugo Chavez’s ‘Bolivarian revolution’ rather than during the “socialist” rhetoric that Chavez took up following the attempted coup in 2002 to oust him from power.

Mélenchon sees these revolutionary movements, and others, like the Arab Spring, and mass revolts in recent years in Chile, Sri Lanka and other countries, as part of the process of “citizens revolutions”.

Mélenchon is right to take inspiration from these movements, as illustrating the revolutionary potential that is present in the new era of capitalism. However, Mélenchon fails to draw conclusions from them. These mass movements are just left hanging as models of the new “citizens” revolutions. Significantly Mélenchon is silent about why all of these movements either hit a wall or were defeated.

A rigid stages approach to revolutionary processes 

Mélenchon divides the revolutionary process into three rigidly separate stages. The “destituent”, the “instituent” and finally the “constituent”. The “destituent” tears down the old order. The “instituent” establishes “the people” as the main actor, and finally the “constituent” creates new institutions to rule. The “constituent” phase of the revolution, according to Mélenchon, flows from the “destituent” process and ends up calling for a constituent assembly.

The mass revolutionary upsurges Mélenchon refers to, indeed all revolutions, do unfold through different phases. However, a mechanical, rigid separation of them is not what is involved in a revolutionary process. Each constitute a part of a process. The crucial issue posed, however, is whether an alternative power is built to replace the state machine of the old order through which the ruling class ruled. How is capitalist rule to be ended and what social system is to replace it, are the central issues posed. What is Mélenchon’s objective – a “citizens revolution” of what and for what? To be successful in ending capitalist rule a revolutionary socialist programme, organisation and party is necessary to advocate the concrete steps needed to achieve that goal.

These were lacking in the “citizens” revolutions that Mélenchon draws upon and explains why they ultimately failed and the capitalist order remained in power.  He lays great stress on one aspect of these movements, the emergence of the assemblies in neighbourhoods or localities which took place. These, by implication, Mélenchon sees as the emerging alternative power. Although in some countries like Sudan during the revolutionary movements that began in 2019, committees were established, they did not link up and become the basis for a genuine workers’ and poor people’s government. In other recent mass movements in Sri Lanka, Chile and elsewhere, there were gatherings of neighbours or protesters, but these did not develop. Mélenchon includes the Gilets Jaunes, Yellow Vest movement in France, in the same category.

Those developments were very significant. Yet they were also unstructured, amorphous, lacking a clear programme and democratic structure. In essence, they fizzled out and dissolved. Those who played the most militant role were edged aside. They were not the basis for an alternative state power which could confront and replace the existing state of the ruling capitalist classes.

They were not comparable to the soviets in revolutionary Russia in 1917 or the Cordones Industriales in Chile in 1972/3. These were elected councils of workers, subject to recall. These were organs of struggle and the basis for a new state to be constructed. Mélenchon conflates two different forms of organisation, (or lack of it in one instance), into one. In arguing as he does, Mélenchon reveals how detached he is from these events and romanticises them – a fatal mistake for a revolutionary. The CWI analysed in detail and participated in these events (see: The Constituent Assembly and Other Questions Arising from the Recent Uprisings in Latin America | Socialist World Media and Sri Lanka crisis: What is to be done? | Socialist World Media)

In the revolutionary movements which erupted in Chile, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere in recent decades, the working class was present but not as a consciously organised collective force leading the revolutionary uprisings. The movements were multi-class, often dominated by semi-proletarian or petty bourgeois layers, and often with a plebian populist character. This was reflected in the form of organisation and programme they adopted. Of course, this varied in different countries. In some, the trade unions played a more decisive role, for example in Ecuador and Tunisia. But the character of these movements, the absence of organisation and lack of a clear political programme were important common elements.  The failure to overcome these obstacles resulted in all these movements eventually hitting a wall or being defeated.

The changed composition of the working class in many countries, de-industrialisation, and absence of the massive factories upon which the soviets or cordones were based, means that these forms of organisations are unlikely to be repeated in exactly the same way in many countries. Other mass forms of organisation however will need to emerge and be built that can play the same role.

Committees of struggle elected in the workplaces, linking together with community or neighbourhood organisations, with a structure, and elected delegates subject to recall, in some form, will be necessary. And with a revolutionary socialist programme, together with a party of the working class and poor, will be essential for any revolutionary movement to be successful and to overthrow the capitalist regimes.

The social urban movements are a crucial component today in the neo-colonial world and the need to link them together with the working class is an important task. The explosion of the urban population has brought with it an army of the urban poor, and street vendors and the like.  This issue is now also present in many industrialised countries, albeit in a somewhat different form. For example, as seen in the movement against housing evictions in Spain.

However, the structures of the organs of struggle are not enough. A party of the working class and poor is necessary to argue the case for a socialist revolution and the concrete steps needed to achieve that goal in opposition to the pro-capitalist and confused currents that reject such a course. It is necessary to advocate an alternative social system, socialism, and give this content to confront capitalist rule. Mélenchon unfortunately fails to do this.

This is one of the crucial lessons to take from the revolutionary upsurges which have taken place. Lessons from the Paris Commune in 1871 are possibly instructive of what can possibly emerge. Mélenchon refers to 1789 and the Parisian sans-culottes ‘sections’ in 1792. But he negates any reference to the experience of 1871 when an alternative state did briefly take power. In his book Mélenchon draws a comparison with the neighbourhood assemblies, the sans-culottes ‘sections’, and the soviets in 1917. However, they are totally different in composition, role and potential.

The formlessness of the concept of “the movement” rather than party has been expressed by Mélenchon in relation to the LFI, which he has literally referred to as ‘gaseous’ (a cloud). It flows from his idea of the “era of the people” and “citizens revolutions”.

The current crisis in France has led La France Insoumise to call for the ending of the 5th Republic and the convening of a 6th Republic. Mélenchon has taken up one of the demands of the ‘gilet jaunes’ (Yellow Vests) for an ending of the “monarchical excesses” of the Presidency and more powers to the National Assembly in which “citizens” can propose their own referendums. France has had 15 constitutions since 1789. A call to end the 5th Republic however needs to be linked with the idea of not merely a political change to the bourgeois constitution but for a new social system – socialism. Something the LFI and Mélenchon do not explicitly demand despite sharp denunciations of capitalism.

Consumerism and ‘endless economic growth’

One of his attacks on capitalism centres on the issue of economic growth. He denounces social democracy for capitulating to the idea of consumerism and endless economic growth. The idea of “degrowth” is expressed in different forms by sections of the “new left” internationally. He rightly argues that unfettered growth and consumerism under capitalism is incompatible with sustaining the world’s eco-system. He gives illuminating examples of the waste contained within capitalism production. A television in the 1980s worked on average for 11 years. Now it lasts for only six years. The life span of a personal computer has been cut by 66% from 10 years in 1990 to a mere three years today.

The ravages of the food industry Mélenchon exposes brutally. In France, 50 million male chicks and 20 million female ducklings are deemed useless for production purposes. They are therefore crushed alive, as soon as they are born, every year.

Yet implicit is his argumentation against capitalist growth and consumerism is the idea of de-growth or zero growth to protect the environment. Under a democratic socialist plan of production, the waste and capitalist consumerism would be eliminated. Planned growth, in harmony with the planetary eco-system would not only be entirely possible but necessary.

One issue historically in Mélenchon’s analysis that is flawed is his assertion that leaps in the population give rise to a systemic social change or social changes. The rate of human population has dramatically accelerated. It took 300,000 years for the number of humans to reach 1 billion – close to the start of the industrial era around 1820. Yet one hundred years later there were two billion more. The second billion arrived 3,000 times faster than the first billion. Now there is an extra billion every 12 years or so. After 2100 the population is estimated to fall, he concludes, too late.

Yet the issue is not only the size of the human population but the social system. Mélenchon claims that every time the population doubles there is a change in the “human condition”, or we can assume social conditions and system. There is an element of truth in this. Rapid population growth is a factor in the process of changing social conditions and even systems. However, it is not the only factor, and the opposite can also occur. A change or development in the social system progressively can lead to a population growth. Likewise, a fall in the population can also result in a fundamental social change. The “black death” in Europe between 1346-1353 killed an estimated 50 million people, nearly 50% of Europe’s population at the time. However, it resulted in a weakening and change in feudalism. Conditions for the peasants improved, arising from a massive labour shortage. The changes within feudalism, at the time, helped pave the way for the development of early capitalism later.

After a devastating critique of capitalism what at the end is Mélenchon’s conclusion? He calls for a break with the existing world order and for a new direction in human history that “does not lock the future into any preconceived model.” He calls for “virtue” which must be based on equality. But how? His answer is “creolisation”. A term which originated in the Caribbean, where contact between different groups led to the formation of new languages. By “creolisation” he means a process whereby cultures, languages, and people mix to create something new. This, Mélenchon concludes, is the future of “humanity which is soaring to new heights”.

Yet to achieve this a clear alternative social system to capitalism – socialism – is necessary. Capitalism can offer no way forward for society. It is dragging society backwards now with powerful features of social disintegration and decay present. Any new left party needs to include the idea of socialism as part of its objectives and programme. Yet to have it written into its constitution is not enough. It is essential to explain what it means and to fight for it.

Die Linke (Left Party) in Germany includes socialism in its objectives but fails to campaign for it or explain what it means. It is quite possible in Britain that ‘Your Party,’ when it is finally established, will include reference to ‘socialism’ as its objective. To be successful it must go further, and explain what it is and link it to the day to day demands and needs of the working class and what programme is necessary to achieve it. To achieve socialism a clear understanding of the role of the working class, and all other classes in society, the methods of struggle, programme, and organisation necessary to achieve it is essential. Despite the central and decisive role that La France Insoumise is playing today, unfortunately Mélenchon lacks clarity on these critical questions, as outlined in his book, despite the importance of the issues he raises.

Now the people – Revolution in the 21st century’  by Jean-Luc Mélenchon

The ‘Crisis of Democratic Capitalism’, Review By Sean Figg

“Democratic capitalism” is in crisis, warns Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, in his new book. Such is the severity of this crisis its very survival is in question. Wolf confirms early on that his oxymoronic “democratic capitalism” is shorthand for “free-market capitalism” in which “markets, competition, private economic initiative, and private property” are central. With the economy secured from genuine democratic control by these economic ‘capitalist first principles’, the “democracy” Wolf fears for is the existing parliamentary and presidential systems in Europe and North America, which Wolf calls “liberal democracy”, based on “universal suffrage” and “representative democracy”.

Wolf’s alarm for the future of “democratic capitalism” is significant. He is a far-sighted representative of the ruling capitalist classes, described as “staggeringly well-connected within the elite circles” for whom the FT is written. Wolf has been a leading figure in the World Economic Forum in Davos for nearly a quarter century and has boasted that “I don’t know if there’s any significant central banker I don’t know”.  In Democratic Capitalism, he explores a whole number of vital questions about the future of world capitalism and it is not possible to deal with all of them in a review article. Ultimately, he is grappling with what the CWI has referred to as “the convergent multiple crises” of the system, and, in particular, reflecting on the decline of US imperialism and the certainties its world dominance, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, gave to the capitalist classes of the major imperialist powers in Europe and North America.

Crisis of Confidence

The 2007/08 world economic crisis profoundly shook the confidence of the capitalist classes in the West. Nearly fifteen years later, for many, Wolf included, shaken confidence has mutated into a far more profound crisis of confidence. He laments his complacency post-2007/08. Referencing his 2014 book dealing with the crisis, “I was wrong”, he apocalyptically tells us, “the fire is not next time; it is now. Moreover, COVID and the impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine has made it burn even hotter.” Wolf has written Democratic Capitalism in acknowledgement of the deepening alarm across the capitalist classes for the future of their system and to provide answers to them on the way forward.

The FT’s own laudatory review of Democratic Capitalism went so far as to promise that it would not be “too much of a stretch to see Martin Wolf … as a modern Marx.” It is true that Wolf is familiar with Marxism and, up to a point, influenced by it. At Oxford University Wolf studied under Marxist economist, Andrew Glyn, a supporter of Militant, forerunner of the Socialist Party (the CWI in England & Wales). Wolf recognised his debt to Glyn by speaking at his funeral. This influence creeps into Democratic Capitalism, with Wolf, for example, reproducing a long quote from the Communist Manifesto, which he describes as “one of the most important documents of the nineteenth century”, commenting that Marx and Engels “described the emerging capitalist economy brilliantly”. However, while willing to borrow at times from Marx’s ideas, Wolf rejects his revolutionary conclusions and a conscious anti-revolutionary thread runs through Democratic Capitalism. This reflects that for Wolf the problem of reforming capitalism to avoid the threat of revolution is very much alive, as it always is for serious representatives of the capitalist class.

Central to the capitalist classes’ crisis of confidence has been the rise of Donald Trump from 2016 and the strengthening of right-wing populism in a whole number of countries, fuelling political instability in what Wolf had considered, until now, the “consolidated democracies”. Within the opening pages of Democratic Capitalism, Wolf is railing at Trump for having “no ideological attachments to liberal democracy or free-market capitalism.” For Wolf the rise of Trump was seminal and confirmed that the capitalist classes face a crisis of political representation. It is becoming harder and harder, across the advanced capitalist countries, for them to find stable political parties capable of forming governments to rule in their interests.

The rise of China, whose rulers have, he points out, “rejected the link between capitalism and democracy”, is the international background to Wolf’s “crisis of democratic capitalism”. “The ascent of China” has, he correctly says, “shaken the confidence of the West and confidence in the West”. Wolf compares the situation today to the ‘golden age’ enjoyed by “democratic capitalism” from the 1990s. In just five years, between 1989 and 1994, according to the Polity IV database, which he cites, the number of capitalist democracies increased from 48 to 76. This was largely due to the creation of newly independent states as the Soviet Union broke up, and, in Eastern Europe and parts of Africa and Asia, the ending of one-party dictatorships that had looked toward it as a model. Thereafter, according to Wolf, capitalist democracy’s advance continued, but slowed, reaching 97 countries by 2016. This period, at least up to the 2008 crisis, was the era of capitalist globalisation dominated by US imperialism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the discrediting of its bureaucratically planned economy under one-party totalitarian rule, US “democratic capitalism” stood, briefly, as an unrivalled economic and political model.

Wolf believes that a global “democratic recession” has now set in. Whilst the number of autocracies is not increasing as it did in previous eras of capitalist crisis, such as the 1920s and 1930s, there are more leaders of capitalist countries, who, like Trump, do not feel the need to profess a commitment to US-style “liberal democracy”. Wolf, correctly, names Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Hungary’s Victor Orban, Poland’s Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and India’s Narendra Modi as examples. Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could also be added to the list. Wolf also observes that the number of what Polity IV terms “anochracies”, i.e. ‘failed states’ of the sort that have proliferated across the Middle East and North Africa, is rising – from 21 in 1984 to 49 in 2016.

Wolf exaggerates the 1990s ‘golden age’ of “democratic capitalism”. In a number of countries “capitalist democracy” was short-lived. In many more the formal adoption of multi-party elections, universal suffrage and greater democratic freedoms did not transform them overnight. Especially in the neo-colonial world political repression remained significant despite their formal introduction. Nevertheless, Wolf’s “democratic recession” describes something real. It is one important reflection of the decline of US imperialism which is no longer the unrivalled model on the world stage and is no longer able to play the same role in underdeveloped neo-colonial states of propping-up governments to contain centrifugal social forces – often by the most anti-democratic methods.

System Undermined

Wolf recognises that his “crisis of democratic capitalism” is “in substantial part the ignition of the slow-burning anger left by the last financial and economic crisis [in 2008], coming, as that did, after a long period of mediocre performance…”. The stagnation of capitalism has meant stagnant and falling incomes for the working and middle class across advanced capitalist countries. Wolf gives useful figures showing that between 2005 and 2014, 65-70% of households in “high-income countries” had “flat or falling real incomes”. In the UK the figure was 70%, in the US 81%, and in Italy a staggering 97%. He also gives figures to show the devastating impact of the 2007/08 World Economic Crisis on growth in GDP per head. By 2018, taking the 1990-2007 trend as the starting point, a trend which Wolf describes as “feeble” to begin with, people in France were 13% poorer than they otherwise would have been, in the US people were 17% poorer, in the UK and Italy 22% and in Spain 24%. Only Germany kept pace with the previous period. The Covid-19 pandemic has now accelerated the shortfall to 32% in Spain and the UK, 28% in Italy and 21% in the US. Alongside this, inequality has exploded and the very top of society has enjoyed a phenomenal accumulation of wealth.

Wolf continues, “People expect the economy to deliver reasonable levels of prosperity and opportunity to themselves and their children. When it does not, relative to those expectations, they become frustrated and resentful. That is what has happened. Many people in high-income countries condemn the global capitalism of the past three or four decades for these disappointing outcomes. Instead of delivering prosperity and steady progress, it has generated soaring inequality, dead-end jobs, and macroeconomic instability.” To this could be added deepening polarisation between the classes. Wolf concludes that “The legitimacy of any system always depends on performance. In the end, people will cease to trust a system that does not work for them.”

Wolf links this basically correct point to the strengthening of right-wing populism. However, he does so in a one-sided way. He glosses over the fact that in the years immediately following the 2008 economic crisis left movements, with elements of populism, were also strengthened. In a number of countries the left advanced further than today’s right-wing populists have yet achieved – for example, Corbynism in the UK and the Syrizia party in Greece. Disappointments in the failures of left-wing populism and ‘soft’ left reformism have now, in a number of countries, reinforced the vacuum of working-class political representation. The weakness of the workers’ movement and the absence of mass working-class parties is the decisive factor in creating the political space for right-wing populism to exploit the anger of working-class and middle-class people.

Solutions

Wolf recognises that the survival of “democratic capitalism” hinges on reigniting stagnant economies to broadly raise living standards. For this, Wolf says, “We need a radical and courageous reform of the capitalist economy”. He calls for a “New” New Deal offering a “rising, widely shared and sustainable standard of living”. His summary of possible policy changes on welfare spending, unemployment benefits, pensions, student debt etc., not only remain firmly within the framework of capitalism, as is to be expected, but do not go beyond the current limited debates, especially those in the US and UK, and even then, Wolf fails to advocate specific policies. Minimum wages should be raised, but not so high they fuel unemployment. A universal basic income is a bad idea, he believes, but a universal job guarantee is a good one, though he does not propose how it could be implemented. Wolf wants changes to corporate incentives and executive pay and to curb corporate influence on politics. But his only specific proposal is to make the cost of independent corporate audits part of the listing fee on stock markets. Wolf wants more competition but does not say how this might be engendered beyond a general call for governments to “invest”.

Everything Wolf puts forward to reigniting economic growth and underpin his “New” New Deal is some version of Keynesian ‘demand management’. Further, there is not a single new idea. Wolf runs through a list of possibilities that have been the staple of debates in the capitalist media for years: redistribution of incomes to those “who will spend rather than save”, negative savings rates, so-called “helicopter money” transfers, a 100% tax credit for fixed investment, running-up government deficits through “some combination of tax cuts and higher spending” etc.

Having laid out the possibilities, Wolf asks, “So, which of all these alternatives, or what combination, makes sense? The answer is that any of them might do so. They are also all risky.” At this point, it is easy to imagine a collective face-palm from capitalist policy makers at this non-answer. Perhaps Wolf did imagine it when he defensively says, “There exist a host of proposals for dramatic actions, many of which seem to suggest we can find magic wands able to deliver an upsurge in sustainable prosperity. This is unlikely.” He then admits “sadly, we understand only a little about economic growth.”

Wolf’s proposals are a timid Goldilocks pic ‘n’ mix – not too little of this, nor not too much of that; maybe this, or maybe that. They completely fail to live up to his call for “radical and courageous reform of the capitalist economy”. He tries to justify this in his references to the anti-Marxist ideas of Karl Popper, the mid-twentieth-century philosopher, who, like Wolf, championed “liberal democracy” while claiming that Marxism inevitably led to totalitarianism. Wolf’s own “approach to reform”, he tells us, “is that of “piecemeal social engineering”, as recommended by Popper, “not the revolutionary overreach that has so often brought calamity”. Here Wolf tries to reassure the ruling class by making a virtue of necessity. It is also an attempt to lower their expectations, sweetening this bitter pill with an anti-revolutionary flourish.

Capitalism & Democracy

Wolf insists that the capitalist class is the foremost defender and champion of “democracy”. This requires ignoring the existence of capitalist dictatorships and semi-dictatorships across the neo-colonial world, many of which are supported by Wolf’s ‘democratic capitalists’. It also requires ignoring what is happening in many “consolidated democracies”. President Macron in France, for example, used anti-democratic presidential powers to push pension reforms through parliament regardless of majority opposition. In the UK, new ID requirements for voting have been introduced which will make it harder for many to vote and new anti-strike laws have been proposed.

The struggle for democratic rights and the greatest possible democracy under capitalism has always been central to the class struggle. It has been at the heart of recent revolutions and mass movements in the neo-colonial world, for example in Chile, Sudan, Myanmar, Iran and Eswatini. In this era, democratic questions can and will play a central role, even in the “consolidated democracies” of Europe and North America, as they have in previous periods, such as the civil rights movement in the US in the 1960s. The strikers in France, fighting the attack on pensions, found themselves forced to take up democratic questions in order to respond to Macron.

A regime of “universal suffrage” and “representative democracy” poses a constant dilemma for the infinitesimally small capitalist class: how to prevent the working class from using its crushing numerical majority to challenge its ownership and control of the economy. The capitalist class can never form a government with their own handful of votes. Indeed, they do not generally form governments staffed from their own ranks at all. Bankers are busy running banks, industries, factories etc. Capitalists have little interest in governing directly. They know, with exceptions here and there, like Trump, that they cannot be the ‘face’ of the system. The capitalists must find a social base within the middle class and sections of the working class, on whose votes they can rely, and from which a reliable cadre of pro-capitalist politicians can be elevated.

When the capitalists succeed in this, Lenin described capitalist democracy as “the best possible political shell for capitalism, and, therefore, once capital has gained possession of this very best shell, it establishes its power so securely, so firmly, that no change of persons, institutions or parties in the bourgeois-democratic republic can shake it.” Capitalist democracy, in ‘normal times’, Lenin explains, “stealthily shoves aside the poor and is therefore hypocritical and false…”. Wolf unintentionally confirms this point when he describes how “Wealth is also a source of power. Shareholder control over companies gives direct economic power. Wealth exercises influence via philanthropy, ownership of media, and so forth. But wealth also has a powerful direct influence over politics, by funding parties, supporting candidates, buying political advertising, promoting political causes, and paying for lobbying. Thus, high levels of wealth inequality will … corrode a democratic polity.”

Wolf may feign alarm at how capitalism has come to undermine “democracy”. But this has always been the case. Lenin actually anticipated the standard blind spot of capitalist ‘democrats’, saying that the “restrictions, exclusions, exceptions, obstacles for the poor” to participate in capitalist democracy “seem petty, especially in the eyes of anyone who has never known want himself and never been in close contact with the oppressed classes…” This sums-up Wolf’s general attitude.

Marxists would more precisely call “liberal democracy”, bourgeois, or capitalist, democracy, to indicate its contradictory character. In answer to the anti-democratic manoeuvres of the capitalist class and its political representatives, the working class must utilise to the full every democratic space it has prised open within capitalism, defend historic gains whilst pointing to their limits and demanding these be extended, and call out the hypocrisy of the capitalist class as they resist. The social weight of the working class, whilst felt by the capitalist class as an anti-democratic pressure on them, is simultaneously the greatest check on the rolling back of historic democratic conquests.

But during periods of prolonged economic crisis, the precarious equilibrium between the classes that capitalist democracy requires to function in ‘normal’ times is disrupted. Trotsky explained that “the rate of a [capitalist] democracy’s development and its stability is in inverse ratio to the tension of class contradictions.” The cumulative effect of the economic crisis of the past fifteen years, and before, has been to ratchet up class tensions across Wolf’s “consolidated democracies”. This is the material foundation of the ruling class’s crisis of political representation. It is the rupture between the capitalist class and the middle class in particular, in the context of a vacuum of working-class political representation, which has strengthened right-wing populism with destabilising consequences for the capitalist class’s control of society. This is what has moved Wolf to alarm, not a belated realisation of the anti-democratic character of capitalism.

Anti-Democrat

Throughout his book, Wolf shows a high level of (capitalist) class consciousness on the role of “liberal democracy”. However he might try and prettify it, Wolf is conscious that it is capitalist democracy that he wants to strengthen, and, in reality, embraces the idea that “democratic capitalism” should “stealthily shove aside the poor” from politics. He actually gives space to the consideration of the outlandish proposals of the “philosopher” Jason Brennan of Georgetown University to restrict the franchise to the “better informed”. Although Wolf ultimately dismisses Brennan’s ideas, he resurrects their spirit in his own anti-democratic proposal for appointed “houses of merit” composed of “people of exceptional achievement” who would be given the power to “improve and delay” legislation. These would be akin to the UK’s House of Lords, which Wolf explicitly approves of (albeit not its “current system of appointment” he reassures). “There can be great value”, Wolf tells us, “in unelected senates, properly constructed and run.” Extending the same principle to the US, rather than any proposals to remove the completely undemocratic Electoral College, Wolf would prefer “informed insiders to have a big role in choosing candidates for the presidency.”

Wolf is explicit that the real business of governing capitalist society should be the preserve of its elite. “If the needed reforms [to “democratic capitalism”] are to happen”, he tells us, “elites must play a central role. A complex society without elites is inconceivable.” Twice we are told that “safeguarding the fragile achievements of democratic capitalism” is “the responsibility of elites”. By “elites” Wolf seems to mean privileged middle-class layers whose social position derives from the inequalities of capitalism, thus giving them a stake in its preservation. For example, Wolf’s “houses of merit” should, he says, be composed of “people with exceptional achievement in a wide range of civic activities – the law, national and local politics, public service, business, trade unions, media, academia, education, social work, the arts, literature, sports and so forth.” This is hardly a roll-call of working-class occupations. Taken all together, Wolf’s approach is a stunning confirmation of the hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy. Despite pages of fluff about “restoring citizenship”, “education in civic values”, and “inclusive patriotism” Wolf’s concern is to reconstruct a social base for the capitalist class and carefully reinforce the barriers to genuine democratic control over society.

It was Trotsky, in the context of the 1930s, who warned that “The uncontrollable deterioration in the living conditions of the workers makes it less and less possible for the bourgeoisie to grant the masses the right of participation in political life, even within the limited framework of bourgeois parliamentarism.” Wolf appears to be contemplating how far that needs to be pushed today, given the crisis of capitalism and the limited prospects for improving the living conditions of the masses. For now, he is looking in the direction of what could most generously be described as a technocracy. Albeit one that keeps the slaves well-fed and content, something which is not possible on the basis of capitalism. But how fundamentally different is this to the political regime in China, which Wolf condemns, where the ruling elite of the so-called ‘Communist’ Party decides on behalf of the masses what is in their best interests?

This is a warning to the working class about the direction in which even liberals, like Wolf, can move as capitalism’s crisis grinds on. It would be no great leap from Wolf’s conception of “liberal democracy” to giving support to anti-democratic, even Bonapartist, measures in the name of the ‘greater good of society’, in reality, capitalism. Bonapartism is a phenomenon, described by Marx, in which, in periods of sharp class tension, the capitalist state becomes elevated, allowing it to play a relatively independent role, balancing between the different classes, and factions of classes, locked in struggle. A Bonapartist state need not act exclusively against the working class, as it is not just the tension between classes that intensifies in periods of economic crisis. It is also the tensions within classes too – between the different layers, groups and factions of which they are composed. Bonapartist measures can be used against different wings of the capitalist class too. Wolf, for example, clearly believes that the “rentier capitalists”, i.e. the finance wing of the capitalist class, need to be reined-in.

A product of the strengthening of right-wing populism has been the weakening influence of the capitalist classes over the executives and legislatures of governments in a number of countries. This has required extraordinary interventions from outside. In the US, for example, a section of the ruling class wants Trump permanently removed from the political field and has used the Espionage Act against him. In the UK, the short-lived right-wing Truss government, following its ‘mini-budget’, was made unworkable by a ‘no confidence’ campaign within the ruling class. This included, for example, using the Bank of England, the IMF and US President Biden, to ratchet up the pressure on Truss, first to change course and then to resign. However, the vacuum of working-class political representation is crucial in shaping the calculations of how the ruling class responds to right-wing populism. When faced with a choice, it would rather, at this stage, lean on the right against the left, as, for example, the British ruling class did in its support of Boris Johnson in the 2019 election as the only means to defeat Jeremy Corbyn.

Disorientation

Wolf engages in some ideological soul-searching in Democratic Capitalism. He actually begins the book by returning to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ – the idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 confirmed liberal democracy as the end point of human ideological evolution. Wolf is not the first capitalist ideologue to return to this. Stephen D. King, HSBC’s senior economic advisor, for example, even referred to “the return of history” in the title of his 2017 book covering much the same ground as Democratic Capitalism (see here).

That they return to Fukuyama after nearly thirty-five years confirms what an ideological anchor ‘the end of history’ formed for the capitalist classes. It was a source of self-belief and confidence that allowed an exploiting minority to project the idea that it ruled in the best interests of humanity. Events have smashed that. So why do they keep returning to it? It is because they have nothing new to replace it with. That is why Democratic Capitalism falls so flat. There is no material basis for confidence amongst the capitalist class today. Wolf is like an ageing cynic who revisits the haunts of his youth in a doomed effort to recapture the optimism of earlier times.

It will be no surprise that in re-tracing Fukuyama’s intellectual steps in Democratic Capitalism Wolf arrives at the same ideologically pre-destined conclusion – “democratic capitalism” is still the best possible economic and political system. But in place of Fukuyama’s triumphalism, Wolf is pragmatic, even apologetic, paraphrasing arch-imperialist Winston Churchill to say, “Just as market capitalism is the least bad economic system, so is liberal democracy the least bad political system”.

Democratic Capitalism is ultimately a failure on its own terms. Wolf is trapped by the contradictions of capitalism and has shown no way to overcome them. He does not provide the answers, nor the reassurance to the ruling classes that he set out to. Wolf’s book serves rather as a measure of their disorientation in this era of capitalist crisis and a warning of how they can be prepared to curtail democratic rights, and more, to preserve their rule. It is the social weight of the working class that is the decisive obstacle to the rolling back of previous democratic gains and the decisive social force capable of arresting right-wing populism’s growth. To fully harness this requires organisation, however, adding further urgency to the struggle to build new working-class parties that fight for socialism and genuine democratic control of society.

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