Marxist
Education Portal
Scotland, France and the International – Special International Bulletin of the Committee for a Workers’ International
October 1998
Contents
Chapter 1. ‘A contribution to the Scottish debate’ by Murray Smith (CWI IEC, France) 12 August 1998
Appendix B: General Correspondence Between The CWI And The UIT
Appendix C: Correspondence Between CWI And UIT On Germany
Murray Smith, who originally helped bring fresh forces in France to the CWI, is Scottish by birth. He broke from the CWI not long after this debate.
Abbreviation:
UIT – Unidad de los Trabajadores Internacional – United Workers International
Introduction
This is a special Committee for a Workers’ International bulletin that is available to all members of the International. The issues relate to the debate on Scotland and France and other issues such as the revolutionary party, building the International and regroupment between the existing Trotskyist international organisations.
Murray Smith (France) submitted a document dealing with these and other issues that we publish together with a reply from the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International.
The extensive appendices that are published will give comrades a full background of how our relations with the UIT [Unidad de los Trabajadores Internacional – United Workers International] have unfolded during the last twelve months. This is one of the central questions currently being debated between the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International and the French section.
All of the main issues covered in this bulletin will feature as part of discussion at the forthcoming [1998] 7th World Congress of the Committee for a Workers’ International.
Tony Saunois for the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International.
A Contribution To The ‘Scottish Debate’
By Murray Smith (France, International Executive Committee), 12 August 1998
1. The debate that has developed between the Scottish Executive Committee and the British Executive Committee involves questions of the strategy and tactics for building our sections and the Committee for a Workers’ International today, and building mass parties and a mass international in the future. The debate may have started over Scotland, but it is becoming clearer and clearer, especially after the European School in Leuven, that it has much wider implications. The Scottish comrades are right to say that there are “fundamental differences of approach”, and that “the entire International will benefit from an open debate around these differences”.
2. For revolutionary Marxists, it should be a truism to say that we will not build revolutionary parties by a process of linear development, by simply recruiting to our existing organisations. Revolutionary parties will be built by a process of splits, fusions, realignments, linked to economic and political developments, the class struggle and to the crisis of the workers movement produced by the collapse of Stalinism and the bourgeoisification of the reformist workers’ parties. Just one year ago, at the European School in Ghent, Peter Taaffe summed this up as follows: “But a new mass International will not develop in a linear fashion. The process will involve fusions, splits and the reassembling of genuine revolutionary forces on an international and national plane” (reprinted in the pamphlet, ‘History of the Committee for a Workers’ International’ by Peter Taaffe). That was hardly the theme of this year’s school in Leuven.
3. This does not of course mean that at each moment in each country we are presented with opportunities for regroupment or for building new parties. In many cases, no doubt the majority at the present time, we only have the possibility of building “arithmetically”, by individual recruitment. But in so doing we are preparing a cadre force and developing our influence in such a way that will enable us in the future to take bold tactical initiatives involving fusions, regroupments, new parties, etc. In the future, as the Scottish comrades point out: “Before emerging as mass revolutionary parties, our sections in every part of the world will at certain stages be forced to participate in and, from time to time, initiate hybrid, transitional and broader formations”. (New Tactics for a New Period para 7).
4. Notwithstanding the wider implications, it is our orientation in Scotland which is at the centre of the debate, so let’s start from that. Are the comrades correct in launching the new Scottish Socialist Party? Is their definition of the new party as “hybrid” valid? And if so what does this mean? Are they going about things in a correct way? How should we deal with the question of links with the Committee for a Workers’ International?
5. The debate over Scotland got off to a very bad start with the first Scottish document. The project of launching the Scottish Socialist Party seemed to be justified more by conjunctural factors (the coming elections) rather than fundamental reasons, there was a lack of precision as to what forces would really be involved, and especially the role of the Committee for a Workers’ International forces in the new party and their relationship with the Committee for a Workers’ International was treated rather superficially. Many comrades in the International were alarmed by this document, particularly the last aspect. However, that was in March. Since then other documents have been written. The British Executive Committee wrote a reply to the first Scottish document. The Scottish comrades then produced: ‘For a Bold Step Forward’ (reply from the British Executive Committee: ‘In Defence of the Revolutionary Party’) and ‘New Tactics for a New Period’ (followed by ‘Reply to New Tactics’ from the British Executive Committee).
6. These documents deal with much broader questions concerning the party, the programme, and the history of the revolutionary movement. The British Executive Committee have charged the Scottish Militant Labour with nothing less than liquidationism and dissolution of our forces and the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International now speak (in their letter of July 10th) of differences over principles, perspectives, programme, and organisational forms. Indeed, they contend, ominously, that the Scottish proposals are “at variance with the principles, perspectives, and programme which have been democratically established as the ideas of the Committee for a Workers’ International”.
7. Neither the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International nor the British Executive Committee have succeeded in justifying these extravagant charges. The reality is that this debate is not between “defenders of Leninism” and “liquidators”. It is between partisans of a conservative and potentially sectarian conception of party-building, which in essence boils down to the linear growth of our own organisations, and those who advocate a more dynamic conception, involving, fusions, regroupments and new parties.
8. The British Executive Committee has reproached the Scottish comrades with choosing to write ‘The Scottish Socialist Party: a Political Justification’ rather than continuing the debate on the points raised in the above-mentioned documents. Quite clearly the Scottish comrades made a choice. They chose to reformulate and re-present their project and their propositions, in my opinion in a much clearer and more thorough way, taking into account criticisms and points made in the debate.
9. That choice was entirely justified and it is quite wrong of the British Executive Committee to claim that “A Political Justification” simply “makes a series of assertions about the strategy proposed by the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee”. What the document does in fact is to present a closely argued case for the Scottish Socialist Party project, with an argumentation rooted in the real situation in Scotland and the real situation of our forces. Taken along with the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s ‘Proposals for progress on the new Scottish turn’ (which are not the Scottish comrades’ final word and are open to debate) this document should have enabled us to take the debate forward. Unfortunately, the British Executive Committee did not take advantage of this opening and chose to reply with a document which like its predecessors, fails to deal with the actual situation in Scotland and simply repeats accusations of liquidationism and dissolution.
10. Nevertheless the issues raised in some of the previous documents are important ones and I will try and take some of them up further on in this document.
The Case for the Scottish Socialist Party
11. In their most recent document, ‘A Political Justification’, and in their contributions at the European School in Leuven, the Scottish comrades have made the case that there is a place for a new Scottish Socialist Party, a space to occupy between a Labour Party in decline and a rising Scottish National Party. They explain that there is a potential audience for such a party, which would be a socialist combat party without immediately adopting all the positions of the Committee for a Workers’ International or being affiliated to it. They explain that there is a political constituency for such a party, among people attracted neither by New Labour nor the Scottish National Party, that this is linked to the stronger socialist and communist tradition in Scotland, and that the new party can rapidly grow. They argue that this party has to have as broad an appeal as possible and that therefore it should comprise the forces of the Alliance and indeed wider forces which would respond positively to the project and could come from the Labour Party, the unions and the Scottish National Party. On the necessity for a new party, the comrades have made a convincing case. The next question is: how to go about it?
12. The British Executive Committee and the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International defend what has come to be known as Option I. The comrades would relaunch Scottish Militant Labour as the Scottish Socialist Party, seeking to recruit from the Alliance and beyond. This has been refused by the Scottish comrades as not enabling us to draw in forces broader than ourselves, and as being sectarian in relation to the forces with which we have worked in the Alliance. In A Political Justification they explain why, in some detail (paragraphs 60 to 73), and there seems no need to repeat the arguments here. But the case has been made and comrades who support Option 1 really have to: a) stop saying that the Scottish comrades haven’t explained why it’s sectarian; and b) reply to their arguments. Something that the latest British Executive Committee Reply to A Political Justification signally fails to do.
13. As for option 2, it is predicated on the existence of broad forces that no one including the British Executive Committee pretends exist at this stage. The British Executive Committee’s reaction to that is that therefore the answer is option 1. There is of course another option: the Scottish option, which unlike option 2 starts from forces that really exist and represents a non-sectarian alternative to option 1. The Scottish Socialist Party would be launched from the present membership of the Scottish Socialist Alliance, without making it a condition that they join the Committee for a Workers’ International, plus our own forces not presently in the Scottish Socialist Alliance, plus other forces who could be attracted by the project. It seems clear that a new party launched from the Alliance with the support of trade unionists, ex-Labour Party, ex-Scottish National Party, would get a bigger echo than a simple relaunch of Scottish Militant Labour. And that it could attract new, fresh forces which we then could win in two ways a) by winning individuals to the Committee for a Workers’ International tendency; but b) and more importantly, by seeking to win the Scottish Socialist Party as a whole to revolutionary positions and to the Committee for a Workers’ International.
14. Would this signify that we are turning towards the old, tired, ex-Labour Party and trade union forces and not towards fresh layers? “Many of those who will be involved in the launching of a Socialist Labour Party will be former Labour Party activists and current trade union activists. But the main political constituency for such a party will not be found among these layers: its potential support is overwhelmingly amongst fresher layers of workers and young people who have never been active in traditional labour movement organisations”.
“The case for a new socialist party is clear. By campaigning for socialist policies it would provide a banner behind which the most class-conscious workers, young people and radical middle-class strata could be mobilised”.
15. Both quotes are from the editorial of ‘Socialism Today’ of December 1995. Replace ‘Socialist Labour Party’ by ‘Scottish Socialist Party’, the argumentation holds good. And in 1998, in Scotland, after a year of Blairism and given the importance of the national question, the potential support for a socialist party should be greater than it was in 1995-96 in Britain as a whole.
16. Will the Scottish Socialist Party be an electoralist party? The above-quoted editorial also explains: “The Socialist Workers Party continues to believe that mass working class support for socialist policies can be won without using election campaigns as a vitally important platform, a vehicle for mass propaganda activity. Scargill is right in suggesting that fielding a credible array of candidates in a general election will be vital to the effectiveness of a new party”. A Political Justification explains that the elections of 1999 are not the most important question, but that they are important. Therefore fielding “a credible array” of socialist candidates for the first Scottish parliamentary elections would also be “vital to the effectiveness” of the Scottish Socialist Party.
17. If comrades are afraid that the Scottish Socialist Party would only be electoralist, on what are their fears based? Since the Scottish Socialist Party will be largely a continuation in a higher form of the Alliance, why should it be less involved in extra-parliamentary campaigns than the Alliance has been? The document ‘Struggle, solidarity and socialism in practice: a report on Scottish Militant Labour and Scottish Socialist Alliance campaigns 1995-98’ devotes four or five times as much space to mass campaigns and industrial work than to elections, and that reflects the reality of Scottish Militant Labour and the Scottish Socialist Alliance over the past period.
18. One of the fundamental arguments of the British Executive Committee is that a party must be either revolutionary or broad, one or the other. At its most caricatural, this is baldly expressed as “‘broader’ and ‘Marxist’ are contradictions” (Reply to New Tactics 48). This is frankly false, schematic and yes, undialectical. The logical and equally schematic continuation of this false dichotomy is the choice offered between options 1 and 2. The Scottish comrades argue that the Scottish Socialist Party would be a party in movement, hybrid, transitional. Such parties have existed throughout the history of the workers’ movement, not only in the Second International but in the early years of the Comintern and in the 1930s. Describing such parties as centrist is insufficient. We have to know “in which way the arrow points”. “What is most important in every political organism is its tendency of development” wrote Trotsky to Sneevliet. What is also important is the capacity of revolutionary Marxists to influence this tendency of development. The essential point is not that hybrid parties are impossible, but that they are unstable, cannot last forever and must either crystallise in one form or another, break up or disappear.
19. But the Scottish comrades are well aware of this. That is why they have set the objective of winning the Scottish Socialist Party as such to the Committee for a Workers’ International and to a clear revolutionary position. The British Executive Committee does at least recognise this as a possibility: “But in our view the new formation would only become a revolutionary party if the ‘elements of a revolutionary party’ within it constituted a politically cohesive, organised Marxist tendency actively working to win the other elements to the project of building a revolutionary party, on the basis of support for a Marxist programme, commitment to building a party based on the principles of democratic unity, and affiliation to our International” (In defence of the Revolutionary Party). But the comrades continue to insist on the inevitably “broad” (reformist or centrist) nature of the Scottish Socialist Party, independently of what our comrades actually do.
20. Certainly, in launching the new party we will have to make some concessions to other forces involved. But any political differentiations that will take place in the Scottish Socialist Party are unlikely to start from abstract discussions on programme. As the Scottish Socialist Party grows, they will more likely take place around concrete political choices, around alliances, tactics and slogans. And it is in those kind of debates that we can politically win comrades who are perhaps not willing to join Scottish Militant Labour today. The idea that the new party will inevitably be “broad” doesn’t take account of real political processes. It declares that we launch a party with revolutionary and non-revolutionary elements, and – the result is a foregone conclusion. The character of the party is not decided by the struggle of living forces but by some obscure law of political genetics. On the contrary, the future of the Scottish Socialist Party will be decided by the course of the class struggle and the debates which flow from that, and in large measure by how we intervene.
21. Today the real question we should be asking is: how can we launch the Scottish Socialist Party in such a way as to create the most favourable conditions for it to evolve in the direction we want? Part of the answer lies in the organisation of our own forces as a tendency. But the real question is to define the tasks of that tendency, what it should do, before deciding its structure down to the last detail.
Programme
22. The British Executive Committee have raised the question of programme in a general sense. They have said very little, except negatively, about what should be the programme of the Scottish Socialist Party. This is however crucial. As we have said, the organisation of our own comrades is not an end in itself, nor is it only or even primarily to recruit individually or to organise some independent activities. It is to exert, before, during and after the launch of the Scottish Socialist Party, a conscious Marxist influence on the programme, perspectives, statutes, activity and forms of organisation of the new party. On these questions, not much help is forthcoming from the British Executive Committee.
23. The British Executive Committee documents have pointed out a number of problems in the way the Scottish documents deal with the question of programme -revolutionary, transitional, action programme, etc. These problems are real. In order to address them, we have to ask: what do we mean by “programme”, and what makes a programme revolutionary?
24. On one level, we have the historic programme of Trotskyism. This is based on the heritage of classical Marxism, the first four congresses of the Comintern, Trotsky’s later contributions, particularly on Stalinism, Fascism, Popular Fronts and the theory of permanent revolution; to which we can add the programmatic contributions of the Marxist movement and the Committee for a Workers’ International since 1940. It is important to educate our cadres in this tradition, which concentrates the lessons distilled from 150 years of the history of the class struggle and the workers’ movement.
25. Of course, that doesn’t mean we defend every jot and tittle of our heritage, but that we draw out what Trotsky calls the “essential principles”:
“The International Left Opposition stands on the terrain of the first four congresses of the Comintern. That does not mean that it bows down before each letter of their decisions, some of which have only a temporary character, and which in their practical consequences, for some of them, have been refuted by subsequent experience. But all the essential principles (concerning imperialism and the bourgeois state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasantry and the oppressed nations, the Soviets, work in the unions, parliamentarianism, the policy of the united front) are still today the highest expression of proletarian strategy in the epoch of the general crisis of capitalism”. (Trotsky, the ‘Eleven Points’ revised, July 1933, translated from the French version).
26. But this does not exhaust the question of the programme:
“The importance of a programme does not lie so much in the manner in which it formulates general theoretical conceptions (in the last analysis, this boils down to a question of ‘codification’, i.e. a concise exposition of the truths and generalisations which have been firmly and decisively acquired); it is to a much greater degree a question of drawing up the balance of the world economic and political experience of the last period, particularly of the revolutionary struggles of the last five years – so rich in events and mistakes”. (Trotsky, ‘The Third International After Lenin’, Pathfinder, p 3). (Trotsky speaks of “world economic and political experience” because he is dealing with the Draft Programme of the Comintern. The programme of a national section would of course also take into account national experience).
27. “The significance of the programme is the significance of the party”(…) “Now, what is the party? In what does the cohesion consist? The cohesion is a common understanding of the events, of the tasks, and this common understanding – that is the programme of the party”. (Trotsky, Discussions on the Transitional Programme, Pathfinder, p136).
28. So first of all, we have to distinguish between: a) our programme in the historic sense, on which basis we educate our cadres; and b) a programme which is written to express our ideas at a given moment or over a given period, to sum up and present our objectives to workers and youth. Such a programme can be adopted by a congress and can be modified as the situation changes. Such a programme starts from “a common understanding of events and tasks” into which we can “codify” the main lessons of history but which takes as its starting-point the immediate past and the present to point towards the future. This kind of programme is not written for a revolution sometime in the future but starts from the situation today and throws a bridge towards the socialist revolution. We can extract certain key points of the programme and diffuse them massively, as the Scottish comrades propose to do, and we can conduct campaigns and agitation, around specific aspects of the programme. In discussing the Transitional Programme, Trotsky pointed out that the programme as a whole could not be understood by the workers in general, but only by the advanced layers.
29. This is the kind of programme that Peter Taaffe was talking about in his document ‘Our programme and transitional demands’ (British Members Bulletin 13, 1995) which begins: “From time to time it is necessary for our organisation to re-evaluate its programme, its slogans, to examine its language and update its ideas”. Of course the way in which we put forward a programme of immediate, democratic and transitional demands flows from our overall historic programme, but it is also linked to our perspectives and to the immediate needs of the working class and its level of consciousness. This is the kind of programme we need to be discussing for the Scottish Socialist Party.
30. We have many examples of such programmes. For example, the French section has an “Action Programme”, as no doubt do other sections. To my knowledge the British section has had no action programme under that name, but a series of such documents, most recently the 1997 manifesto of the Socialist Party.
31. In ‘In defence of the Revolutionary Party’ the British Executive Committee point out: “But it is necessary to recognise that winning broad, new forces to a transitional programme is not the same thing as winning their adherence to the programme of Trotskyism”. But what better way of starting to win them to what the comrades correctly call “the full programme of the revolutionary party, which is a body of ideas and the accumulated experience of the Trotskyist movement” than by winning them to a transitional programme which is the concrete expression in a given period or situation of this full programme? Provided of course that there is a core of Marxist cadres to follow through this process. Isn’t that what happens in our sections? Why should it be different in the Scottish Socialist Party, which will not be a section, provided the solid Marxist core of our comrades plays this role?
32. What should such a programme be like? In the document already quoted, Peter Taaffe writes. “Because of the character of this period it is necessary to integrate perspectives and the main programmatic demands, which should be put forward at each stage, as far as possible, in one document”. Exactly: a programme should start from an analysis of the international and national situation, be clear on the main programmatic questions which are relevant to the present period, take up the main issues facing workers and youth, put forward demands, and indicate the objective, socialism. That is the method we have tried to employ in the Action Programme of the French section.
33. Fundamental questions of programme are not posed in the same fashion in internal educational schools and in a public programme. Take for example the question of the United Front versus Popular Frontism. Our cadres have to be educated in the history of these questions, the debates of the Comintern, Trotsky’s writings on France and Spain, etc. We can hardly go into all that in a programme which we publish and distribute widely. But in such a programme we would have to explain in as accessible a way as possible the necessity of the political independence of the working class, of how we fight for workers’ unity and why we don’t make fronts with bourgeois parties, linking that to the concrete situation in the given country at the given time.
34. No programme taken in isolation is revolutionary. No revolution was ever made by a programme. If a party were to formally adopt Trotsky’s Transitional Programme and remain wedded to reformist, parliamentary politics it would not be a revolutionary party. The nature of a party depends also on its leadership, cadres, structures, and above all its methods of action. A party whose primary goal is to mobilise and lead workers in struggle is infinitely more revolutionary than a sect with a “correct” programme.
35. Take the example of the famous “three planks” of the Bolshevik Party in 1912 (the democratic republic, the eight-hour working day and the confiscation of the landed estates). The RSDLP had a programme, adopted in 1903, which contained the objective of the socialist revolution on an international scale, but not as an immediate objective in Russia. In 1912 Lenin still defended the bourgeois nature of the Russian Revolution, albeit a bourgeois revolution which would have to be led by workers and peasants. When he changed his position in 1917 he had to lead a fight to reorient the party via the April Theses and then to translate that reorientation into slogans and into a popular programme, notably in: The Threatening Catastrophe And How To Avoid It’.
36. In 1912 the task was to overthrow the Tsarist autocracy. And the three planks prepared the party and the masses for that task. They constituted the basis of a worker-peasant alliance to carry out a democratic revolution. The Mensheviks had the same position on the nature of the revolution (though leaving its leadership to the bourgeoisie); but they limited themselves to partial demands – freedom of speech, assembly and association, the right to strike, -which the Bolsheviks did not refuse to fight for, but which did not lead workers to challenge the existence of Tsarism.
37. So the Bolsheviks had a programme that was revolutionary in the given circumstances, in that its realisation was incompatible with the maintenance of Tsarism. However, just as important as their programme was their method. While neglecting none of the immediate economic demands of the workers, the Bolsheviks consistently, and with success, sought to mobilise them in political strikes against the autocracy. It was the combination of programme, methods of struggle and a leadership and cadres steeped in the Marxist tradition and steeled by years of struggle that made the Bolshevik Party revolutionary in 1912. The Mensheviks had the same general programme (the programme of 1903) and the same general historical references, but they were not playing a revolutionary role, neither through the demands they put forward nor through the way they intervened in the class struggle.
38. What gives a programme its revolutionary character or not is not formal distinctions between “transitional” and “full socialist” but whether it helps take the working class forward to a confrontation with the ruling class and advances the struggle for socialism. It is not a question of whether one or another demand is realisable under capitalism but of the logic of the whole programme and the methods used to fight for it. It is not a question of whether you are for smashing the bourgeois state in general but whether you are for mass struggle now based on the mobilisation of working people.
39. If we apply this method to Scotland we will judge the Scottish Socialist Party by the content of its programme as a whole and its incompatibility with capitalism, but also by its practice, by how it intervenes in the class struggle. The Scottish Socialist Party is not conceived of as a revolutionary party, but as a combat party with a revolutionary leadership and cadres, with a socialist programme and which takes up the key issues facing the Scottish working class. The question we should ask is: is such a party, whose backbone would be Scottish Militant Labour, which does stand on our historic revolutionary programme, capable of taking the working class forward in the concrete conditions of Scotland today?
40. On the programme itself, it is clear that the Scottish comrades have made the programme of the Scottish Socialist Alliance evolve and that the Alliance accepts large parts of our programme. However the launching of a new party gives us a new chance to prepare a programme which will build on the advances of the Scottish Socialist Alliance period and if possible improve on them. It should aim to start from the main lines of the international and Scottish situation, and in particular the way in which the international economic situation affects Scotland (as one of the Scottish comrades did in an intervention at Leuven). It should be clear on the objective of socialism and the political independence of the Scottish Socialist Party, on the nature of the Scottish National Party, against any stages theory (first independence, then socialism) and the popular frontism that would flow from it, as well of course as developing specific demands. The raw material for all that largely exists already, not only in the programme of the Scottish Socialist Alliance but in the documents of Scottish Militant Labour and in the analytical articles in ‘Scottish Socialist Voice’.
41. One particular point needs to be developed, and that is the question of Europe. The Scottish National Party slogan of “Scotland in Europe” was a minor stroke of genius. It enabled (he nationalists to escape from the image of isolationism, of being “Little Scotlanders”, an image which is unattractive to large parts of the Scottish electorate, particularly young people. And they did it in such a way as to break out of the sterile debate of independence versus the Union.
42. The British ruling class will not easily resign itself to Scottish independence. They will try and resist it in different ways, for example by trying to play on divisions in Scottish society, particularly religious divisions. They will also try and whip up anti-Scottish chauvinism in England, of which demagogues of Right and Left like Lord Archer and Ken Livingstone recently gave us a small foretaste in their eagerness to be Mayor of London. Our organisation in England will have the responsibility of countering such demagogy.
43. Faced with a strong movement for independence, at the end of the day the British ruling class will probably be ready to propose anything short of full independence – more autonomy or even some sort of federation. And it will seek to find political forces in Scotland ready to compromise on independence. In such a situation to narrowly tie the question of an independent socialist Scotland to a Socialist Federation of Scotland, England, Wales and Ireland could be a source of confusion. Of course we must stress the need for unity with workers in England, Wales and Ireland (including trade union links). But we should widen the horizon and put forward the perspective of the Socialist United States of Europe, as indeed all our European sections should be doing.
44. That would enable us to put across a really internationalist perspective, and to overcome the limits of calling for socialist independence in a small country. As the Scottish comrades put it: “Clearly, in the age of globalisation and multinational capitalism such a programme [a socialist programme for Scotland, – Murray Smith] is unsustainable for any length of time within the borders of a small country. Consequently, our demand for socialist independence has to be raised in a bold, internationalist form; we should seek to popularise the message that an independent socialist Scotland should take the lead in an international battle against multinational capitalism” (Scottish Militant Labour document ‘Scottish independence and the struggle for socialism’).
45. In this framework we can take on the nationalists, explaining to workers in Scotland the real meaning of the capitalist Europe that is the Scottish National Party’s perspective, the Europe of Maastricht, Amsterdam, neoliberalism, deregulation, privatisation and unemployment (using examples from other European countries). We can say that we too are for “Scotland in Europe” but a different Europe, a workers’ Europe, a socialist Europe. And we can make that perspective more concrete by giving prominence to workers’ struggles in Europe.
The Committee for a Workers’ International and the Scottish Socialist Party
46. A large part of the discussion has centred on the question of the International, of the Committee for a Workers’ International. The British Executive Committee and the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International are fundamentally opposed to our Scottish comrades creating a party which would not be a section of the Committee for a Workers’ International. Evidently, if we accept Option 1, the problem disappears. The Scottish Socialist Party would be the Scottish section of the Committee for a Workers’ International. This is clearly the preferred option of the British Executive Committee and the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International.
47. However, the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International and the British Executive Committee have begun to take stock of the fact that they have failed to convince all but a small minority of the Scottish organisation of the validity of Option 1. A discussion has therefore begun on how the Scottish comrades should be organised inside the Scottish Socialist Party if they do go ahead and launch it.
48. There should be no doubt in our minds as to the importance, not just of internationalism, but of an International. From this point of view the point that is made in New Tactics for a New Period 16 about the Bolshevik Party making the revolution without being part of an International, while factually correct, is politically misleading. In 1917 the Bolsheviks were actively trying to build a new revolutionary international, and the absence of such an international was a key factor in the defeat of other revolutions in Europe and the consequent isolation of the Russian Revolution.
49. Today, we build our international, the Committee for a Workers’ International and defend the perspective of a mass international, the conditions of whose creation we cannot predict in advance. Therefore, as should be clear by now, there is no question of our Scottish comrades leaving the Committee for a Workers’ International. As for the Scottish Socialist Party, our aim is to win it to the Committee for a Workers’ International. But this involves more than just an effort on the part of our Scottish comrades.
50. Why should there be resistance in the Scottish Socialist Alliance and the future Scottish Socialist Party to the idea of affiliation to the Committee for a Workers’ International? Doesn’t this prove, as the British Executive Committee suggest, that there are bigger political problems than the Scottish comrades admit? Or alternatively that they are not doing enough to raise the profile of the Committee for a Workers’ International? Neither of those conclusions would be justified.
51. We all know that in the present period there is some reticence towards joining political parties, especially ones with a clearly-defined political profile. This reticence affects both workers who already have some experience of being politically organised and youth who are new to politics. The problem is probably less serious now than several years ago, but it is still a problem. And what goes for a party goes even more for an International. At least people can see our sections in action on a day-to-day basis, we can demonstrate the utility of a political organisation. For the International it is more difficult to have a profile: it depends on an international press, publications and campaigns. Remarks have been made along the lines that the Committee for a Workers’ International is better-known in Kazakhstan than in Scotland. Of course, because of the campaign for lonur the Committee for a Workers’ International is better known in Kazakhstan than in Scotland – or England, or France, or Germany. This level of “debate” just obscures the problem.
52. If we look at the example of the WPUS in 1934 (see below, para 68), it didn’t join the ICL but it did come out for a “revolutionary international”. However, that was in a context where the creation of a new international was widely discussed and sometimes advocated in the international workers’ movement (Declaration of Four, Paris Congress, Spanish Socialist Youth, Caballero, etc.). That is hardly the case today. Today it is necessary to convince people first of all of the need of an international and secondly of why they should join our international. As regards the Scottish Socialist Party, we should be concretely discussing how the Scottish comrades and the International can act together to attract the Scottish Socialist Party towards the Committee for a Workers’ International.
53. As regards the organisation of our own forces, when we go into a party we have to be clear on two things. First of all, what is the nature of the party, and then what are our objectives, what do we want to do with this party. In the Labour Party we organised in a certain way, confronted by a bureaucratic apparatus which was our mortal enemy. In a party like the PRC in Italy or a coalition like the IU in Spain we could organise more openly, but still tightly. In a party which we seek to win en bloc to the Committee for a Workers’ International and in which we play a dominant role we can afford to have a looser structure. Not a looser political identity, but a looser structure.
54. Concerning our objectives, the reason for launching the Scottish Socialist Party is not to create a milieu where we can recruit individually. The Alliance would do for that. It is to create an instrument capable of attracting wider forces which we can then win to our ideas, individually and by seeking to win the party as a whole. The way we organise is conditioned by that. We want to influence the programme of the party. But just as important, we want to build the Scottish Socialist Party and make it function as a combat party. If that is the case then decisions flow from that as to the use of our full-timers, the question of finances, the paper, frequency of meetings etc.
55. If we look at the recommendations of the majority of the delegation which visited Scotland in this light, we will see that some of them are quite unadapted to the objectives fixed by the Scottish comrades. In reality, the comrades were trying to make proposals in the framework of the Scottish Socialist Party project, but since they don’t actually believe in this project, the whole thrust is to try and take out the maximum insurance policy against dissolution of our forces by beefing up the Committee for a Workers’ International tendency, to the detriment of the Scottish Socialist Party itself.
56. If we applied the proposals concerning the paper, finances and full-timers, we would be launching a parry with a monthly paper (in order for the Committee for a Workers’ International tendency to have its own paper), we would be starving the new party of the subs of some of its most active members and keeping a large part of its potential full-time team for the Committee for a Workers’ International tendency. Frankly, there would be little point in launching a party under those circumstances.
57. Rather than starting by defining the tasks of the Committee for a Workers’ International tendency as if it were a party within the party, the aim should be to get the Scottish Socialist Party to act as much as possible as a section of the Committee for a Workers’ International would, in terms of public activity, mass campaigns, elections, branch educationals, public meetings. And for the Committee for a Workers’ International tendency to do what the Scottish Socialist Party cannot at this point do: circulate Committee for a Workers’ International material, ‘Socialism Today’, etc., publish a Committee for a Workers’ International journal, organise Committee for a Workers’ International meetings.
58. The Committee for a Workers’ International tendency should have its own structure, annual conference, leadership. It should publish an internal bulletin and a journal (monthly as soon as possible) and use the publications of the Committee for a Workers’ International and ‘Socialism Today’. Fortnightly meetings of our members seems a not unreasonable objective to start with, but it is impossible to stipulate down to the last detail how we will function in a party that does not yet exist. In reality the frequency of our own meetings and the question of whether they are open or not will depend on many things – the rhythm of activity of the Scottish Socialist Party, the political issues which arise, etc.
59. But we should be clear on one thing. If the Scottish comrades take the initiative and the political responsibility of launching the Scottish Socialist Party, they have to have the means to make it work: that means in the first place the necessary finances and full-timers. We should determine the allocation of finances and full-time resources between the Scottish Socialist Party and the Committee for a Workers’ International tendency globally, according to the needs of each. And ‘Scottish Socialist Voice’, as the paper of the Scottish Socialist Party, should stay fortnightly until it can become weekly.
60. There is cause for considerable disquiet in the refusal of the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International to guarantee the recognition of a Scottish section. Behind that there seems to be a narrow conception of international democratic centralism which is even more disquieting and which calls for a separate discussion. Hopefully an agreement will be reached between the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International and the Scottish leadership on the functioning of the Scottish section. But the threat of non-recognition should not be wielded; and the proposal of the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee to draw a balance-shoe! of the Scottish Socialist Party experience after 12 months seems eminently reasonable.
Questions of history
61. A number of historical examples have been evoked. We’ve already touched on the Bolshevik party, and we’ll come back to it. Let’s take two examples which have perhaps more relevance to us today, concerning tactics in the 1930s by organisations more closely resembling some of our sections than did the Bolshevik Party.
62. In 1934 Trotsky advised the British Trotskyists, who were at that time a group of about forty, to enter the ILP. The objective that he fixed was not to recruit individuals, but “to work for the Bolshevik transformation of the party (that is, of its revolutionary kernel)”. Furthermore, as time passed and the ILP weakened, his appeals to the British Trotskyists to enter the party became more urgent, as he tried to save something from the wreckage.
63. Trotsky’s method of posing the question of entry into the ILP to the British Trotskyists is enlightening: “The publication of a small, monthly paper under the circumstances is senseless, because the same articles are published earlier or at the same time in the (American) Militant. We can make good use of the Militant as a ‘central organ’ for our work within the ILP”. And later: “I believe (and this is my personal opinion) that even if you should give up your special organ you will be able to use to advantage the press of the ILP, The New Leader (the paper of the ILP) and the discussion organ. The American Militant as well as the International Bulletin could well supplement your work” (Writings, 1933-34).
64. So Trotsky thought it was all right for a group of forty, (which had yet to prove itself in the class struggle) to enter a party of ten thousand (at the time he was writing) in which there were all sorts of reformists, centrists and Stalinists, giving up its paper, using the press of the ILP and the international press of the ICL. In other words he was posing less stringent conditions than the British Executive Committee which is dealing with a Scottish organisation of several hundred with a proven record in the class struggle and considerable political authority: an organisation which is not just “entering” a party, but helping to launch a party in which we will be close to a numerical majority and certainly a political majority and whose paper we will edit.
65. Was Trotsky worried about the dissolution of Trotskyist forces? “The great advantage of the Left Opposition lies in the fact that it has a theoretically elaborated programme, international experience and international control. Under these conditions there is not the slightest basis for the fear that the British Bolshevik-Leninists will dissolve without a trace in the ILP”.
66. Ah, comrades may say, Trotsky talks about “international control”. Yes, but in terms of political discussion and persuasion, not organisational control. “Of course the International Secretariat did not intend to and could not intend to force you by a bare order to enter the ILP. If you yourselves will not be convinced of the usefulness of such a step, your entry will be to no purpose”. (Writings, 1933-34). Two years later he wrote: “We cannot make any claim to leading our national sections directly from a centre, even if this centre were much more united than it is at present. Within the bounds of the united programme and the common political line, every section must necessarily lay claim to a certain elbow room in which to act. I am a little surprised that I am obliged to say this to the Dutch friends, who, up to now, have carried on their policy absolutely independently and in many important respects in direct contradiction with the firm opinion of the international organisation”. In the same article, Trotsky added of course that “we retain the right to our opinion”. It is worth recalling this very flexible interpretation of international democratic centralism in view of some of the positions that we heard expressed in the debates in Leuven.
67. As a matter of fact, of course, Trotsky failed to convince the British Trotskyists to enter the ILP (only a minority did so, and late). That was a serious lost opportunity for Trotskyism in Britain.
68. The example of the fusion of the American Trotskyists with the Musteite organisation in 1934 has been cited by both the Scottish comrades and by the British Executive Committee. Two points which have some relevance for this discussion are worth underlining. Firstly, the new organisation, which was called the WPUS, was not a section of the ICL, whereas the CLA had been. Article III of the WPUS constitution read: “The Party, at its launching, is affiliated with no other group, party or organisation in the United States or elsewhere. Its National Committee is empowered to enter into fraternal relations with groups and parties in other countries and, if they stand on the same fundamental programme as its own, to co-operate with them in the elaboration of a complete world programme and the speediest possible establishment of the new revolutionary International. Action on any organisational affiliation must be submitted to a National Convention of the Party”.
69. The British Executive Committee say that Cannon and Trotsky did not set out to build a hybrid or transitional party with Muste. However this is what they did, aiming of course to “transform the new party into a revolutionary party as quickly as possible”. Compromises were made. And, although acting in a concerted way to influence the WPUS the Trotskyists did not constitute themselves a “party within a party” which was formally affiliated to the ICL.
70. In fact, over a four-year period 1934-38, there was no openly affiliated organisation in the USA to the international Trotskyist movement. That did not prevent the American Trotskyists from carrying out mass work and tactical turns (the fusion that led to the WPUS, entry into the Socialist Party) which led to the American Socialist Workers Party becoming the strongest section of the Fourth International when it was founded in 1938. Of course, the leadership remained in close contact with Trotsky, and the Trotskyists caucused during the entry into the SP in a much tighter way that they had done in the WPUS. Both the Scottish and British comrades have pointed out that Cannon was politically intransigent on the programme and flexible on organisation. That is exactly the point. The British Executive Committee is being extremely rigid on organisation, practically elevating the frequency of meetings of the Committee for a Workers’ International tendency to a level of principle, while leaving the Scottish comrades to politically prepare the launching of the Scottish Socialist Party on their own. In practice, the British Executive Committee concentrates entirely on the narrow question of the form of organisation of the Committee for a Workers’ International tendency in the Scottish Socialist Party, to the detriment of how the comrades would in fact “actively work” in the party.
71. These examples don’t mean that we shouldn’t be organised in the Scottish Socialist Party. They do underline that the precise way in which the comrades are organised within the Scottish Socialist Party is a question not of principle but of tactics, which depends on the character of the Scottish Socialist Party and which is subordinate, as are all organisational questions, to the political goal, in this case the fight to build and politically transform the Scottish Socialist Party.
Bolshevism
72. The history of Bolshevism has been brought into the debate. The Scottish comrades say that “prior to 1912, Bolshevism existed as a loosely organised faction or tendency within the broader RSDLP”. The British Executive Committee replies that “Lenin consistently strove to build an ideologically coherent, democratic centralist organisation (whether termed a faction or a party)”. There are problems with both these definitions.
73. First of all, it is necessary to make a correction. The Scottish comrades quote Trotsky in ‘My Life’ as saying: “The history of the struggle of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks is also a history of ceaseless efforts towards unity”. The British Executive Committee replies that “the real meaning of the quote is exactly the opposite of what is claimed in the comrades’ document. Trotsky refers to the fact that Stalin’s hack historians used the episode of the 1912 ‘August bloc’ as a pretext for presenting Trotsky as a ‘splitter’ and to falsely paint the picture that ‘the history of the struggle of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks is also a history of ceaseless efforts towards unity'”, (my emphasis, Murray Smith)
74. Unfortunately, this interpretation is quite inaccurate, as becomes clear on reading the passage in question. Trotsky actually wrote: “For novices and the ignorant, Bolshevism is furthermore represented as springing fully armed from the laboratory of history. Now, the history of the struggle of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks is also a history of ceaseless efforts towards unity”. He then goes on to give several examples of these “ceaseless efforts towards unity”. Of course, the history of the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks was not only made up of efforts towards unity, but also of splits. To avoid having a unilateral vision of the history of Bolshevism both have to be taken into account and analysed.
75. In general, Bolshevism was more than a loosely organised faction. Precisely how tight or how loose depended on the circumstances. As Trotsky pointed out: “The Bolsheviks changed their organisational structure radically at every transition from one stage to the next”. At the top the faction was quite tightly organised, but probably much less so at the base. Sometimes the faction had its own paper, sometimes it used various RSDLP publications. Was it an “ideologically coherent, democratic centralist organisation (whether termed a faction or a party)”? It would be better to say “politically coherent”, but also flexible. In 1905, Lenin had no qualms about building a party which included, in his own words, “Christians who believe in God, and those intellectuals who defend mysticism (fie upon them!)”, because he was confident in the power of Marxist ideas to dominate the party. He had sharp philosophical differences with Bogdanov and Lunacharsky and he did not avoid the debate on these questions (writing in particular ‘Materialism and Empiric-criticism’). But in 1904 Lenin formed a bloc with Bogdanov to lead the Bolshevik faction, leaving questions of philosophy on one side. This was not a minor question, considering that in 1904 and even more so in 1906 Bogdanov’s philosophical ideas were scarcely Marxist.
76. Throughout his political life Lenin split, unified, fought or compromised for political reasons. He split with the Mensheviks in 1903 to defend the kind of party which was necessary at that point in time; in 1905 he fought against his own “committee-men” (who had backed him in 1903) in order to “open the gates of the party”; in 1905-07 he was for a united party with the Mensheviks in the context of an ongoing revolution; in 1909 he split with the Bolshevik ultra-lefts (the Vperiodists) and sought to ally the Leninist Bolsheviks with the party Mensheviks of Plekhanov.
77. Even in what was to all intents and purposes the final split with the Mensheviks in 1912, Lenin did not simply transform the Bolshevik faction into a party. At the Bolshevik school at Longjumeau in 1911 both Vperiodists and party Mensheviks participated and gave lectures, though they were a small minority. Both were invited to the Prague Conference in January 1912, called by the Bolshevik faction and open to all except the Menshevik liquidators. Only the party Mensheviks came, though Plekhanov himself stayed away. The Vperiodists preferred to get involved with Trotsky’s “August Bloc”. Both Plekhanov and Bogdanov wrote for the Bolshevik ‘Pravda’ in 1912-13. The really definitive splits came in 1914, with those who supported the imperialist war, and in 1917, with those who opposed the taking of power by the Soviets.
78. At each turning-point, political realignments occurred around concrete issues which arose in the class struggle and the workers movement. The idea of splitting or unifying around pre-determined ideological criteria would have been profoundly foreign to Lenin. Again in the period after 1917, currents in the international workers’ movement were judged first of all by where they stood on the socialist revolution in Russia and in their own countries, not by questions of ideology.
79. To simply say that Lenin’s faction or party was democratic centralist shows a certain misunderstanding of the difference between a faction and a party. A revolutionary party exists to intervene actively in the class struggle and it demands of those who join it discipline in action, not ideological discipline. Differences are permissible within the broad framework of the programme of the party. A faction exists to influence the policy of the party in a certain direction and for this its adherents have to have a certain unity of thought, at least on the points that constitute the faction’s raison d’etre.
80. Democratic centralism, first adopted by the RSDLP congress in 1907, is about action. As defined by Lenin, it implies the fullest possible debate (very often open, public debate) before decisions are taken, and discipline, united action once a decision is taken. A faction does not have the same discipline on all questions. For example, at an RSDLP party conference held in July 1907 eight of the nine Bolshevik delegates voted to boycott the Duma elections. The ninth, Lenin, voted with the Mensheviks and others to defeat the boycott, because he put the interests of the party before the discipline of his faction. That was one isolated disagreement. When the disagreements between Lenin and the ultra left Bolsheviks became systematic the Bolshevik faction split down them middle in 1909 and the ultra lefts formed their own faction. At that point Lenin refused to call a Bolshevik congress and sought to ally with those Mensheviks who rejected liquidationism.
An international turn
81. In the Scottish debate, the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International very quickly came out in support of the British Executive Committee, and indeed assumed a leading role in the debate, as was seen very clearly at Leuven. This is unfortunately no accident. It coincides with a clear retreat by the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International on the question of fusions, regroupments, new parties and relations with other revolutionary forces.
82. In their first document the Scottish comrades write: “But the worst mistake that we could make now would be to turn back the calendar and return to the strategy of building an independent Marxist organisation in isolation from the rest of the left” (They subsequently modified “in isolation” to “independently”). The response of the British Executive Committee is very revealing. They react by – correctly – pointing out that in the past, both in the Labour Party period and subsequently, we have worked in a variety of fronts, campaigns and caucuses with other forces, and still do. This factually correct reply misses the political point. As far as can be seen there is no problem with our sections not working in this way with other forces. The problem arises when it is a question of building parties with other forces.
83. There have been cases of already existing national organisations fusing with/joining the Committee for a Workers’ International, the most recent being the French section in 1993. Small regroupments with other forces have also taken place in the framework of national sections (France, Belgium, Australia, USA). But the dominant position has been for sections to grow by arithmetical recruitment.
84. If the Scottish debate were an isolated case then there would be less cause for concern. The attitude of the British Executive Committee and the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International would still be seriously mistaken, but the problem would be limited. However, taken together with the change in attitude on the question of regroupment internationally, and in particular what can only be called a U-turn on the perspective of fusion with the UIT, there is a clearly identifiable tendency. In France, this began to be obvious to us during discussions with the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International in April, May and June this year concerning our relations with La Commune, the French section of the UIT, with which we are discussing fusion.
85. Discussions began with the UIT last year and they participated in the European School last summer. After a meeting in Barcelona last November between delegations of the leaderships of the Committee for a Workers’ International and UIT, a joint declaration was issued which ended by announcing that the discussions would be pursued “with the objective to explore the possibility of unifying our two organisations as part of the regroupment of revolutionary currents and Trotskyist organisations, which defend revolutionary socialism”. An accompanying letter from the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International to the sections added: “Such a development (a fusion) could mark an historical turning-point in building a more powerful revolutionary international organisation of workers and young people”. Subsequently Tony Saunois attended their World Congress and visited their sections in Latin America and came back with a highly positive report.
86. These developments encouraged us in France to reinforce our (already existing) collaboration with La Commune and we increasingly found that we could work together on a wide range of issues in the class struggle with few problems, not any more than could be contained in a single organisation. Certainly, there were the differences on international questions, which did not however impede the collaboration of our two organisations in France, and which were of course known to the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International when the perspective of an international fusion was being put forward as a possibility. Today we cannot guarantee that we will successfully fuse with La Commune: simply that it is a realistic perspective. And the French section is not out for unity at any price. We have taken a very firm attitude towards another revolutionary organisation in France which put considerable pressure on us to rush into a fusion without testing out whether it was possible through common work and discussion in the way that we are doing with La Commune.
87. Since March relations between the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International and the UIT have been reduced to a strict minimum and there is no more talk of fusion. For the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International, this is supposedly justified by the UIT leadership’s refusal to discuss allegations about their past made by Carlos Petroni (an ex-leader of the Moreno current, now a leading member of our US section) and by a manoeuvre by their small German section to link up with a group who left our German section in Berlin. This is not the place to go into details. On the substantive issues in question, the UIT leadership was at fault. They should have been prepared to discuss their own past, whatever the rights and wrongs of the question. And they were wrong over Germany, as they have now admitted. By the way, in both cases the comrades of La Commune were openly critical of their own International Secretariat.
88. However, these two incidents have been used to freeze discussions and common action with the UIT and since then the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International has made it clear that it thinks the French section is proceeding too fast with La Commune. There are two things wrong with this attitude. In the first place the two incidents in question do not justify allowing the whole process which was under way with the UIT to seize up. What is at stake in the discussions with the UIT is the question of fusing with an international that shares with us the objective of building a revolutionary Marxist international and parties in every country, and that represents serious forces – “largely proletarian” and made up of “committed revolutionaries” to quote the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International letter of last November. That has not changed because we have run into some problems with them. We have a duty to verify if a fusion is possible on a principled political basis and not to be side-tracked by incidents of secondary importance. No serious member of the UIT, even those critical of their International Secretariat over the two incidents in question, will take us seriously otherwise. We should decide our attitude towards other political forces in terms of our political characterisation of these forces and what they represent, not on this or that incident. You only have to look at the way Trotsky persevered in trying to regroup with other forces in the 1930s in spite of all sorts of political errors and organisational manoeuvres by their leaderships, much worse than anything the UIT has done.
89. The second mistake has been to try and impose this attitude towards the UIT on the French section. We have no problem with the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International being involved in our discussions with La Commune. In principle this can be useful. However it is quite clear that what the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International is attempting to do is to put the brakes on the fusion process which is underway in France, to bring us into line with its own mistaken policy towards the UIT. Of course the present state of relations between the two internationals makes the perspective of a fusion in France more complicated than it needed to be. The question of the international affiliation of a fused organisation in France would have to be resolved. But this would be possible on the basis that both La Commune and ourselves would keep our international affiliations. We would not try to railroad them out of the UIT or let ourselves be railroaded out of the Committee for a Workers’ International.
90. The attitude of the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International could have been seen as an over-reaction to a couple of incidents, which could be corrected. Various statements have been made at Leuven and elsewhere by comrades of the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International to the effect that we have not abandoned the perspective of regroupment. However what is needed now is not just verbal assurances but to go back on the offensive for discussions and joint campaigns to verify whether a fusion is politically possible. Unfortunately the reaction of the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International to the resolution adopted by the recent International Executive Committee of the UIT concerning relations with the Committee for a Workers’ International gives absolutely no grounds for optimism on this score. That is something that will have to be taken up in the discussions for the World Congress
91. The Committee for a Workers’ International, by the forces that it represents and by its programme and perspectives, is well placed to play a central role in the regroupment of revolutionary forces on an international level, involving both national and international currents. As well as the UIT, that should particularly involve the LIT. Apart from the general objective which we should have of uniting revolutionary Marxist forces, we will have great difficulty building anything in Latin America without a policy of regroupment, in particular with the forces that come from the Morenoite tradition.
92. What is apparently lacking is the political will to be the motor force of regroupment, and to stick to this objective, overcoming temporary obstacles. Contrast this with the attitude of the American Trotskyists in the 1930s: “We campaigned for the new party. Our great advantage over the other groups – the advantage which assured our hegemony – was that we knew what we wanted. We had a clearly defined programme and that gave us a certain aggressiveness”. (Cannon, ‘History of American Trotskism’, pp 143-144).
93. Over the last period, the whole orientation towards regroupment has been replaced by the insistence on building our own sections. Any lingering doubts that could have been entertained on this question were dispelled at Leuven. We are now told that the Committee for a Workers’ International is not only a revolutionary international but the revolutionary international. Our sections are now systematically described as parties or at least as the nuclei of parties.
94. One of the things, one of the many things that attracted the present French section to the Committee for a Workers’ International in 1993 was the absence of this kind of posturing, of self-proclamation of parties and an International. We even found that the name ‘Committee for a Workers’ International’, for all its disadvantages, showed at least some sense of proportion compared to much of the rest of the Trotskyist movement. This is not a minor question. In 1934 Cannon, who was at the head of an organisation stronger than many of our sections today, had to explain in defence of his tactics to sectarian elements in his own organisation: “We are not yet a party. We are only a propaganda group. Our problem is to become a party” (emphasis in the original). And further on: “You set up the principle (of the independence of the party) in such a way as to make it a barrier against the tactical moves necessary to make a real party possible”. (Cannon, ‘History of American Trotskyism’, pp 223-224).
95. As for the term “nucleus of the revolutionary party”, it shows slightly more modesty. However, as Marxists we do not believe in predestination. There is no guarantee that a nucleus will grow into a party or help to build one. That depends on correct programme, perspectives, strategy and tactics. And especially for a small group, it depends on avoiding what Cannon called “the political disease” of sectarianism.
96. The current trend towards self-affirmation, towards reducing the question of building the party to building our own forces, would rapidly isolate us in France. Serious workers and youth will not be convinced by a group that just considers itself as the revolutionary party, or even as its nucleus. They will want to know what strategy we have for building the party and how we relate to other forces in the workers’ movement. It is perfectly clear that not only in the distant future but in the short to medium term the road towards a revolutionary party will involve fusions, regroupments, and the question of a new workers’ party. Even on our own modest scale our not insignificant growth over the past period has been achieved both by direct recruitment and by mini-regroupments, the one reinforcing the other.
97. Is there a special climate in France? Certainly there are specific characteristics of the workers movement here, as in other countries. In particular there are large Trotskyist organisations and a Communist Party which, though greatly weakened, is still a mass party and has a significant left wing. There is even a definite left wing in the Socialist Party. There are also important developments in the unions. And all this has to be placed in the context of a rise in the class struggle since 1993 and especially since 1995. So we have specific problems and specific opportunities.
98. But in Scotland there are no big Trotskyist organisations, the old CP has disappeared and the different fragments which subsist are relatively weak. Our own organisation occupies a dominant position on the Left and still we have come up against the limits of simply building our organisation arithmetically, as demonstrated by the experience of the Alliance and the discussion over the Scottish Socialist Party. This has not taken place against the background of the same level of industrial struggle as in France but in the context of a political sea-change which presents us with big opportunities and big challenges.
99. What if neither Scotland nor France was really exceptional but for different reasons the evolution of the political situation meant that possibilities existed today of taking bold initiatives which are not reducible to simply building our own forces by arithmetical recruitment? What if, as the Scottish comrades say: “Before emerging as mass revolutionary parties, our sections in every part of the world will at certain stages be forced to participate in and, from time to time, initiate hybrid, transitional and broader formations”?
100. For us, building revolutionary organisations is not an end in itself. It is clear that big struggles are on the agenda in France. We have a responsibility to try and ensure that there is an organisation capable of intervening on a qualitatively higher level than in 1995. Of course at the present time we build our own organisation. But we are also in favour of building a new workers’ party along with other forces, a party which would certainly not be a classical revolutionary party but hopefully a combat party with a programme capable of arming the working class and of attracting into its ranks the best workers and youth. Of course, within such a party we would maintain our own Committee for a Workers’ International tendency: that is not negotiable.
101. We need to discuss how new workers’ parties can come into being. The Scottish comrades pose the question clearly enough: “This in turn must throw into question the assumption that new mass formations will in the future necessarily take on everywhere a left reformist character. We accept that among the general mass of the working class left reformist and centrist illusions will grow in certain periods. These ideas will inevitably be reflected within any future mass parties of the working class. However we would have to challenge the assumption that these parties will necessarily be led by left reformists” (New Tactics for a New Period 38).
102. The British Executive Committee replies: “We will not intervene in new formations especially if we are able to take a major part in launching them, fatalistically accepting that it is predetermined that they will be led by left reformists. We would fight for a bold anti-capitalist programme and radical socialist demands, attempting to win a majority to revolutionary ideas. But we have to start with a realistic assessment of our own forces and of the other forces coming into such a formation” (the Socialist Party Reply to New Tactics for a New Period 41). They develop the same sort of idea in their reply to A Political Justification. Yet the dominant idea is still that new workers’ parties will appear independently of our own initiatives, and that they will be tend to be led by reformists. This was particularly the case at Leuven.
103. There is an exchange of views between the Scottish Militant Labour-Executive Committee and the British Executive Committee in the section “Isolation” of New Tactics for a New Period and the corresponding section of the Socialist Party Reply to New Tactics for a New Period. In the first place it is not possible to accept the British Executive Committee’s version of the “real line of argument of this section” (of New Tactics for a New Period), given in paragraphs 33 and 34 of their own document, which they then proceed to conveniently demolish in paragraphs 35 to 38. This an old and not very reputable debating trick. In general it is better to stick to what people actually say or write.
104. What the Scottish comrades actually say is that it was not possible “to create mass parties or even to seek to create broader formations of revolutionaries and left-wing socialists” in the postwar period. The debate over what is objective and what is subjective in the failure of Trotskyists to build mass parties is potentially endless. But yes, Trotsky, as the British Executive Committee say, “continually sought ways of developing new mass revolutionary formations” in the 1930s. And we might add, without much success. Trotsky himself attributed that failure in the last analysis to objective causes, notably in an interview with CLR James, ‘Fighting Against the Stream’ (Writings 1938-39). Of course, even in difficult objective conditions correct or incorrect tactics can make a difference: witness the relative success of the American Trotskyists as against the errors and missed opportunities of in particular the French and Spanish sections. We could also discuss to what extent the wrong policies of many Trotskyists groups during World War Two and the difficulties in understanding postwar reality contributed to the weakness of the movement. What is incontestable is that the huge strengthening of Stalinism and reformism and the postwar boom created objective conditions which left the Trotskyist movement isolated and ruled out the building of mass revolutionary parties, at least in the advanced capitalist countries, for a whole period. That situation only began to be modified in the late 1960s, and has changed qualitatively over the last decade.
105. The important question, therefore, is what is the situation now? We all agree that the consciousness of the working class has been pushed back since the collapse of Stalinism. But in what direction is the arrow pointing? Is it continuing to be pushed back? It is rather the case that the ideological effects of the collapse of Stalinism are giving way to the effects of capitalist crisis, neoliberalism and globalisation. Workers and youth are beginning to look for answers. And reformism and Stalinism as organised forces, not only as ideological currents but as massive bureaucratic machines, have been enormously weakened.
106. That does not mean that there will be no more reformism or centrism in the working class or that it will not take an organised form. But new reformist organisations will be weaker, less stable than before. There are therefore considerable opportunities for revolutionaries to increase their influence, find a mass audience and build parties. We should avoid like the plague any sort of “stages theory” whereby the working class would have to go through reformism and centrism before arriving at revolutionary Marxism. The weaker the forces of Marxism, or the more mistakes these forces make, the longer the road and the stronger the influence of reformism. But if the Marxist forces have sufficient strength and are capable of taking bold initiatives while remaining firm on their programme, we can significantly influence the situation and build strong revolutionary organisations which can challenge reformism in the working class. What else can be the meaning of building a “small mass party numbering tens of thousands, particularly in the next two, three or four years”. Without going into the time-scale in each country, such possibilities can exist. But we will only be able to take advantage of them if we are capable of bold tactical initiatives.
107. We should also beware of establishing too linear a connection between economy and politics. It is not necessarily the case that the developing economic crisis will produce, in that order, big struggles and new mass workers’ parties. History, and Trotsky, should warn us against such simplistic reasoning. As the 1930s showed, economic crisis does not automatically produce big struggles immediately. Sometimes the impact of economic crisis and international political events can provoke a crisis and recomposition of the workers’ movement before there are big movements of the working class. That was certainly the case in France in the early 1930s, and not only in France.
108. In the present crisis of the international workers’ movement is it the case that, as the Scottish comrades write: “Not only in Scotland, but internationally, the traditional ideological battle lines which divided the left have become blurred”? (Blurred, not erased). If we approach the question on a strictly ideological level, the difference is as sharp as ever between reform and revolution, popular front and united front, permanent revolution and revolution by stages. That is indisputable. But two things have changed. Firstly, the forces defending reformist and Stalinist ideas have been qualitatively weakened by the collapse of Stalinism and the working class’s experience of social-democratic governments, and therefore we are in a stronger position to fight those ideas.
109. Secondly, those militants who did not “hoist the white flag” are in many cases looking for a red flag. They are open to our ideas and you can easily find CP members defending ideas which in the past would have been dismissed as Trotskyism. As the Scottish comrades say: “These general long term processes, combined with the specific experience of working together within various campaigns, have led to a breaking down of political barriers which at an earlier stage may have appeared almost insurmountable”. We can clearly see this in the breaking down of barriers between Trotskyists and members of the French CP, which were indeed until quite recently almost insurmountable.
110. Paragraph 34 of the Socialist Party Reply to New Tactics for a New Period attributes to the Scottish comrades, the idea defended by “one or two comrades who now evidently reject the idea of building a Marxist revolutionary party: Trotskyism was a reaction to Stalinism; Stalinism is finished; therefore Trotskyism is (wholly or largely) redundant”.
111. If “one or two comrades” want to defend such ideas we can debate with them, once we know who they are. In the meantime it is more important to understand what is the relationship between Trotskyism and Stalinism (and reformism) in the workers’ movement today. To say that in the past Trotskyism was simply a reaction to Stalinism is of course mistaken. Trotskyism at its origin was the continuation in an programmatic and organised form of communism, of revolutionary Marxism after the degeneration of the Communist International. Having failed to build mass parties in the 1930s Trotskyism had to exist for several decades faced with powerful Stalinist and Social-Democratic parties who held the allegiance of the majority of the working class. Thus Trotskyism was obliged to exist as a left opposition, to delineate itself programmatically from the reformists and the Stalinists, while seeking to address the workers and youth who followed them.
112. Trotskyism is neither wholly or partly redundant. But it has to rise to the challenge of a new situation. Now Trotskyists have to build parties not in opposition to powerful reformist and Stalinist parties, but more and more to replace these parties. That means that we have to increasingly take on positions of leadership in struggles and in the unions. And we have to build parties capable of providing political answers and leadership in struggle. We still have to criticise the Socialist and Communist parties and in particular fight against the trade union bureaucracy, but especially we have to provide political answers, a way out of the capitalist crisis that points towards socialism. The days when a Trotskyist organisation could simply exist and recruit to its own ranks while criticising Stalinism, Social-Democracy and other Trotskyists are over. Now Trotskyists will be judged above all by their capacity to give a lead to workers in struggle and to build new parties which really defend the interests of the working class.
113. We have often criticised Lutte Ouvriere for not following up the call for a new party that it made in the wake of the 1.6 million votes it received in the 1995 presidential elections. It was thus, through its own sectarianism, not only unable to fully capitalise on its own electoral success, but actually suffered a split. The remarks made by the Scottish comrades in New Tactics for a New Period are perfectly apt. If LO had followed through with its initiative what would have been the result? Certainly not a revolutionary party as defined by the British Executive Committee. Nor would it necessarily have been a really “broad” party in the sense of Option 2. It could however have attracted broad layers of workers and youth around the initial nucleus of LO militants, leading to quite a “hybrid” result.
114. An opportunity was lost in 1995, but the necessity of building a new workers’ party in France remains. And the task of revolutionaries is not simply to wait for a new party to appear and then enter it, but to work to create such a party along with those workers and youth who are coming to see the need for it. And to the degree that we were able to influence the course of events, we would seek to launch it as on as clear an anti-capitalist transitional programme as possible.
115. The Committee for a Workers’ International will have big opportunities in the coming period, as an International and in many countries. But to take advantage of them we will have to show great tactical flexibility and be capable of innovating. In the reaction of the British Executive Committee and the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International to the projected Scottish Socialist Party in Scotland and in their general approach to the question of the party and the International, there is at least the beginning of a sectarian turn which would prevent us from taking advantage of the possibilities which will arise. It is not too late to correct this, but if we do not correct it we will pay a heavy price in missed opportunities.
The Programme, The Party And The International
A Reply To Murray Smith (France), From The International Secretariat
Introduction
1. Murray Smith’s document “Contribution to the “Scottish debate” is both a defence of the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s proposals for a Scottish Socialist Party combined with a general critique of the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International.
2. This criticism of the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International is not limited to its position on the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s plans. As well as opposing the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International’s recent handling of discussions with the UIT, Murray Smith argues that a debate has opened “between partisans of a conservative and potentially sectarian conception of party-building, which in essence boils down to the linear growth of our own organisations, and those who advocate a more dynamic conception, involving, fusions, regroupments and new parties”, (paragraph 7)
3. A large part of Murray Smith’s document is, to all intents and purposes, a reworking of the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s “Scottish Socialist Party – A Political Justification”. In relation to the “Scottish debate” it actually adds very little that is new. At the same time Murray Smith’s method of argument is significant.
4. In paragraph 8 Murray Smith writes that: “The British Executive Committee has reproached the Scottish comrades with choosing to write The Scottish Socialist Party: a Political Justification rather than continuing the debate on the points raised in … (previous) documents. Quite clearly the Scottish comrades made a choice. They chose to reformulate and represent their project and their propositions, in my (Murray Smith’s) opinion in a much clearer and more thorough way, taking into account criticisms and points made in debate.”
5. A discussion or debate should be a real exchange of views which clarifies issues and lays the basis for future activity. This means that a debate cannot be simply a continuous repetition of points which take no account of how the discussion develops. Nevertheless previous positions cannot simply be forgotten, either they are still defended or they are openly and clearly altered.
6. Unfortunately this has not been the case with the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee. In practically every document they have produced in this debate they have effectively sought to side-step criticism by abandoning, without comment, their earlier positions. A simple example is the 1999 elections in Scotland. Compare paragraph 32 of “Political Justification” with paragraphs 2 to 6 in “Initial Proposals”.
7. In paragraph 32 of “Political Justification” the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee wrote that “the elections in 1999 are a factor an important one at that, but we could live with the alliance (the existing Scottish Socialist Alliance) if that were the only issue at stake. Yet that is not the only or even the most important question”.
8. However paragraphs 2 to 5 of Initial Proposals read quite differently: Among other points the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee write that ” 1999 will be a decisive year for the socialist left. Three separate sets of elections will take place in Scotland during the first half of 1999″ . (paragraph 2), “the stakes are sky high: if the socialist left in these elections fails to make a breakthrough, the advance of socialism could be slowed down”, (paragraph 3), “important in determining whether socialism can make a breakthrough in 1999 will be the calibre and cohesion of the socialist opposition itself. The specific form of Proportional Representation under which both the Scottish and European elections will be conducted poses sharply the need for socialist unity…under the Additional Member System that will operate in Scotland there is absolutely no room or political justification for two or more socialist parties to stand in opposition to one another” (paragraph 4).
9. Naturally opinions can change, but when they do this needs to be explained, something the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee have not done in this debate. This is why the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s previous statements cannot now be ignored as Murray Smith implies. Murray Smith tries both to quietly bury some of the Scottish Militant Labour’s previous material, while quoting from other parts when it suits his argument.
10. The Socialist Party Executive Committee’s July “Reply” commented that “Scottish Socialist Party A Political Justification” “ignores the political issues that have been raised in the debate…they completely ignore all of the arguments put forward in their (the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s) previous documents” (paragraph 1). While “Reply” went on to raise and discuss a number of these about-turns, Murray Smith fails to make any substantive comment on the Socialist Party Executive Committee’s arguments.
11. In his desire to strengthen the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s positions Murray Smith tries to provide a protective shield. Although the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee have not, so far, withdrawn any of the material they have written in this debate Murray Smith attempts to consign some parts of the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s documents to the archives while using other parts that suit him.
12. Clearly the issues being discussed are not abstract, the debate began over concrete questions relating to programme and tactics in Scotland. Despite the wider differences now raised by Murray Smith, Scotland remains an issue. In a certain sense Scotland has become a test case. Now the new “Manifesto for a socialist Scotland (Interim ten point programme)” agreed by the Scottish Socialist Alliance (Scottish Socialist Alliance) National Council on 6 September provides an opportunity to examine in detail the political basis upon which the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee are proceeding.
13. This debate has already produced many documents. We do not intend here to discuss all the points that Murray Smith raises as many have already been commented on in British Executive Committee material. Furthermore some of the historical issues, partly concerning the pre-1917 Bolshevik history, should be dealt with separately and the questions concerning international democratic centralism will be featured at the forthcoming Seventh World Congress.
14. In early September the Socialist Party National Committee debated the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s proposals again and decided, among other points, that “This National Committee wishes to put on record its opposition to the approach of the Scottish Militant Labour leadership in this debate and registers its opposition to their proposals. However, in order to remove any suggestion that we are resorting to formal organisational measures, we very reluctantly accept that the Scottish Militant Labour will go ahead and implement these proposals. We similarly accept that Scottish Militant Labour should go ahead with discussions with the Committee for a Workers’ International with the aim of forming a separate section in Scotland. These decisions will be reviewed after one year”. (The full text is reprinted in the Appendix).
15. Notwithstanding the ending of this stage of the debate in Britain the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International thinks that Murray Smith has raised issues both in regard to the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s position and wider questions which should be replied to. In this document we want to concentrate more on the new general issues that Murray Smith raises, while commenting on some of the arguments he uses to support the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s position and also on the Scottish Socialist Alliance’s new “Manifesto” which is included in this Bulletin.
Programme
16. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s “Political Justification” gives an “orthodox” description of the Scottish Militant Labour’s programme in paragraphs 6 to 12. However, as the British Executive Committee point out in their “Reply”, in so doing the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee “completely ignore all of the arguments put forward in their previous documents” (paragraph 2). Nowhere in “Political Justification” do the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee even acknowledge that they have made a substantial about turn, at least on paper.
17. Murray Smith carefully refers to this when he writes “The British Executive Committee documents have pointed out a number of problems in the way in which the Scottish documents deal with the question of programme…These problems are real”, (paragraph 23). But, in contrast to his sustained criticism of the British Executive Committee and International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International, nowhere in his section on “Programme” does Murray Smith give any indication of what these “real” problems are. It seems that Murray Smith is formally registering, for the record, the most glaring weaknesses of the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee before going on to defend their fundamental ideas.
18. This is not the way to debate. If “these problems are real” then Murray Smith has a responsibility to explain what the “problems” are for the benefit of his readers, the Scottish Militant Labour and the International. Why does Murray Smith not say whether or not these “real problems” have already had an effect on the Scottish Militant Labour’s activity?
19. As the British Executive Committee has argued the first three Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee documents raised questions about what is a revolutionary programme. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee have maintained that today the Scottish Militant Labour and Scottish Socialist Alliance have “the same programme” (“For a Bold Step Forward” paragraph 86), that “paradoxically, the task of organisationally and ideologically delineating the forces of revolutionary Marxism from other socialist currents was in the period 1919-1920 a much more crucial task than is the case today.”. (“For a Bold Step Forward” paragraph 42). They criticised the British Executive Committee for “mixing up the question of programme – which we would understand to be a list of policies and objectives, which could be expressed in written form and democratically voted upon at a conference – with something wider and less tangible”. (“New Tactics for a New Period”, paragraph 12).
20. While the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s about turn in “Political Justification” is welcome, the fact that it was done without any analysis of their previous positions means that no-one can be certain which position the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee will next adopt.
21. At the start of the discussion the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee argued that “not only in Scotland, but internationally, the traditional ideological battle lines which have divided the left have become blurred … a more principled and courageous minority moved … towards greater acceptance of a political programme which advocates full-blooded socialism combined with workers’ democracy, in the past, such a programme would have been dismissed as Trotskyism.” (“Initial Proposals “, paragraph 16).
22. From the beginning the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee confused the acceptance of socialist policies (often vaguely called “full-blooded socialism”) with a revolutionary Marxist programme. The question of centrism, i.e. the acceptance of revolutionary policies in words without the willingness or ability to put them in practice, was a closed book to the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee. Historically the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee would have had great difficulty in describing the difference between Marxism and Austro-Marxism. Some Austro-Marxist leaders proclaimed themselves revolutionaries and actually participated in the 1934 Austrian workers’ uprising. But they were not Marxist revolutionaries.
23. Trotsky commented that “the fact that a few Social Democratic leaders took part in the battles is at best only testimony to their personal valour. But the working class demands political insight and revolutionary courage from its leadership. Personal virtues … cannot substitute for a lack of these qualities…. What is necessary, however, is systematic revolutionary education of the vanguard and winning the trust of the majority of the proletariat in the practical intelligence and daring of the proletarian general staff. Without this precondition, victory is completely impossible.” (“After the Austrian Defeat”, 13 March 1934, Writings of Trotsky Supplement (1934-40), page 460). This type of exact characterisation has been absent from the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee throughout this discussion. Instead we get phrases like “full-blooded socialism” which have no Marxist meaning.
24. The first Socialist Party Executive Committee document, “A Reply to Scottish Militant Labour”, attempted to clarify this first position of the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee and challenged whether the Scottish Socialist Alliance’s “Charter for Socialist Change” really was “a very clear and concrete programme for the overthrow of capitalism.”. (“Initial Proposals”, paragraph 19).
25. The SP Executive Committee explained that “We have been able to reach agreement on a campaigning, fighting programme with others on the left, including some from a Stalinist tradition. Nevertheless, the Trotskyist tradition includes fundamentally important ideas on perspectives, revolutionary strategy, strategy on the national question, tactical methods of struggle, and methods of party building which are far from being accepted by many others on the left.” (paragraph 26).
26. “For a Bold Step Forward”, the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s second document, rejected the arguments of the SP Executive Committee. It stated that:
27. – “we have established our programme as the programme of the emerging left in Scotland” (paragraph 55)
28. – “Taken together, all of the programmatic documents of the Scottish Socialist Alliance constitute nothing less than a detailed transitional programme for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of workers’ power”, (paragraph 60)
29. – “one point is clear; within the Scottish Socialist Alliance now there are now no differences of opinion on advancing a full-blooded socialist programme”, (paragraph 78)
30. Scottish Militant Labour’s internal structures “have been affected by our involvement in the Alliance and the difficulties we have encountered in attempting to simultaneously promote and build two parties with the same programme.”, (paragraph 86); politically meaning that the Scottish Militant Labour and Scottish Socialist Alliance have the “same programme”.
The Scottish Socialist Alliance’s new “Manifesto”
31. The second SP Executive Committee document, “In Defence of the Revolutionary Party” examined some of the Scottish Socialist Alliance’s material to show its limitations ( paragraphs 60 to 67). But, as we have already said: debates move on. We now have “A Manifesto for a socialist Scotland (interim ten point programme)”, which was agreed by the Scottish Socialist Alliance National Council on 6 September as “a preliminary starting point around which we can explain the basic aims of the new Scottish Socialist Party”. Thus we can see more concretely the actual programme of the proposed Scottish Socialist Party, judge its character and decide whether the above claims from “For a Bold Step Forward” can be upheld.
32. Unfortunately this “Manifesto”, reprinted in this Bulletin, is neither a transitional or revolutionary programme. It concretely shows that the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee are proposing to hand over the bulk of the Committee for a Workers’ International’s Scottish resources to an organisation whose “interim ten point programme” could only be described as left reformist, not even centrist. Even if the Scottish Militant Labour was going to participate in an organisation with this programme, this participation could only be on the basis that, from day one, the Committee for a Workers’ International section had its own independent voice, clearly and regularly explaining the Marxists’ programme and policies.
33. This programme is, in many respects, a retreat on the programme which the British comrades advanced when they were working in the Labour Party. Including when comrades stood as parliamentary candidates on a Labour Party ticket.
34. The Scottish comrades have said that the Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party programme is evolving. This may be the case but it does not excuse confusion. The Marxist movement has always been very exact about programme. Faced with the “no good” Gotha Programme Marx wrote that
“After the Unity Congress is over, Engels and I will publish a short statement to the effect that we entirely disassociate ourselves from the said programme”. (Letter to Bracke, Marx/Engels Collected Works, Volume 24, page 77). In the case of the Scottish Socialist Party programme the Committee for a Workers’ International comrades have to be very clear about its limitations and weaknesses, and ensure that our own programme is widely known. The Scottish Militant Labour’s plan to have only a quarterly Committee for a Workers’ International journal will make this task very difficult.
35. One of the most well known and important of our election slogans, ‘A Workers MP on a Workers Wage’ is entirely absent. It is true that the Scottish Socialist Alliance Constitution does cover this point, but why is it not in the “Manifesto”? We understand that it is included in the new Scottish Socialist Party Constitution which unfortunately we have not et seen. However, because of the importance of this question it should also be featured in the “Manifesto”. This is not an abstract question. Next year the Scottish Socialist Party will strive to get members elected to the new Scottish Parliament.
36. Nowhere in this “Manifesto” is there a challenge to the inevitable corruption of bourgeois politics. How will the Scottish Socialist Party show that it is different from the other political organisations and that it has no careerists within it? This is a key issue in Scotland given the corruption among Labour MPs and local councillors. The Scottish Socialist Party needs to stand out as something different from the other parties, not just in words but in the actions of its leaders. Perhaps the comrades forgot to put the slogan ‘A Workers MP on a Workers Wage’ into the Scottish Socialist Party’s launching “Manifesto”. But, if this is the case, then unfortunately it shows a slipshod attitude to the programme.
37. Why is there no direct criticism of the Labour Party or Scottish National Party in the “Manifesto”, particularly when both still have members who call themselves “socialists” or “lefts”?
38. There are no demands for a fighting trade union policy, for trade union democracy or against the privileged trade union bureaucracy. Where are there calls for regular election of officials, for the right of immediate recall, or for officials to be paid the average wage of the workers they represent?
39. While opposing cuts in public spending there is no indication given of how they can be fought. The “Manifesto” does not outline how the Scottish Socialist Party would propose to fight against the spending limits of either the British government or new Scottish administration. Where is the reference to building a mass movement, something which the British comrades stressed, for example in Liverpool, while still working in the Labour Party?
40. The section on the “The Economy” is totally inadequate. Nowhere does it clearly explain that the Scottish Socialist Party, while fighting now for immediate reforms, stands for a socialist government which can only succeed on the basis of breaking the power of capitalism. The term “extension of democratic ownership” is elastic, leaving the door open to a possible reformist or Stalinist interpretation of calling for a gradual take over of the commanding heights of the economy.
41. The phrase “The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party is for a radical alternative to the ‘free market'” also leaves room for reformism. The failure to state that the Scottish Socialist Party stands for a socialist alternative means it does not rule out tin; idea of an “Alternative Economic Strategy” which the British reformist Left used to advocate. In fact the “Manifesto’s” formulation could also be agreed by the so-called “labour wing” of the German Christian Democrats who counterpoise the so-called “social market economy” to “pure capitalism”.
42. Apart from the idea of a “radical redistribution of wealth” the “Manifesto” does not give any hint of how its demands can be financed. It does not argue for an economic plan of production drawn up, and controlled by, the labour movement.
43. Despite the section on “International Solidarity” there is no hint that a socialist Scotland could only develop and survive with an extension of the overthrow of capitalism beyond Scotland’s borders. This particularly raises the issue that a workers’ government in Scotland would have to attempt to aid the workers’ movement in England and Wales in also overthrowing capitalism. While not ignoring the European dimension, the Scottish Militant Labour needs to concretely argue for a fighting alliance between Scottish workers and the English and Welsh working classes.
44. All in all, this “Manifesto” is a weak reformist document, notwithstanding its use of the word “socialism”. Certainly it is not the “detailed transitional programme for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of workers’ power” which “For a Hold Step Forward” wrote about in paragraph 60. II really in the recent period the Scottish comrades have been building “two parties with the same programme” (For a Bold Step Forward” paragraph 86), then this also raises serious questions about the Scottish Militant Labour’s own programme.
45. Murray Smith, perhaps preparing for having to justify such a weak programme, writes that “we will judge the Scottish Socialist Party by the content of its programme as a whole and its incompatibility with capitalism, but also by its practice, by how it intervenes in the class struggle”. Of course words are not enough, deeds count. But no-one with any real knowledge of the Trotskyist movement would accept the downgrading of the question of the programme.
The Scottish Socialist Alliance “Manifesto” – A transitional or an action programme?
46. Possibility Murray Smith will say that this “Manifesto” is an “action programme”. However the “Manifesto” is weak on action, not really spelling out what Scottish Socialist Party members will be fighting on in the workplaces, communities or in the Labour movement. Certainly the “Manifesto” does not have the feel of belonging to the “combat party with a revolutionary leadership and cadres” which Murray Smith writes about in paragraph 39.
47. Murray Smith, in paragraphs 29 and 30, seems to equate a transitional programme with an action programme when they really are something different. An action programme can be made up of a few demands on which struggles can be immediately based. These demands can be drawn from a transitional programme, but in isolation, in and of themselves, they are not a transitional programme.
48. In a discussion in March 1938 Trotsky asked: “What is the sense of the transitional programme? We can call it a programme of action, but for us, for our strategic conception, it is a transitional programme – it is a help to the masses in overcoming the inherited ideas, methods, and forms and adapting themselves to the exigencies of the objective situation. This transitional programme must include the most simple demands. We cannot foresee and prescribe local and trade union demands adapted to the local situation of a factory, the development from this demand to the slogan for the creation of a workers’ soviet. These are both extreme points, from the development of our transitional programme to find the connecting links and lead the masses to the idea of the revolutionary conquest of power.” (“Discussions on the Transitional Programme, 1977 Pathfinder edition, pages 100/1).
49. It is on this criteria that the British Executive Committee had already previously criticised in its documents the political weaknesses of the Scottish Socialist Alliance policies, policies which the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee have described as being “a very clear and concrete programme for the overthrow of capitalism and the building of a new socialist Scotland with an internationalist perspective”. (“Initial Proposals” paragraph 19). The text of the new “Manifesto” contradicts the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s description of the Scottish Socialist Alliance’s politics and confirms the critique of both the British Executive Committee and International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International.
Compromises and a Committee for a Workers’ International section
50. It has been clear for some time now that the Scottish Socialist Alliance does not have a revolutionary Marxist approach, and that already the Scottish Militant Labour leadership have been forced to make compromises in order to reach agreement with other Scottish Socialist Alliance members. This would not necessarily always be wrong, provided a distinct Scottish Militant Labour political profile was also being maintained and the concessions did not become unprincipled.
51. Examples of the extent of these compromises have been given already in this debate. In “For a Bold Step Forward” the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee provide quotations from the Scottish Socialist Alliance’s material. Among these extracts there is the following from the Scottish Socialist Alliance Constitution which “imposes rigid conditions upon its public representatives: “All Scottish Socialist Alliance elected representatives must be prepared to:… (c) participate in non-violent direct action campaigns and activities”, (paragraph 59).
52. Why is the term “non-violent” there? The working class and Marxists prefer a peaceful struggle but the proletariat and its organisations have a right to defend themselves. Marxists have always pointed out that the responsibility for any violence lies with the ruling class and its representatives. The ruling class is always prepared to use repression. It was not an accident that in Britain one of Thatcher’s very first acts on coming into office in 1979 was to dramatically increase police pay.
53. Just looking at Britain, we have seen clashes taking place during the Thatcher years, most notably during the miners’ strike and, to a lesser extent, during the Poll Tax battle. The use of the phrase “non-violent” can also lead to the danger that fresh workers and youth will interpreted it as an implied criticism of the miners and others, who during the course of their struggle became involved in clashes with the state.
54. Previously, when asked about this phrase, the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee explained that “non-violent” was included at the request of non-Scottish Militant Labour members in the Scottish Socialist Alliance. Perhaps this is what Murray Smith meant by the Scottish Socialist Party having a “broad appeal”?
55. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee may have decided that this compromise was justified in order to maintain the Scottish Socialist Alliance as a “united front” type organisation. This view can be debated. But, whatever the opinion on this specific point, this compromise is a concrete example of why it is absolutely necessary for the Scottish Militant Labour comrades to maintain their own revolutionary organisation and separate propaganda.
56. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s first idea, “one variant”, for the Scottish Militant Labour to “throw everything into the new party” (“Initial Proposals”, paragraph 25), i.e. cease a separate existence as a revolutionary organisation, would have meant it would have been impossible for Committee for a Workers’ International members to struggle in an organised way against ideas such as “non-violent direct action”. This would mean a political dissolving of the Committee for a Workers’ International section in a sea of political confusion, each Committee for a Workers’ International member would be forced to try to fight individually for Marxist policies.
57. The possibility of ceasing to be organised was no slip of the pen by the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee in their first document. In their second document, “For a Bold Step Forward”, the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee returned to the question and tried to justify the possibility of having no organised Committee for a Workers’ International section within the Scottish Socialist Party. They wrote “There are many historical examples of Trotskyist and Marxist groupings armed only with ideas which have been extremely effective”, (paragraph 160).
58. It seems that Murray Smith does not agree with this. He thinks that a Committee for a Workers’ International section must continue, but at the same time he agrees with the Committee for a Workers’ International handing over to the new party the resources it has accumulated in Scotland and financing the new “broad” party’s launch and full timers. In other words Murray Smith accepts a weakening of the Committee for a Workers’ International section in order to get the Scottish Socialist Party, a party with a “broad appeal”, off the ground.
A Question of Programme and Organisation
59. Murray Smith’s document provides some useful quotations from Trotsky on the question of the programme, including the link between the programme and the revolutionary organisation, the party. Murray Smith quotes Trotsky explaining in a discussion in June 1938 how the “cohesion” of the revolutionary organisation rests upon “a common understanding of the events, of the tasks, and this common understanding – that is the programme of the party” (“Discussions on the Transitional Programme”, 1977 Pathfinder edition, page 171).
60. In a letter written a week before that discussion Trotsky wrote that “we can attract others to us only by a correct and clear policy. And for this we must have an organisation and not a nebulous blot.” (“Discussions on the Transitional Programme”, 1977 Pathfinder edition, page 168). The danger of the Committee for a Workers’ International section in Scotland becoming a “nebulous blot” is precisely posed by the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s plan to hand over the majority of its resources to the Scottish Socialist Party, with the Committee for a Workers’ International section holding monthly meetings and publishing a journal every three months.
61. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee originally implied that a Committee for a Workers’ International section many not be necessary because the new Scottish Socialist Party would be similar to the Workers’ Party of the United States (WPUS) which existed between 1934 and 1936. The WPUS was formed by the US Trotskyists in the CLA and the Muste- led American Workers Party. As the British Executive Committee have pointed out the American Workers Party contained “militant working class ranks .. moving towards revolution, while a section of its leadership … were moving towards the position of the CLA and the Fourth International.” (“In Defence of the Revolutionary Party”, paragraph 52).
62. This is not the situation with the proposed Scottish Socialist Party. As we have seen the Scottish Socialist Party’s new “Manifesto” is not a revolutionary document. By comparison the WPUS from the beginning supported the building of the Fourth International. Muste himself participated in the July 1936 International Conference for the Fourth International. Publicly Muste and the other US representatives were described as “observers”, because four months earlier, in March, the WPUS had decided to publicly formally dissolve and start entry work in the US Socialist Party.
63. Despite Murray Smith quoting, in paragraph 68, from the constitution the WPUS adopted at its December 1934 founding conference, the fact was that, in reality, the WPUS was in the Fourth International movement. This is shown by the dispute between Muste and Shachtman over Muste’s wish to nominate Abern as the US member of the new International Secretariat at the July 1936 International Conference (see Writings of Leon Trotsky, Supplement 1934-40, pages 706 to 709). Perhaps this is why Murray Smith writes “over a four-year period 1934-38, there was no openly affiliated organisation in the USA to the international Trotskyist movement”. (paragraph 70, our emphasis).
64. For Trotsky the link between the revolutionary programme and the revolutionary organisation for both formulating and implementing political action is clear. This is quite different from the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s view that “there have been many historical examples of Trotskyist and Marxist groupings armed only with ideas which have been extremely effective”. (“For a Bold Step Forward”, paragraph 160).
65. On both criteria of programme and organisation the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s plans do not pass the tests which Trotsky poses.
An over-emphasis on Recruitment ?
134. It is wrong for Murray Smith to present “Arithmetic growth” crudely as something to be avoided. This can lead to the idea that recruitment can be left until the future and neglecting of the work of building and developing the revolutionary organisation today. The issue is really how to avoid sectarianism in our activity. If there are no other formations with which one can work with, or intervene in, then sections have to strive as much as they can to develop their independent activity.
135. Even regarding the UIT there are very few countries where both the Committee for a Workers’ International and the UIT have sections, and it is only in France that they are roughly of similar size. So what does Murray Smith’s sweeping statement “over the last period, the whole orientation towards regroupment has been replaced by the insistence on building our own sections” (paragraph 93), mean for the comrades in Belgium, Britain, the CIS, Greece, Nigeria, Sri Lanka or Sweden just to name a few sections? Are they working incorrectly, should they reduce emphasis on recruitment, instead today becoming “the motor force of regroupment” (paragraph 92)? And today, precisely with whom should they attempt to regroup or launch new parties with? Significantly in his general critique of the work of the sections Murray Smith does not give a single specific example from any countries apart from Scotland and France.
136. In this regard the Swedish section’s development provides a positive example to the whole International. Despite the absence of large scale class struggles, the attacks on the welfare state provided the comrades with the opportunity to build. The Swedish section’s emphasis on recruitment has resulted in a growth from a membership of 196 at the end of 1991 to 702 at the time of the last European School. It is not clear whether Murray Smith is making a critique of the Swedish section’s emphasis on recruitment. Was the Swedish comrades strategy “a conservative and potentially sectarian conception of party-building” (paragraph 7)1 Certainly Murray Smith should clarify whether he thinks that the Swedish comrades should have pursued an alternative strategy, and if so, precisely which one?
137. In Britain, during a period of generally sharpening class relations and a number of serious class struggles, our section grew from about 30 to over 8,000. This was not simple single recruitment, but often recruitment of groups of workers and youth involved in struggle. During the 1984/5 miners strike over 500 miners joined the British section. It could be discussed whether this was individual or group recruitment! And the British section did not only intervene in struggles, it also initiated and led two mass campaigns, in Liverpool from 1983 to 1985 and against the Poll Tax from 1988 to 1991. Again we should ask whether this was generally the correct strategy.
138. These types of gains are only possible if the membership is instilled with political confidence in our ideas and organisation, so that they are enthusiastically able to recruit from interventions and from their work and social milieu. Murray Smith’s approach would have the effect of lowering the “recruiting consciousness” of comrades.
139. In some countries, such as France, the issue of fusing with forces from existing “Trotskyist” groups is of greater importance than in others. However, even where this is achieved it is not a substitute for recruiting and building a base amongst the fresh new forces of the workers and youth, the vast majority of whom are not organised in either of the existing revolutionary parties. Our capacity to reach the best of the forces in other Trotskyist groupings will be greatly enhanced by us showing in practice how we can build amongst the fresh layers. It was the initiative of the Committee for a Workers’ International in launching the Youth Against Racism in Europe that was a big factor in attracting the French comrades towards us.
140. Throughout his document when Murray Smith gives historical examples they are often wrong or are interpreted in a one sided manner.
141. For example in paragraph 93 Murray Smith writes, in effect critically, that “our sections are now systematically described as parties or at least as the nuclei of parties” and in the following paragraph quotes Cannon as saying “We are not yet a party”. But this is completely misleading. At the time this quotation from Cannon refers to, late 1935/early 1936, not “1934” as Murray Smith writes, Cannon was not actually talking about the Trotskyists name. Cannon was in fact arguing, at that time, for the Trotskyists entry into the Socialist Party in order to take a further step towards building a mass party. The date is quite significant, because in December 1934 the US Trotskyists had created a new organisation with the followers of Muste, called the Workers’ Party of the US. Obviously the term “party” was not the issue in the debate over entry into the Socialist Party in late 1935/early 1936. This is confirmed by the fact that, after leaving the Socialist Party, the US Trotskyists created the Socialist Workers Party at the end of 1937.
142. Trotsky had no problem with the use of the term “party” in the 1930s. For example in May 1938 Trotsky wrote explaining to a Belgian comrade that “our national organisations call themselves parties (Trotsky’s emphasis) or leagues” (Trotsky Writings 1937-38, page 346). The question today is still how we work, not whether or not, according to the national situation, our sections are publicly called parties.
Recent relations with the UIT
143. Murray Smith critically writes that “since March relations between the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International and the UIT have been reduced to a strict minimum and there is no more talk of fusion” (paragraph 87). This is unfortunately largely true and is disappointing in view of the hopes which were raised last year. But there are political reasons for this.
144. Murray Smith seeks to downplay the two incidents which have undoubted led to a cooling of relations between ourselves and the UIT leadership. He writes that “the two incidents in question do not justify allowing the whole process which was under way with the UIT to seize up. What is at stake in the discussions with the UIT is the question of fusing with an international that shares with us the objective of building a revolutionary Marxist international and parties in every country, and that represents serious forces” (paragraph 88).
145. The material published in this Bulletin’s Appendixes show how our relations with the UIT have unfolded this year.
146. Reading this material it should be clear that, in his document, Murray Smith avoids the main underlying issues when he tries to describe the dispute with the UIT.
147. As Murray Smith writes in paragraph 87 the initial problem with the UIT leadership occurred over a “refusal to discuss allegations about their past”. These questions were raised by Carlos Petroni, a member of our United States National Committee, who had previously been active alongside the UIT leadership when both were members of the LIT. While the UIT International Secretariat said formally that they were willing to discuss these points, they refused to so in the presence of Carlos Petroni. But Carlos Petroni is the only Committee for a Workers’ International member who had personal experience of the UIT’s past and his exclusion would effectively prevent a full discussion of the issues. We could not accept the UIT leadership hampering this discussion by attempting to have a veto over which Committee for a Workers’ International members were present, especially excluding the Committee for a Workers’ International member who raised serious questions about the UIT’s past methods.
148. The CWI International Secretariat made efforts to overcome this problem. In early March the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International actually held a meeting with two UIT leaders to attempt to resolve this issue, but the UIT did not agree to our position that the Committee for a Workers’ International should be able to itself decide who was in its delegation. Without agreement on this issue we were unable to discuss the actual points raised by Carlos Petroni.
149. A fusion cannot only be based upon political agreement on the current situation. It also has to be based upon an examination of the past record and traditions, political and organisational, of the organisations fusing. The French comrades themselves did this during their discussions with the Committee for a Workers’ International in 1992/3. Their 1993 “Report on the Militant” precisely dealt with historical questions, starting in the 1940s, as well as contemporary issues.
150. Any successful fusion will not only be achieved on political agreement, it also requires the building of mutual trust and honesty between the members of the organisations coming together. The November 1997 “Joint Declaration” said that “these discussions (between the Committee for a Workers’ International and UIT) have to be developed in a frank and loyal debate”. But the UIT’s attempts to effectively limit this discussion placed a serious question mark over how open they were prepared to be.
151. It inevitably raised serious doubts about the UIT leadership’s working methods. For our part, we have always made it clear that are prepared to discuss any issue relating to our past and present work, including controversial issues like Ireland, the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war.
152. The serious doubts that developed during the discussion relating to the history of the UIT were re-enforced by subsequent developments in Germany.
A ‘Loyal Debate’ In Germany?
153. In regard to Germany, Murray Smith while writing that the SL (the UIT’s German section) carried out a “manoeuvre” (paragraph 87), then goes onto dismiss the issue by saying “this is not the place to go into details”. But Murray Smith completely ignores both the question of trust and the main political issues involved.
154. As the material in the Appendix shows the UIT International Executive Committee apologised over reaching a political agreement with a small split from the Committee for a Workers’ International “without having first fully informed the SAV and the leadership of the Committee for a Workers’ International” (UIT emphasis). But lack of information is not the sole point of dispute. The UIT International Executive Committee have not answered the SAV Executive Committee’s main questions about the SL’s effective concentration on discussing with SAV members in opposition to the SAV leadership, the fact that the SL’s leading comrade attended factional meetings of the then SAV opposition or the SL’s sudden loss of interest in a second round of discussions with the SAV Executive Committee. The SL’s approach was not the “loyal debate” mentioned in the “Committee for a Workers’ International/UIT Joint Declaration”, but was, as Murray Smith says, a “manoeuvre”.
155. After the problems involving Carlos Petroni developed the SL’s activity increasingly took on the appearance of a raid to gain some members. The fact that the July meeting of the UIT International Executive Committee declared “itself favourable” to taking the breakaway from us, the SI, into the UIT at their next International Executive Committee meeting shows that they are putting a small numerical gain in Germany above their future relations with the Committee for a Workers’ International.
156. Currently, at the time of writing, the SI are consciously campaigning to persuade the SAV members they personally know to leave the Committee for a Workers’ International. In this situation the only conclusion we can come to is that, in Germany the UIT have, and are still, carrying out a “manoeuvre” to try and split the SAV. After this experience how is it possible for the Committee for a Workers’ International to have any confidence about the intentions of the UIT leaders to work towards a genuine and principled fusion?
157. At the same time the UIT International Executive Committee have totally avoided even commenting on the political questions we have raised about the new journal, Was Tun!, which the SL have jointly launched in Germany with the SI split away from us.
158. On 1 July the International Secretariat of the Committee for a Workers’ International and SAV Executive Committee jointly wrote to the UIT International Secretariat concerning, among other points, the political basis of the split in the SAV and the political character of Was Tun!:
“The UIT International Secretariat’s letter, while implying disagreement with the SI’s split, avoids making any political characterisation of the disputed issues in Germany. This is surprising given that the UIT comrades have been aware for some time of the debate and, via the SL comrades in Berlin, actually participated in it. Indeed on 29 January 1998 Pedro F had a personal discussion with Bob L in London on the situation in Berlin. PF then said that he was not sure about all the disputed issues, particularly in regard to the SAV standing in the coming 1998 Bundestag election. However PF, correctly in our view, commented that “it seemed that the Berlin opposition (now the SI) did not emphasise enough building the party”. Given that comrade PF later visited Berlin in April, when presumably he would have had the opportunity to examine the disputed issues for himself, we are surprised at this absence of any political comments in the UIT International Secretariat’s letter…
“the ‘proof of the pudding is in the eating’. Now the SL is producing a joint journal, Was Tun!, with the SI whose content seems to show that there now is political agreement between the SL and SI.
“This new journal is a precise example of the political mistakes of the former Berlin opposition. Apart from other questions, generally this journal does not use the transitional method as it does not raise the question of changing society. The journal does not describe itself as a socialist paper, rather a “paper for employee’s politics”. This reflects the policy of the SI grouping. When the SI members were still in the SAV the one branch which they controlled, Berlin Wedding, decided not to sell the SAV paper to or produce a SAV leaflet for the workers involved in a struggle in the AEG/AMC factory, instead organising solidarity action simply as “activists”.
“Only in one small Was Tun! article, which describes the SI and SL, is the word “socialism” actually used. In the main political article, “For a different policy! For Workers Lists!”, there is no mention whatsoever of the need for the expropriation of the capitalists and a planned economy, despite the fact that the authors mention the Communist Manifesto. In other words it seems that the SL agrees with the SI that a transitional programme does not have to raise the question of nationalisation or socialism. If this is the case, then it is easier to understand why the SL lost interest in discussing with the SAV Executive Committee. Furthermore the article, while calling for “Workers Lists”, does not put forward any concrete position or steps that activists should take towards the coming Bundestag election.”
Once More on the UIT
159. Murray Smith writes that “what is needed now is … to go back on the offensive for discussions and joint campaigns to verify whether a fusion is politically possible” (paragraph 90). Murray Smith does not mention the UIT International Executive Committee’s non-response to our political questions regarding Germany. So how can the Committee for a Workers’ International “verify whether a fusion is politically possible” if the UIT leadership simply ignore the political questions we raise?
160. Have the French comrades raised these political issues with the membership of La Commune and, if so, what response did they receive? During discussion between the UIT International Secretariat and the CWI International Secretariat in Paris in September this year the UIT argued that the points of difference in Germany between the SAV and the SL/SI were “tactical” and consequently their International Secretariat had not got a position on the disputed issues! Once again the issues were evaded with a proposal for joint campaign in solidarity with the Russian miners.
161. Murray Smith correctly writes “we have a duty to verify if a fusion is possible on a principled political basis” (paragraph 88). We await the reply from the UIT on the political and tactical issues that developed in Germany.
162. The International Secretariat is also waiting for the French comrades to produce their long promised political analysis of La Commune and the UIT. As we have said before the model for this report should be the “Report on the Militant” which the French comrades wrote as part of our 1993 fusion discussions.
163. In regard to the French comrades discussions with La Commune the International Secretariat is not trying to “impose” (paragraph 89) anything on the French section except to insist that before there is any joint paper or fusion there is a serious political discussion, which includes programme, perspectives and the International. As Trotsky pointed out “…unity is an excellent thing. But demarcation on the question of the Marxist programme must precede unity (fusion of the mass newspapers) in order for that unity to be honest and long lasting” (4 January 1936 Letter to the GBL CC, in Crisis of the French Section page 127).
164. As we have stated earlier, a merger it is not simply a question of formal political agreement or the following of correct procedures. There is also the question of trust. In 1938 Trotsky, writing to the then French section about fusing with Molinier’s group, said that “we must explain to them that the elimination of every suspicion in this respect is for us as an international organisation an imperative condition for any further discussions. If they oppose this verification in spite of our insistence, they doom themselves” (“Thoughts on the French Section”, Writings of Trotsky 1937-38, page 320). While obviously the then situation with Molinier was different from that with the UIT today, we have the same approach as Trotsky. There must be “the elimination of every suspicion” before any fusion can take place.
165. For this reason, our future relations with the UIT can only be determined by their willingness to fully discuss their history, fully repudiate their raiding tactics in Germany and comment on the political issues that arose in Germany.
166. The Committee for a Workers’ International does not have a hostile or sectarian attitude to the UIT members. We respect the majority of them as genuine revolutionary socialists, notwithstanding the political differences we have with them. However, we need to try and ensure that they are fully aware of the wrong methods and dishonest attitude that their leaders have adopted in dealing with the Committee for a Workers’ International.
Trotsky’s approach to regroupment and recruitment in the 1930s.
167. As the International Secretariat explained at the European School, Trotsky while striving to achieve principled revolutionary unity did not, as Murray Smith implies in paragraph 88, have an open door policy to all who claimed to be “revolutionary” or even “Trotskyists”. Boundaries had to be maintained against both centrism and sectarianism. Trotsky’s tactics were not fixed. They were determined by the stage of development of the objective situation, developments within the workers’ movement and the concrete position of the Trotskyist movement.
168. The first ever international Trotskyist conference in February 1933 in reviewing its past development agreed that:
“In approaching the task of assembling its ranks on the national and international scale, the Left Opposition had to begin with the various groups that actually existed. But from the very beginning it was clear to the basic nucleus of the International Left Opposition that a mechanical combination of separate groups which count themselves among the Left Opposition is permissible only as a starting point, and that later on, based on theoretical and political work as well as internal criticism, the necessary selection must be made…
“The principle of party democracy is in no way identical with the principle of the open door…
“As far principled methods are concerned, the International Opposition has never broken with any group or any individual comrade without exhausting all methods of ideological persuasion…
“The proposal to call a conference with each and every group that counts itself in the Left Opposition (the groups of Landau and Rosmer, the Mahnruf, Spartakos, the Weisbord group, etc.) represents an attempt to turn the wheel backward and shows a complete lack of understanding of a revolutionary organisation and of the methods of selection and development of its cadres. The pre-conference not only rejects but condemns such an attitude as being in radical contradiction to the organisational policies of Marxism”. (The International Left Opposition, its tasks and methods, Documents of the Fourth International, 1933-40, pages 27/8)
169. Within months the entire world situation was transformed with the victory of Hitler in Germany. In July 1933 Trotsky called for the Left Opposition to abandon its previous position of attempting to reform the Communist International and called instead for a new, Fourth International. The Trotskyists started discussions with other left organisations on the call for a new International. In August 1933 the Trotskyists issued with the German SAP and the two Dutch parties, the OSP and RSP, the “Declaration of the Four” for a new International. Despite bringing together organisations with differing positions, this Declaration was principled, putting down some markers against centrism: While ready to co-operate with all organisations, groups and factions that are actually developing from reformism or bureaucratic centrism (Stalinism) towards revolutionary Marxist policy, the undersigned, at the same time, declare that the new International cannot tolerate any conciliation towards reformism or centrism. The necessary unity of the working class movement can be attained not by the blurring of reformist and revolutionary conceptions nor by adaptation to the Stalinist policy but only by combating the policies of both bankrupt Internationals.” (Documents of the Fourth International, 1933-40, page 58)
170. However a few months later this alliance, the “Bloc of Four”, broke down. During the 1930s the Trotskyists combined calls for revolutionary unity with the work of building the forces of the Fourth International. The emphasis being given at any moment was linked to the concrete objective situation nationally and internationally. After the collapse of the “Bloc of Four” Trotsky wrote: “The Bloc of Four as such was an indispensable step on the way to the Fourth International, a step that must and will be repeated on a higher level. Nevertheless, we should not close our eyes to the fact that following the demise of the Bloc of Four, the ICL is at the moment the only organisation that openly and consistently raises the question of a new, communist, Fourth International. This fact imposes new and important tasks on our organisation and imparts increased significance to it and its development…
“Alongside independent propaganda and active work all means must be employed – always keeping with the concrete situation – to link up with the masses, push them forward, and consolidate new revolutionary cadres from their ranks.
“Above all this includes:
Systematic fraction work in the trade unions…
Systematic fraction work in all workers’ parties and organisations…
Very special attention to promoting work among the youth in existing youth organisations as well as by building and broadening new youth organisations.
Forming alliances and blocs with organisations striving for a new communist party and International. These must be based on a clear principled basis and concrete formation of goals.
Fusion with such organisations on the basis of a clear communist programme” (Tasks of the ICL, July 1934, Writings of Leon Trotsky Supplement (1934-40), pages 508 and 511/2)
171. The above resolution, like all documents, reflects the time when it was written. Trotsky was always flexible in tactics. For example, while the resolution strongly argues in support of the French Trotskyists entering the SFIO (Socialist Party), a year later Trotsky was arguing for the French Trotskyists to end their entry work because the situation had changed again. But the essential point in this resolution is that it shows Trotsky’s emphasis on building, especially among youth, while arguing that in the future there would be new alliances probably “on a higher level”. This rounded approach is absent from Murray Smith’s document with its criticism of our “insistence on building our own sections” (paragraph 93).
Conclusion
172. In the best sense of the word the Scottish Militant Labour is carrying out a manoeuvre in forming a “broad” Scottish Socialist Party. This step is a political manoeuvre which attempts, in the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s view, to strengthen the socialist movement.
173. But, as both the British Executive Committee and the International Secretariat have tried to explain, this manoeuvre is based upon the Scottish Militant Labour forming a “broad” party in which, at first, Committee for a Workers’ International members will be a majority but which will carry out day to day activity on a non-Marxist programme. Simultaneously there will be a weakening of the structures of the Committee for a Workers’ International section, with it having, at least at first, monthly aggregate meetings in each city, one Full Timer and only a quarterly publication in Scotland in which they can develop their analysis and programme.
174. Bearing in mind these considerations we can only conclude that the Scottish Militant Labour’s decision to launch a Scottish Socialist Party on this basis is not only wrong but also dangerous.
175. In 1928 Trotsky wrote about how Marxists should approach manoeuvres, especially in regard to the Marxist organisation itself: “The most important, best established, and most unalterable rule to apply in every manoeuvre reads: you must never dare to merge, mix, or combine your own party organisation with an alien one, even though the later be most “sympathetic” today. Undertake no such steps as lead directly or indirectly, openly or maskedly, to the subordination of your party to other parties, or to organisations of other classes, or constrict the freedom of your own agitation, or your responsibility, even if only in part, for the political line of other parties. You shall not mix up the banners, let alone kneel before another banner.
“It is the worse and most dangerous thing if a manoeuvre arises out of the impatient opportunistic endeavour to outstrip the development of one’s own party and to leap over the necessary stages of its development (it is precisely here that no stages must be leaped over), by binding, combining, and uniting superficially, fraudulently, diplomatically, through combinations and trickery, organisations and elements that pull in opposite directions. Such experiments, always dangerous, are fatal to young and weak parties…
“that is why – and we arrive here at point which is of paramount importance for the Comintern – the Bolshevik party did not begin with manoeuvring as a panacea but came to it, grew into it in the measure that it sunk roots deeply into the working class, became strong politically and matured ideologically…
“It was not flexibility that served (nor should it serve today) as the basic trait of Bolshevism but rather granite hardness…This is what the communist parties of both the West and the East must begin with. They must first gain the right to carry out great manoeuvres by preparing the political and material possibility for realising them, that is, the strength, the solidity, the firmness of their own organisation”. (“Strategy and Tactics in the Imperialist Epoch”, in Third International After Lenin, 1957 edition, pages 140/1)
176. Reading Trotsky, especially the last sentence quoted, we can see how far the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee have forgotten the ABCs which our movement was built upon.
177. The dangers of the Scottish Militant Labour’s new tactics are that it will lead to the disappearance of a politically effective Committee for a Workers’ International organisation in Scotland and, flowing from that, the “broad” Scottish Socialist Party adsorbing the Committee for a Workers’ International comrades.
178. We would not rule out that, in the future, the Scottish Socialist Party could possibly develop. But, if it did, then it would be even more important to maintain and develop the “the strength, the solidity, the firmness” of the Committee for a Workers’ International section. Only on this basis could any reformist or centrist trends be combated and the new Scottish Socialist Party members be won to a revolutionary socialist position and the Committee for a Workers’ International.
179. Right at the end of his document, in paragraph 115, Murray Smith raises the issue that “there is at least the beginning of a sectarian turn” in the Committee for a Workers’ International because of the reaction of both the International Secretariat and British Executive Committee to the Scottish Militant Labour’s plan.
180. But nowhere does Murray Smith give any examples of a sectarian approach in practice. Where are the British Executive Committee or International Secretariat advocating stopping joint activities with other forces in Scotland? Murray Smith says that no-one pretends that “broad forces … exist at this stage” (paragraph 13). So Murray Smith is arguing that we have a sectarian approach because we are against using the bulk of our resources in Scotland to form a party with a “broad appeal as possible” while at the same time effectively downgrading the role and functioning of the Committee for a Workers’ International section?
181. Internationally Murray Smith does not give any examples other than that of France where the International Secretariat is opposed to fusion with La Commune not because we are sectarian but because we are not convinced that there is the political basis to achieve a fusion on a principled basis.
182. In effect Murray Smith is hoping for the best on the basis of a few months limited co-operation with La Commune. Co-operation which has mainly taken the form of some joint leaflets, petitions, joint interventions and joint meetings of the Executive Committee’s of both organisations.
183. In April we urged the French comrades’ to produce a document on La Commune. This, we understand is still being prepared. It is necessary for the comrades’ to explain what balance sheet they have drawn regarding the political and organisational character of the La Commune. Do they envisage La Commune leaving the UIT and if not how is the question of international affiliation to be resolved? It is necessary to see how the comrades estimate the political differences we have with La Commune.
184. However La Commune are also the French section of the UIT. We cannot close our eyes to the behaviour of the UIT regarding their past and Germany tells us about their methods. In his enthusiasm to secure agreement with La Commune, Murray Smith implicitly accepts, in paragraph 87, the UITs apology over their procedure in Germany. However he does not comment on the attitude adopted by either the UIT or La Commune to the political issues and methods used by them in this dispute.
185. Murray Smith seems, in regard to our differences with the UIT, to have a position of registering them but then hoping they can be overcome in practice. But serious questions, as opposed to smaller differences, cannot be treated in this way. Closing your eyes and hoping for the best is not the way for a Marxist to proceed, we need to face reality and ask questions. Otherwise there can be a tendency to look for short-cuts through rose tinted glasses.
186. Murray Smith is correct that wider issues-have been raised in this debate which will continue to be discussed internationally.
187. Our coming World Congress will have to draw up a balance sheet of our discussions with international tendencies like the USFI, LIT, UIT and ITO and national groupings like the DSP.
188. These discussions have shown that there is not the political basis for a fusion to take place with these organisations. Of course, in some national section some forces from some of these organisations have fused together with us.
189. In this situation the 1934 resolution, “Tasks of the ICL”, provides a good outline of our task of building the Committee for a Workers’ International today, while not ruling out in the future alliances, blocs and even fusions “on a clear principled basis and concrete formulation of goals”.
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 23 SEPTEMBER 1998.
APPENDIX A: MATERIAL ON SCOTLAND
SOCIALIST PARTY NATIONAL COMMITTEE. 5-6 SEPTEMBER 1998
Resolution 1
We consider that it is necessary, at this point in the discussion, to briefly summarise our position on the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s latest proposals for a Scottish Socialist Party (Scottish Socialist Party).
There has been an intensive discussion on the issues, with an exchange of documents between the SP Executive Committee and the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee and debates at the National Committee, regional meetings, and at the Committee for a Workers’ International European School. In our view, the main documents produced by the Scottish Militant Labour Executive to justify their proposals (Initial Proposals, For a Bold Step Forward, New Tactics) fundamentally question our ideas on the role of a revolutionary party and party-building, the character of a Marxist programme, the role of the International, and important aspects of the perspectives. The SP Executive Committee’s documents have replied to all the Scottish Militant Labour’s points in detail, but the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee has not responded to our arguments. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive’s latest document, Scottish Socialist Party – A Political Justification, ignores all the theoretical, historical, and programmatic issues raised in their earlier documents, without any indication that the comrades are now withdrawing any of their previous arguments. We believe that, in reality, the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s proposals for a Scottish Socialist Party flow from their false political arguments put forward in their documents.
We are totally opposed to the political and organisational proposals put forward in ‘Scottish Socialist Party – A Political Justification’ and the ‘Resolution to Scottish Militant Labour Conference from Scottish Militant Labour Executive’ (received by the SP Executive Committee on 25 August).
In case there is any doubt about our general position on Scotland, we would like to make the following points clear: We recognise that there will be exceptional opportunities for Marxism in the next period and that our Scottish organisation has to prepare to seize the possibilities which will develop. Over a year ago, before the current debate began, we raised the need for Scottish Militant Labour to change its name and proposed that the Scottish organisation should become a separate section of the Committee for a Workers’ International. We are also in favour, as in England and
Wales, of the formation of a new, broad, socialist party if sufficient forces can be brought together and provided it is done on a principled political basis.
We still believe that the best way forward in Scotland would be for the comrades to adopt one or other of the two options the SP Executive Committee proposed (2 April). Option 1 (favoured by the Executive Committee and by a majority of the International Executive Committee delegation which visited Scotland on 26-29 June) would be to relaunch Scottish Militant Labour as a revolutionary Marxist Scottish Socialist Party, which would continue to collaborate with other forces in a broader alliance, electoral platform or other formation. Option 2 would be for the Scottish Socialist Alliance to be relaunched as a broad Scottish Socialist Party, organised on a united front basis, allowing the participation of different political organisations, groups, trends, etc, in which our revolutionary organisation would play a key role.
However, the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s document, Scottish Socialist Party – A Political Justification, rejects Option 1, ignores Option 2, and instead proposes a hybrid Scottish Socialist Party. We are opposed to this for fundamental political reasons:
(1) The Scottish Socialist Party being proposed will not be a broad socialist party, organised on united front lines, in which our comrades would participate as a revolutionary organisation; nor will it be a revolutionary Marxist organisation. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s proposal, in our view, is in reality for a centrist party. Some elements of a Marxist programme will be combined with reformist policies on the basis of a false method which is incompatible with the tradition of Marxism and Trotskyism. Leaders of Scottish Militant Labour will come together with reformist and centrist elements in a hybrid leadership of Scottish Socialist Party without the safeguards of a united front structure which would enable our own organisation (while collaborating with other forces in building the new party) to retain an independent Marxist identity and policy.
(2) The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s latest proposal for a new organisation (which they now propose should be called International Socialist [IS]), which would form a Scottish Section of Committee for a Workers’ International, are politically and organisationally inadequate. The organisational proposals put forward in the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s resolution must, in our view, be considered in the context of the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s political justification for the proposed Scottish Socialist Party. The proposal for a “revolutionary platform/tendency” would not ensure the development of a revolutionary Marxist organisation capable of maintaining a clear Marxist banner, formulating correct programme and perspectives, and of recruiting and developing cadres. The proposed approach would not provide an effective means of building a revolutionary organisation capable of withstanding hostile pressures and winning broader support through different stages of struggle in the future.
We note (resolution point 10) that the International Socialists will have the right to have members-only meetings, but the emphasis is on open meetings which will not be weekly but “should meet monthly as a minimum” (point 3). The resolution states (point 9) that International Socialists members who have Scottish Socialist Party positions or are elected representatives “will be accountable to the International Socialists”, but the resolution makes no reference to the International Socialists organisation being based on the method of democratic unity.
There is no proposal for a weekly or fortnightly paper. The only public face proposed for the organisation is a quarterly magazine. The proposals for finances indicate that the main finance for the Scottish Socialist Party will come from Scottish Militant Labour members, but (for reasons which are not explained) paying via the new International Socialists for six months and subsequently paying directly to the Scottish Socialist Party.
The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s current proposals will not, in our view, enable the comrades to build effectively in the next period, and will pose the serious danger of throwing away past gains. We therefore urge the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee, even at this stage, to reconsider their proposals.
Socialist Party National Committee, 5-6 September 1998
Resolution 2
Scottish Socialist Party Debate: Procedure
This National Committee strongly opposes the refusal of the leadership of Scottish Militant Labour to recommend the postponement of their proposals for the establishment of the Scottish Socialist Party at least until the British Special Congress (3-4 October) if not until the World Congress in November.
We believe that the Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s insistence on going ahead at the Scottish Militant Labour Conference (12-13 September) goes completely against the principles and usual practices of ‘democratic unity’ on which our organisation rests. The Scottish Militant Labour Executive Committee’s course of action denies the membership of the SP in England and Wales and of the Committee for a Workers’ International as a whole, together with our Scottish comrades, the opportunity of fully and collectively taking decisions on crucial strategic and tactical issues which can determine the fate of the revolutionary movement.
This National Committee wishes to put on record its opposition to the approach of the Scottish Militant Labour leadership in this debate and registers its opposition to their proposals. However, in order to remove any suggestion that we are resorting to formal organisational measures, we very reluctantly accept that Scottish Militant Labour will go ahead and implement these proposals. We similarly accept that Scottish Militant Labour should go ahead with discussions with Committee for a Workers’ International with the aim of forming a separate section in Scotland.
These decisions will be reviewed after one year. This decision does not preclude further debate and discussion at the Special Conference and at the World Congress.
A manifesto for a socialist Scotland
(Interim ten point programme for the Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party)
This suggested draft ten point programme was drawn up following a discussion at the September National Council meeting of the Scottish Socialist Alliance.
It is based upon the Charter for Socialist Change, with some modifications.
It is neither a final policy statement, nor a comprehensive political programme, but a preliminary starting point around which we can explain the basic aims of a new Scottish Socialist Party.
There will be ample opportunity in the coming months for the new party to develop and refine these points, as well as to work out a more detailed socialist programme for Scotland
Scottish Parliament
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for an independent socialist Scotland.
We reject the idea that the Queen should remain as Head of State and support the principle of a democratic republic in which feudal institutions such as the Monarchy and the House of Lords are swept away.
In the meantime we will fight within the new devolved parliament for socialist policies.
International solidarity
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party promotes international solidarity of the working class and the oppressed against global capitalism.
We stand for the eventual establishment of a democratic socialist alliance of European states rather than a Europe dominated by big business.
We are for the cancellation of Third World debt and for international solidarity and cooperation around socialist policies to end poverty, starvation, environmental destruction, exploitation, war and racial hatred.
Equal rights
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party is opposed to all forms of racism, sectarianism and national chauvinism.
We stand for full citizenship and equality for all within a socialist Scotland, regardless of race, nationality, religion, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation.
We are in favour of a Scottish parliament in which women have equal representation.
The economy
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party is for a radical alternative to the ‘free market’. We reject the notion that Scotland’s economic policy should centre around attracting inward investment by offering lavish subsidies, low taxes and cheap labour, and natural resources to transnational companies. Instead the Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for an economy which is democratically planned in the interests of society as a whole.
Specifically, we stand for the social/public ownership under democratic management of all industries privatised under the last government; and for an extension of democratic ownership to include Scotland’s major industrial, construction, commercial and financial corporations.
Poverty and unemployment
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for a radical redistribution of wealth from the rich to the working class and the poor.
The real problem facing Scotland is not lack of wealth – but the concentration of most of the country’s riches in the hands of a small clique of multi-millionaire bankers, industrialists, landowners, shareholders and stockbrokers.
As a first step to tackling poverty and inequality, the Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party supports the introduction for a 6 an hour minimum wage (in line with the European Decency Threshold) and a corresponding increase in all welfare benefits.
We also stand for a maximum ceiling on incomes of 120,000 a year – the equivalent of ten times the level of the minimum wage. This would represent at least a small first step towards a more equal society.
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/ Scottish Socialist Party also stands for the basic working week to be reduced to 35 hours as part of a phased and planned job creation programme leading to a four day working week.
Workers rights
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for the repeal of all anti-trade union legislation and for a new charter of workers rights which will guarantee the right of all employees to take industrial action and join a recognised trade union.
We are for greater autonomy for trade unionists in Scotland within the unitary all-British trade union movement. .
The environment
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/ Scottish Socialist Party stands for the right of people in Scotland to live in a clean, healthy and safe environment.
We support the removal of nuclear weapons in Scotland and internationally and the safe decommissioning of Scotland’s nuclear power stations – with guaranteed alternative employment to be provided.
We will fight for an integrated and affordable public transport network to discourage the use of private cars.
We will campaign for all toxic waste dumps to be identified and made safe and for all hazardous substances, including asbestos, to be safely disposed of.
We stand for the setting up of democratically elected bodies at community, city/town, regional and national level to help monitor and protect the environment.
Land
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for a radical shift in the pattern of land ownership in Scotland as the first step to regenerating Scotland’s desolate rural communities.
We oppose the feudal landholding system in Scotland which has resulted in less than 0.01 per cent of the population owning 80 per cent of all land.
We believe that Scotland’s land should be legally recognised as the common property of the people of Scotland.
We stand for restrictions on the size of landholdings with upper limits defined according to the quality of the land.
We stand for the transfer into public and community ownership of unoccupied and unutilised land, including sporting estates.
Public services
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party opposes privatisation of public services and will fight for the reversal of Tory and New Labour policies which encourage private profiteers to become involved in the health service, education and other public services.
We stand for the bringing into democratic control, Health Trusts, Water Boards and all other unelected quangos.
We will fight for the restoration of all cuts in health, education, housing and other public services.
We will campaign for the abolition of student fees, and for the restoration of student grants and other benefits.
Housing and homelessness
The Scottish Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party stands for a radical socialist housing policy which aims to end homelessness and provide decent, affordable accommodation for everyone.
We will campaign for the cancellation of Scotland’s local authority housing debt, estimated to be 3.5 billion, which would release hundreds of millions a year for council housing programmes; and for bringing the major construction companies into the public sector under democratic management.
We will also campaign for the establishment of a democratically-elected Scotland-wide housing forum, consisting of representatives from local authorities, housing associations, tenants associations and relevant trade union.
This forum would play a key role in coordinating a national house-building and renovation programme.
We also stand for an end to the sale of council houses; and oppose the privatisation of council housing.
We will campaign to bring rents and tenancy agreements in the private sector into line with those in the public sector.
APPENDIX B:- GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CWI AND THE UIT
JOINT DECLARATION BY THE CWI AND THE UIT, TO ALL IEC MEMBERS AND CWI SECTIONS, 11 NOVEMBER 1997
Dear Comrades,
Enclosed is a copy of a joint declaration, which has been issued by the Committee for a Workers International (CWI) and the Unidad de los Trabajadores Internacional (United Workers International UIT). This declaration was agreed at the end of five days of discussion which took place in Barcelona between October 30th and November 5th. This followed the participation by comrades from the UIT in the CWI summer school and the congress of the British section. Both of these events have impressed the comrades of the UIT.
The IS was represented by comrades Tony Saunois and Peter Taaffe. Comrades Virginia Rodriguez Arce and John Herd from our Spanish group also attended some of the meetings in Barcelona. The enclosed declaration was subsequently endorsed by a full meeting of the IS which took place on November 6th.
The objective of this letter is to give a brief outline of the discussions which have so far taken place. A fuller report will be given at the forthcoming meeting of the IEC together with a discussion about the prospects for future collaboration and relations between both international organisations.
During five days of intensive discussion the CWI representatives held a series of meetings with representatives of the leadership of the UIT. It was also possible to meet with the Executive Committee and Central Committee of the Spanish section of the UIT, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR).
In all of these meetings the comrades of the UIT adopted an open, honest and fraternal attitude. In addition to these qualities the UIT seems to be largely a proletarian organisation. The members of it have a serious attitude and are committed revolutionaries. If it is possible to arrive at a principled political agreement between the CWI and the UIT which would permit a fusion of both organisations to take place it would clearly mark a big step forward. Such a development could mark an historical turning point in building a more powerful revolutionary international organisation of workers and young people.
However, the discussions between our two organisations are at an early stage and need to be developed further. The recent meetings have allowed the CWI and the UIT to acquire a greater knowledge and understanding of the ideas and analysis put forward by each organisation.
The comrades informed us that their international is comprised of the following forces:
Argentina – the Movimiento Socialista de los Trabajadores which has 900 members.
Brazil – Corriente Socialista de los Trabajadores which has 180 members, two members of state parliaments and currently works inside the PT.
Chile – POR/JOR (Revolutionary Workers Party/Revolutionary Young Workers) with 30 members.
Colombia – Liga Socialista Internacionalista with 25 members.
Peru – Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores which works inside the Nueva Izquierda with 20 members.
Ecuador – Movimiento Socialista de los Trabajadores with 8 members working inside PAIS.
Panama – Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores with 10 members.
Mexico – Unidad Obrera y Socialista which has 55 members.
USA – 10 members (5 in Detroit and 5 in Los Angeles inside the LP).
Portugal – Al Socialismo – with 12 members.
Spain – Partido Obrero Revolucionario with 70 members.
France – La Comuna with 60 members.
Germany – socialist League which has 5/6 members.
The UIT also has two groups of about 30 members in the-former USSR with which it is currently working.
As indicated in the declaration the discussions on international questions covered the current world economic situation/globalisation, the question of the collapse of the former Stalinist regimes in the USSR and Eastern Europe, the traditional workers parties, the colonial revolution, the national question and the building of the international.
During these discussions it was clear (hat there is much agreement between our two organisations but important differences also exist, especially on the characterisation of the former Stalinist states and the national question. In all these discussions the comrades of the UIT were open and are eager to continue debating the issues in a fraternal manner.
The discussions at the CC meeting of the Spanish party of the UIT, the FOR, concentrated on the national/language question in Catalonia and tactics in relation to the United Left (IU). Both discussions where extremely informative and beneficial to us.
The CC session on the IU was informative, at the same time how the comrades intend to work in this grouping which they have been invited to join needs to be explored further in future meetings.
The discussions and joint collaboration in solidarity campaigns between the CWI and the UIT have already been positive. The IS will present a fuller report at the forthcoming I EC meeting and outline proposals of how to develop the discussion further in the direction which is indicated in the joint declaration.
The UIT has agreed to send a representative to the forthcoming IEC meeting. The IS will be represented at the forthcoming world congress of the UIT. following this event it has been agreed that an extensive tour will take place of some countries in Latin America where the UIT has sections. In order to deepen the discussion it will be necessary to organise further visits and discussions involving IS/IEC members and produce a joint bulletin for distribution to members of both organisations. These steps and other proposals about launching joint campaigns between the CWI and the UIT will be fully discussed at the IKC meeting.
The IS urges all sections to publish the joint declaration in their journal and to contact the centre for discussion and clarification.
Comradely,
Tony Saunois, for the International Secretariat.
DECLARATION BY THE CWI/UIT.
Between the 30th of October and the 4th of November a meeting took place between representatives of the leaderships of the CWI and the UIT to advance joint collaboration with the perspective of the regroupment of revolutionary and Trotskyist forces for the construction of the International. Both organisations now consider that a period of class struggle has opened in which the task is posed of building a revolutionary organisation with decisive influence amongst the international working class.
The economic globalisation by which capitalism has supposedly demonstrated its vibrancy/vigour and entered a new stage of development, has done nothing else but illustrate its sharp crisis. The recent fall of the stock markets is nothing less than an anticipation of a new crisis and consequential political convulsions flowing from its stagnant phase. The chronic unemployment throughout the world, the increase of misery and hunger for the population of the semi-colonial countries, the inbuilt social crisis in the big imperialist countries are all proof of a system which cannot take society forward and offer any lasting concessions to the movement of the masses.
Reflected in this crisis there is also the globalisation of the class struggle. During the last few days the French truck drivers have again paralysed the transport system. This action, like the French strike in November/December 1995, is nothing less than an expression of the workers struggle in Europe against Maastricht. The general strike in south Korea, the general strikes in Latin America in recent years against neo-liberal policies, the strike of UPS parcel workers of the USA are all important indications that the working class and other exploited layers, in more and more countries, are fighting with greater tenacity against the crisis of capitalism and anti-working class policies which are being implemented by governments.
In contrast to this increasingly energetic attitude of the workers, the old traditional workers parties (the social democracy and Stalinist parties) and the bourgeois and petty bourgeois movements in the semi-colonial countries, which have had a decisive influence for decades in the workers movement, have taken a pronounced turn towards the right. They have abandoned the struggle of the masses to win their demands. They increasingly have adapted to the new pro-capitalist ideologies. This has provoked crisis and fragmentation and has opened a bigger vacuum for the construction of a revolutionary party.
The world situation in all its facets is evidence that there is no progressive way out of the crisis for the working class and exploited layers other than socialism. In the face of the crisis of the capitalist system in its imperialist stage the working class has to struggle to take into its hands the destiny of the nation and economically expropriate the big capitalist monopolies and multi-nationals. Only socialism with workers democracy offers an alternative to this crisis-ridden society. This can only be won with the building of an international organisation that defends the programme of revolutionary socialism with the new layers and vanguard of workers who will be in the forefront of the workers struggle.
Based upon these issues a period of collaboration and discussion between both organisations – the U1T and CWI – has opened up. The discussion of the differences which exist relate to various questions but in particular relate to the estimation of what took place in 1989 in the countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR, the current class character of these states, the character of the social democratic parties and the national question. These discussions will be developed in a frank and loyal debate together with mutual collaboration over international campaigns in countries and at international level.
This is taking place with the objective to explore the possibility of unifying our two organisations as part of the regroupment of revolutionary currents and Trotskyists organisations, which defend revolutionary socialism.
Letter from the UIT to the CWI. 1 March 1998
Dear Comrades,
We have received your proposals to alter the agenda of the meeting between our two leaderships, in order to firstly have a discussion with Carlos Patroni present about a series of accusations put forward by him during a meeting of the CC of your party in the USA.
The meeting was organised to continue the process of discussion between our two organisations about the agreements and differences and to resolve some questions about common work. For this reason there were four points: the world situation, imperialism and the national question, the building of the international, and a discussion about the conduct of joint campaigns – in particularly a joint declaration to propose in the meeting of the Euro-marches and other organisations supporting the calling of a European Conference of Workers.
You had not proposed to discuss the opinions of that this comrade has about his split with the LIT, the organisation of which the UIT formed a part, and our organisation prior to discussing other issues. He raises a series of accusations and slanders which end by saying that we are preparing a factional struggle.
We are not in agreement with your proposal to have a session of the meeting with accusations and counter accusations of acts which took place ten years ago. We do not think that this will be a correct method -judgments of the balance sheet of what happened historically – to develop the political relations between our two organisations. It does not seem to us to be good to condition the relationship between our two organisations upon the opinions of a comrade who broke with our organisation. At this time, the LIT (our old organisation) judged these issues and concluded that this comrade used intrigue based upon lies.
We do not, and we do not wish to discuss and estimation of Petroni as a member of the CWI; we only have an opinion of his conduct of ten years ago. In this way we do not think that a political relationship can be constructed between two leaderships that have proposed to develop political discussions and common tasks in the class struggle in order to explore the possibility of unification.
It is a fact that there is a campaign by the LIT, with whose leadership we share many political positions, against us. They have put a proviso on all discussion. In our opinion this is a mistaken and defensive attitude to shield/defend/protect their organisation and avoid confronting a real process of reconstruction of the international based upon the unification of principled Trotskyist forces.
We can discuss each one of their accusation, and incorporate our critical estimation about their reprehensible moral conduct that impeded the development of political discussion.
But if we use the same method as the LIT, of establishing provisos, we will fall into mistaken procedures. Everything will end up in a discussion interpretation of actions of the past which will serve no useful purpose for anyone. It is not possible to make an estimation of an organisation discussing isolated balance sheets separated from the mark and conduct of the class struggle. This has been a method that has been very common as a result of the marginalisation/isolation of Trotskyism that has provoked many crisis.
It is a fact that there will be legitimate doubts between two organisations about each other’s intentions. In this case, doubts have developed by you about the character and the intentions of our leadership. We are very willing to face up to these doubts because it is now beginning to limit and condition the common work that we have proposed.
Nevertheless, it worries us that after participating in the CC of the FOR in Spain, the Brazilian congress of our party, meetings of youth and chemical workers in SP, participating in our world congress and visiting various regions of our Argentine party and having every opportunity to speak freely with the cadres and the rank and file, after having visited our Peruvian party, of knowing all the documents about our objectives and our crisis and our estimation of them, that you could open a space to the idea of intrigues that we are preparing for factional work.
We think that the way to resolve doubts is for both organisations to get to know each other better, both our ideas, our internal regimes, our proletarian morals. It should be taken into account that these are always established in practice as a criteria of the truth.
It is for these reasons that we propose to postpone the meeting that was set to take place, in order to create the conditions for a political meeting between our two organisations and that during the dates of the original meeting a smaller meeting takes place to clarify these issues which have developed in order to find a way forward.
This postponement is from the point of view of resolving the problems and to be able to advance in the important road that we have taken.
With Trotskyist greetings, International Secretariat of the UIT
Letter from the CWI IS to the UIT IS, 3 March 1998
Dear Comrades,
We have received your letter regarding the agenda of the meeting between representatives of the CWI and the UIT that was scheduled to take place in London from 7-9 March.
Your proposal to postpone this meeting and convene a smaller one on the 7 and 8 March that will discuss the issues that have been raised by Carlos in the USA is in our opinion the best way to deal with the situation. As we have already informed you by e-mail we accept the proposal for three comrades of the UIT to visit London to meet with a delegation from the CWI. During this meeting we will be able to discuss all of the issues that you raise in your letter but we would like to comment in this reply on some of the points you make.
As you explain in your letter to us our recent proposal regarding the agenda and attendance at the meeting changed the original agreement that we had arrived at when comrade Pedro was in London on 28 January. Our proposal to change the original agreement regarding the meeting was necessary because of the issues that comrade Carlos raised during a meeting of the National Committee of our party in the USA. This was held on 31 January/1 February – after the agreement was reached between us on the agenda of the meeting scheduled for March.
We made our proposal to discuss these issues that have been raised to fully clarify them. There has been agreement between us in all the discussions that have been held between our two organisations that all doubts, questions and differences of opinion should be discussed in a full and frank manner. This has been the case in all the meetings that have taken place between us. We have used the same method in making our proposal to discuss the issues raised by comrade Carlos.
The issues that have been raised by him contain important allegations relating to aspects of your history that we are sure you have had to discuss with other organisations in the past. In our opinion it is much better to clarify these questions at this early stage in the relationship between our two organisations rather than risk them emerging as issues later on. This we feel is in accordance with the full frank nature in which the discussions have already been conducted.
We also hope that you will raise with us any aspects of our political or organisational history that any of your members wish to discuss further with a view to seeking clarification.
There is agreement between us that we cannot start our political and organisational dialogue by laying down in advance provisos on historical questions and activities. This would be a mistake and we have not conducted the discussions with you in this way. However, when issues do arise during a discussion they need to be clarified. This was and remains our intention in proposing to change the original agenda. Only in this way is it possible for the process of discussion and dialogue to be developed on a firm and solid basis.
As you point out in your letter you have allowed representatives of the CWI to participate in the numerous activities, meetings and congresses of the UIT and its national parties where it has been possible for us to freely discuss with many cadres and rank-and-file members of the party. Comrades representing the UIT have attended the European cadre school of the CWI in July 1997, the 1997 congress of the British section of the CWI, and our IEC meeting that was held in November 1997 where similarly free and open discussions were held. In addition to this exchange regular discussions and meetings are held between comrades of the CWI and the UIT in France, Germany, Brazil, Mexico and Chile.
These exchanges have been an essential part of both our organisations becoming more familiar with each other and fully understanding the varied traditions we both have and the political agreement and disagreements that exist between us. The steps that we have taken in this direction need to be built upon and developed. This will help in both our organisations getting to know each other better as you explain in your letter to us.
We hope that this brief letter helps to clarify some of the issues that led us to propose a change in the agenda. These issues and other questions such as joint activities and arrangements for a larger political meeting between us can be discussed further during the meeting in London.
With Comradely greetings, International Secretariat of the CWI
Letter from the CWI IS to the UIT, 4 March 1998
Dear Comrades,
We would like to formally confirm the proposal that we have put forward to Comrade Pedro today (4 March 98)
The comrades of our IS are disappointed with the reply of the UIT regarding the participation in the meeting arranged for 7/8 March between the UIT and the CWI.
In order to attempt to resolve this question, the CWI would like to propose that we convene a small meeting of the UIT and CWI in London on the 7 or 8 March to discuss the procedure to develop the discussions and relations between both organisations and the problems that have developed.
Comrade Carlos Patroni will not participate in this meeting. We propose that 3 or 4 comrades of our IS are present.
Revolutionary greetings,
Tony Saunois, for the IS of the CWI
CWI IS Report on the discussions Between the CWI
and the UIT, 12 March 1988
To: IEC members and National Sections
Dear Comrades,
As you will have been informed a meeting was arranged between representatives of the CWI and the UIT in London from the 7th to the 9th of March. The original agenda for this meeting included a series of important political question that are at the centre of the discussion that has begun to take place between both international organisations. In addition to these issues the question of joint activity and campaigns, especially in Europe were included on the agenda.
After this original agenda had been agreed by both international organisations comrade Carlos Petroni, a former member of the LIT from which the UIT originated, raised some serious historical issues at a meeting of the National Committee our US section that was held on January 3lst/February 1st. This meeting was attended by comrade Peter Madden from the IEC.
The IS subsequently proposed to the UIT that an additional item be added to the agenda of the planned joint meeting that would allow a full discussion to take place of the issues raised by comrade Carlos. We proposed that comrade Carlos should be present at this meeting to facilitate the discussion.
This was verbally communicated to the UIT who, following an apparent misunderstanding, eventually rejected this proposal, stating that they would not be prepared to discuss the issues raised with Carlos present. We enclose the letter we received from the UIT on this question together with the reply of the IS.
In order to try and resolve this problem the IS eventually proposed that the UIT send a small delegation to London on the 7ih and 8th of March and the planned larger meeting was postponed. The UIT sent two representatives to London who met with four members of the IS (PT, TS, LW and PO) and one other full-timer from the international centre (NM) to keep a full record of the meeting.
During this meeting the comrades from the UIT again stated that they were not prepared to discuss these issues with comrade Carlos present.
The IS comrades attending the meeting unanimously agreed that it was not possible to accept this proposal without informing and consulting with members of the IEC and the comrades in the US section. This decision was taken because of the seriousness of the questions raised by comrade Carlos and the issues that have arisen during this discussion. This letter is a brief report of the meeting that took place.
As comrades will know Carlos was a member of the LIT, the organisation from which the UIT originates. He has a whole series of political criticisms of the MAS leadership and of both the LIT and UIT groups that emerged from it. These concern issues of perspectives, programme, strategy and method that we were, in any case, planning to discuss with the UIT leaders. However, Carlos has also raised serious allegations about the MAS leaders’ methods, including extremely serious claims that they used bureaucratic intimidation and violence against their party opponents. Carlos claims that the present UIT leaders shared responsibility for these methods when they were part of the MAS leadership.
Carlos reported that he joined the MAS in 1973 and was expelled in 1987. At its peak, the MAS had a membership of around 10,000. In 1986 its international organisation had around 25 sections with a total membership of 20,000.
In a summary form, Carlos’s main allegations about the UIT (former MAS leaders) are as follows:
i). The Executive Committee of the MAS used bureaucratic and violent methods during an internal struggle in 1987. Carlos says the present UIT leaders played a leading role in the MAS EC at that time. The MAS youth rebelled against the leadership, especially their “Argentinean nationalism”, and presented a document. The leadership denounced them. Carlos says he did not agree with everything in their document but defended their right to raise differences. He was accused of organising a faction. Carlos alleges that in the course of the factional struggle, the leadership raided offices, bugged phones, mobilised the party’s armed security section against opponents, and used violence. The youth group split away or was expelled with about 1,000 members. Carlos was then expelled and sections of their international were given the option of either ratifying his expulsion or of being expelled themselves (The US section was kicked out).
ii) The MAS later split again. Carlos says that the CC rebelled against the EC, with only one EC member siding with the CC. The CC (with about 1,000) became the Argentinean section of the UIT. Carlos claims that those who played the worst role in the 1987 split formed the UIT.
iii) Carlos argued that the method of the UIT is unchanged from the past. Their method was to open up discussions with different international groupings but then essentially try to conduct faction work (a kind of entryism) within them. Carlos himself was sent by the MAS to work with the WRP in Britain and other groups in Europe. He says he has information from personal contacts in Latin America that the UIT are conducting an internal political campaign against the CWI, on issues like the Malvinas and Ireland, claiming that we have a pro-imperialist position.
Because of the seriousness of the allegations made by Carlos the IS insisted that the issues should be discussed with him present. For the CWI to get a full understanding of the questions involved it is essential to have both sides that were present during the alleged events involved directly in the discussion. The comrades of the UIT rejected this proposal. The main reasons that they gave to defend their position were:
i) The LIT had drawn its own balance sheet on Carlos ten years ago and as a result they regarded it as a humiliation to discuss the issues again with him present. They argued that if he were present the CWI would be establishing itself as a tribunal.
ii) It was wrong to begin the discussions between our two international organisations on historical questions and argued that by doing so the CWI was imposing conditions on the discussion.
iii) The discussion should only be organised leadership to leadership.
The IS thinks that these arguments are false and they illustrate that an incorrect method is being used by the comrades from the UIT. It was therefore necessary in the meeting that took place to firmly oppose the arguments of the UIT and to agree that we consult with IEC members before proceeding with further discussion at international level.
The IS rejected the arguments of the comrades from the UIT for the following reasons:
It is not true that the CWI would be constituting itself as a tribunal on events that took place ten years ago. The purpose of the meeting would be to enable the CWI to obtain a better understanding of the UIT/LIT and its methods and traditions. If the allegations made by Carlos are not accurate then the UIT would have the opportunity to clarify the situation. If the allegations are substantially correct then it would be possible for the UIT to explain what methods they use today and what lessons they have drawn from these events.
The IS argued that although it is understandable that the comrades may feel aggrieved about having to meet with an ex-member who they concluded played a negative role it is wrong to refuse to do so. In the recent period it has been necessary for our comrades to meet with a leader of the British section of the USFI who had previously organised a faction in the British section of the CWI and split away from us.
ii) We have not begun the discussions with the UIT on historical questions. The discussions that we have had with them at the British congress, CWI summer school, at the UIT world congress and during the recent visit to Latin America have concentrated on contemporary political issues and joint campaigns.
The comrades from the UIT argue that we are placing conditions on proceeding with the discussions. However, the history of both international organisations is important and needs to be one aspect of the discussion during the exploration of the viability of a possible fusion. If doubts or questions about historical issues are expressed by the CWI or the UIT or members of either organisation they must be discussed and clarified. We are open to discuss any aspect of the history of the CWI with any member of the UIT.
iii) The leadership of both organisations will discuss all the political and organisational issues that arise. However, it is not a correct method to restrict this discussion to “leadership to leadership”. A principled, solid and lasting unification will mean that at all levels of membership in both international organisations there must be a full discussion of all the issues that arise, both historical and contemporary. If this is not done then there will not be a genuine political and organisational fusion of two international organisations.
In addition to these points the IS thinks that it is wrong to accept that the UIT should in effect be able to veto who will represent the CWI in the discussions even if in this particular case one of the proposed representatives was a former member of the LIT. Because of the issues that comrade Carlos has raised and his past involvement in the events he refers to, it is clearly more practical that he participates in the meetings where these questions are discussed as it would be necessary to consult and involve him in these discussions.
Carlos should be discussed in writing and verbally between the leaderships of both international organisations without him present. The IS agreed to consult with IEC members and other comrades before replying to the UIT.
Tony Saunois for the International Secretariat
Letter from the UIT to the CWI IS, 13 March 1998
Dear Comrades,
The motive of this letter is to put in writing the opinions and proposals that we put forward in the meeting at the end of last week. As we have already communicated to you, all of our worry is centred on finding a positive way out of the incident that has developed.
Seven or eight months ago we initiated relations that have gone well and have had positive results. These first steps have reconfirmed the common idea that we developed: to explore after political discussions and common intervention in the class struggle the possibility of converging into one international organisation.
The opportunity that we have to build a revolutionary pole for the vanguard and other Marxist revolutionary forces is perhaps unique in this new stage of the international class struggle.
How can we develop our two currents that came from distinct histories and traditions – all marked by the historic crisis of the IVth? In Barcelona and then in Argentina we spoke of the agreements and disagreements with the objective of finding a common programmatic agreement through intervening in the class struggle, developing common activities and leaving to one side discussions about the past.
It is legitimate that there will be doubts between our organisations about the past. They are themes that we are prepared to take up. But the only form of discussing the past in a just way is in the first place, to leave to undertake a judgement reached around the agreements and differences that we have about the present class struggle and affirming the agreement we have about common tasks. Through this we will get to know our organisations and parties. Without this it is impossible to analyse, to understand and to be able to evaluate the past of an organisation. It has been good that recently we have initiated the process of political discussion between our two organisations. The scheduled meeting had precisely the objective of taking a significant step in this sense.
The UIT proposed that the issues raised by comrade. For these reasons we do not see that it is correct to place the participation in the meeting of a comrade as a condition to clarify accusations made by him and with whom our organisation had a sharp conflict. Such a discussion would turn the meeting into a judgement about these acts and in this manner it would only obstruct the way of making a serious political and methodological characterisation of our organisations and their methods, policy and also their histories and trajectory.
Each organisation has the right to designate their members for the meetings. Nevertheless, in this first stage of relations a lot has to be taken into account that will allow the best development of the meeting in all its aspects. If in our organisation there was somebody who had been part of your organisation we would not have chosen them to be in our delegation, even in order to clarify your past. We would be giving a mistaken message in this manner to end the relations between our organisations. Surely time will allow the overcoming of difficulties and create other conditions a more appropriate means to do so and it is towards that that we look.
To end, we reiterate to you our proposal with the sincere hope of overcoming this incident and our willingness to take the time necessary for this to happen:
To return to the programmed agenda for the meeting: (a) world political situation; (b) imperialism and the national question; (c) the building of the IVth International; (d) campaigns and common tasks.
The relation to the interest that you have shown to discuss the crisis of the LIT, of which one of the former currents forms part of the UIT, we agree to fix a discussion about this theme and to prepare a documented report as soon as possible. In relation to ourselves, we reject the proposal for the comrade of your US section to participate in the meeting that would undervalue the objective of the meeting.
With fraternal and revolutionary greetings,
International Secretariat of the UIT.
Letter from the CWI IS to the UIT, 18 March 1998
Dear Comrades,
Thank you for your letter of the 13th of March in which you outline in writing the opinions and proposals that you presented to the meeting we held in London on the 7th and 8th of March.
In this reply we would like to outline why we think it was correct for us to propose that Carlos Petroni participate in the proposed meeting and why we do
not agree with the response you have made to our proposal. In this letter we also include some of the important issues that Carlos has raised with us. We include a summary of some of the points raised by him relating to certain aspects the history of the LIT. In order to help us clarify these questions we ask you to comment on them.
In raising these issues for discussion and asking for your comments on them, we are not prejudging any of them. We have raised these questions with you in order to clarify important issues that have now arisen in the discussions between out two organisations. However, before outlining the points raised by Carlos we would like to explain why we think our proposal to invite him to the meeting was correct and why we do not agree with the points you outline in your letter of the I3th of March.
As you explained in your letter relations between our two organisations began approximately eight months ago. Following the discussions that were held in Barcelona during October 1997 we jointly agreed in the declaration by us, “to explore the possibility of unifying our two organisations as part of the regroupment of revolutionary currents and Trotskyist organisations, which defend revolutionary socialism.”
Since that declaration was made on November 5th 1997 both our international organisations have taken steps to explore this possibility. Our proposal, to amend the agreed agenda of the meeting between both internationals that was scheduled for the 7-9th of March, to include a discussion on certain aspects of the history of the LIT, with comrade Carlos present, was made as part of this process.
In your letter, (dated 13/3/98) you write, “In Barcelona and then in Argentina we spoke of the fact that the best method – that has permitted us to take the first steps – is to discuss the agreements and disagreements with the objective of finding a common programmatic agreement through intervening in the class struggle, developing common activities and leaving to one side discussions about the past.” In the following paragraph you then continue, “It is legitimate that there will be doubts between the past of our organisations. They are themes that we are open to confront. But the only way to discuss the past in a just form, is in the first place, to begin from having a formed judgment around the agreements and disagreements that we have about the current class struggle and establishing agreements about common tasks. Through this we will get to know our organisations and parties. Without this it is impossible to analyse, understand or evaluate the past of an organisation.”
You also argue that it is not correct to propose “as a condition” the presence of comrade Carlos in the meeting to “clarify accusations of a comrade with whom our (UIT) organisation had a sharp conflict.”
We do not agree with these points for a number of reasons which we would like to clarify. During the discussions that took place in Barcelona and Argentina we explained that in our opinion it would not be correct to begin the discussions between our two international organisations on historical questions. We have not approached the discussions from this point of view.
However, this does not mean that historical questions should be totally “left to one side.” They also form a part of the process of discussion and collaboration between two revolutionary organisations that are exploring, “the possibility of unifying…” The discussions between us have not begun on historical questions.
The comrades from the UIT have sent representatives to the congress of the CWI’s British section, our European cadre school and a meeting of our IEC. We have sent representatives of our IS to your world congress and attended meetings of your national sections in Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Spain. We have held meetings with representatives from both our International Secretariats’ in Barcelona and London and numerous meetings have taken place between our sections at national level in France, Germany, Mexico, Brazil and more recently in Chile.
During all of these meetings the overwhelming majority of the issues that have been discussed have been contemporary political questions and matters relating to joint activity and campaigns. All of these discussions have been conducted in a loyal and frank manner as we agreed in the joint declaration.
However, it is also important that historical questions are clarified if the solid and principled conditions are to be established that will permit a successful unification between two organisations. In our opinion if a serious issue is raised by a leading member of our organisation – in this case, a member of our US National Committee, which discussed the issue in January – then it must be discussed. The same would apply if similar questions were raised in your organisation about us. If any doubts and suspicions arise they must be fully discussed and clarified. If they are not then they will fester and lead to further complications and disagreement at a later stage. It was to avoid this situation arising that we asked for the issues raised by Carlos to be placed on the agenda of the meeting we had organised in March.
Comrades Pedro and Alejandro argued in London that these issues should be discussed on the basis of “leadership to leadership.” This obviously needs to be a part of the process of discussion. However, we do not think that it is a correct method to limit the discussion “leadership to leadership”. If a genuine fusion is to take place then all issues, political, organisational, current and historical must involve discussion among the whole membership of both organisations. Members of our IEC feel that it is essential for some IEC members and leading comrades from our sections, especially when they have experience of the questions we are discussing, to be directly involved in some of the discussions between our two international organisations. If this is not done then a genuine fusion of two Internationals will not be accomplished.
If a principled and lasting fusion is to be possible then it is essential that the membership of both organisations are fully aware and understand the ideas, perspectives, programme, method and tradition of both internationals. This can only be possible through a combination of discussion on contemporary and historical issues and also joint activity and intervention in the class struggle.
We understand, as you indicated in the meeting and your letter, that it would be extremely disagreeable for you to meet with Carlos to discuss historical issues relating to a major conflict that took place between you ten years ago. You have said that such a meeting is not possible. However, surely this is secondary to the importance of allowing both international organisations to acquire a greater clarity and understanding of our respective tradition and methods? For our part, the presence of Carlos in the meeting is necessary to us in this process.
As you are aware we were not active participants in the events in Argentina and the MAS at the end of the 1980s. The presence of Carlos, who obviously has a different account of the events from you, would help us clarify our understanding of the situation that developed. In our opinion his presence in the meeting could only assist us to acquire a better understanding of your history and traditions. We have made this proposal without prejudging any of these questions and with no intention of acting as some kind of tribunal on past events.
Moreover, although Carlos was previously a member of the same organisation as yourselves, he is now a member of the CWI. The UIT and the CWI must appoint their own respective representatives for each meeting and discussion. As we explained at the meeting we have recently been prepared to meet with a former member of our British section who split from us in 1972, after a factional dispute, who is now part of the leadership of one of the British groups of the USFI.
After the discussion with the representatives of the UIT on this question we still believe that it was not correct on your part to refuse to meet with comrade Carlos and discuss the issues that he has raised with us.
We emphasize again that we are fully prepared to discuss all aspects of our history, both political and organisational, in order to enable your comrades to acquire a fuller understanding of our organisation and our ideas, methods and tradition.
However, as you are not prepared to attend a meeting .with comrade Carlos present we enclose a summary of some of the issues that he has raised with us. We ask you to comment on his explanation of the situation and outline in greater detail than you have in your document, “The Historical Balance Sheet of the LIT”, the political and organisational conclusions that you have drawn from this experience.
The points raised by comrade Carlos relate to the methods that were used inside the MAS/LIT during the factional struggle that erupted following the death of Moreno in 1987. We list below some of the main allegations he has raised with us, without prejudging any of them, and ask you to comment upon them. Comrade Carlos alleges that:
-Following the death of Moreno in 1987 a life history of Moreno was published that distorted the historical role of other leaders of the MAS. Former leaders (who later constituted the LSR) were wrongly discredited. Others were wrongly portrayed as heroic resistance fighters.
– A disagreement with the Colombian section of the LIT, the PST, was saddled with the use of bureaucratic and administrative methods.
– At a meeting of the CC of the MAS held in December 1987 a conflict erupted in which the leadership, that included current leaders of the UIT, was criticised for its used of bureaucratic methods. The critics included Luis Zamora.
– These methods were used by those who now make up the leadership of the UIT against the youth wing of the party that eventually formed the PTS. The leaders of youth wing were denounced by current UIT leaders on the basis of allegations about their sexual conduct.
– Carlos Petroni, a member of the IEC who was co-opted onto the IS, defended the democratic rights of he youth organisation although he did not agree with them on all the political issues they raised. He wrote a letter criticising the majority and some of the political ideas of the youth but his request for his letter to be published in an internal bulletin was refused for two months. During this time numerous declarations supporting the majority were published throughout the party. He also alleges that during this period he was denounced as a “foreigner” and a “bureaucrat”, and the youth were threatened with exclusion from the CC if they formed a tendency. Physical intimidation was used by the majority supporters including three physical assaults on him.
– During the run up to the Congress of the MAS the majority provoked physical confrontation and the minority were denied access to propagate their positions and publication of their documents was delayed. When the documents of the minority were printed they were only distributed on a limited basis.
– The regional premises in La Plata that were controlled by the minority were assaulted by armed supporters of the majority. Two other premises controlled by the minority were attacked in the same way. At the same time telephone conversations of supporters of the minority were bugged and the text of conversations were reproduced. Telephone calls were made by majority supporters threatening minority supporters.
– Physical intimidation was used against the minority supporters who constituted a majority on the election list of the MAS at the university in Buenos Aires.
– Carlos Petroni was expelled from the MAS and the LIT at a meeting of the IEC prior to the congress of the MAS and was given no opportunity to defend himself or answer the charges made against him.
– The sections of the LIT were asked to ratify his expulsion or face expulsion themselves.
These are a summary of the some of the main allegations made to us by Carlos. We repeat that we are not prejudging any of them. However, they are important issues and we think it is necessary to discuss them frankly and openly in order to clarify the situation. It was for this reason that we proposed the change to the agenda of the meeting in March and suggested that comrade Carlos participate in the discussion. Because of the seriousness of the questions raised we still think that this was a legitimate and correct proposal.
The description of events that he outlines clearly raise important issues relating the question of the method used to conduct debate and discussion inside the revolutionary movement. We therefore ask you to comment in detail on the points raised and any conclusions you have drawn from your experiences during this period.
Comradely,
Tony Saunois, for the International Secretariat of the CWI
Letter from the CWI IS to the UIT IS, 27 May 1998
Dear Comrades,
As you will know that attitude that was adopted by the UIT to the question of Carlos Petroni and the issues he raised gave rise to serious doubts developing within the CWI about the process between our two organisations. These doubts have been reinforced by the actions of the UIT/Socialist League in Germany.
The comrades from the UIT offered to produce a full explanation of developments in Germany. This has still not been received and the letter to the UIT/SL by the SAV on 6 May 98 has not been replied to.
We are writing to ask you for an explanation and comment about the situation in Germany and also to reply to the letter sent to you by our German section.
Comradely,
Tony Saunois, for the International Secretariat
UIT Summer Camp, Montpelli-25-28 August 1998
Report for IS and Belgian EC
1. This was an international “theoretical” camp, centred around the reading of basic texts of Marxism followed by a discussion whether or not the analysis is still valid in the present situation. Each day had a theme: the Communist Manifesto, the Permanent Revolution, the Transitional Program and Party Building. In the morning there was a lead off on the subject/reading of the text (9h till +/- 12h), the afternoon was free, in the evening the discussion started (20h30 till late).
2. The camp was intended to be a European camp and around 40 were expected to come. Because of financial and visa problems the comrades from Belarus were not able to attend. There were no Spanish comrades, according to the people in Montpellier they were disappointed the camp would be so small and decided not to come.
3. 14 were present: Fuentes and Pablo (1C), Martha, Dirk, Heiko and his girlfriend – she didn’t attend the political discussions – (Germany, last three ex-comrades of the Berlin SAV), Gerard (IS member), Frangoise (teacher), Pablo (FT) and Eric (worker at Renault plant, NC member) (Paris), Nathan (student, NC member), Christele (student), Jean-Paul (NC member), Benoit (post office worker) (Montpellier). Other youth members from Montpellier attended parts of the camp.
4. Two comrades from Gauche Revolutionnaire (GR) were expected to attend (Renauld + another Paris comrade) but didn’t turn up. La Commune comrades didn’t know for what reason.
5. The Montpellier comrades of La Commune have to be mentioned for their hospitality. In order to lower my expenses they proposed that I could stay with one of them (which I did), and in general they were very comradely.
6. The discussions at the camp were at times a bit confusing. The concept of the lead off (reading out the texts and then commenting on them) made it rather unclear where the discussion was going and comments tended to remain abstract. There also was a tendency to go over to Spanish in the discussion while translation wasn’t sorted out. I took part in the discussions and raised differences, by giving practical examples of our analysis and method.
7. General point of departure is that since World War I capitalism is in a permanent crisis. Since WWI we are living in an “epoch of war and revolution”, the only reason why this has not yet led to a socialist transformation of society is because of the betrayal of the leadership, first social-democracy then Stalinism. Therefore the collapse of Stalinism is an entirely positive change in the objective situation. As a consequence the level of consciousness of the working class is higher at present than e.g. at the time the transitional program was written, than in 1968, etc.
8. This means that the CIS is still characterised as a workers’ state, a “very much degenerated” one then. Imperialism tried to impose capitalism in Russia, but the present crash shows that they were not capable to integrate Russia in a capitalist world market. The present protectionist measures are portrayed as the counter-offensive of the bureaucracy, “an example of planned economy”. The call for a political revolution is still the right demand.
9. Inside La Commune part of the rank and file doesn’t agree with this analysis and portrays Russia as a capitalist state. Benoit raised it at the discussion on the Transitional Program, but the subject was further avoided.
10. The present developments in the Balkans are portrayed as revolutionary movements, and are used as an example of the theory of permanent revolution. An article in Correspondence Internationale (the French translation of the UIT IB) of June 1998 on Kosovo starts off with, “A new revolutionary movement is developing in the Balkans. It is the struggle of the Kosovar workers and peasants for national liberty”.
11. These are but a few examples. What was most striking at the camp was that practical questions of members (and of myself), asking for a point of view on present developments in general weren’t answered with an analysis of what was going on but with a quote of Lenin/Trotsky, etc.
12. Apart from participating in the discussions I had individual discussions with different people; with Gerard on our summer school and the process of fusion between GR and La Commune, with Pablo on our summer school, with Nathan on youth work and anti-fascist work, with Pedro Fuentes (Pablo and Gerard present) on the relationship between both Internationals. I made clear in these discussions I was asked to attend the camp by the Belgian EC and that as far as I expressed any opinion, it was my personal one.
13. Gerard was impressed with the financial appeal at the school and the fact that the interventions of the different comrades showed that our sections are “genuine revolutionary organisations, not just satellites of England”. He thought the tone of the debate on Scotland was too sharp. When asked about his opinion on the political issues at stake he said he didn’t agree with the Scottish proposals and personally preferred “option 2”. He was annoyed about what he describes as a tendency to look at ourselves as “the only revolutionaries”. When asked about examples he named the interventions of TS and PO. This he opposed to the text of PT’s lead-off at the ’97 school that MS had translated for him.
14. On the developments in France he made the following comments:
he stressed that GR and La Commune are a lot closer to each other than the CWI and the UIT, and the fact that the demand for unity is from both sides.
The main differences are on international subjects,
and these have to be sorted on an international level.
Since the CWI summer school the GR comrades have proposed to step up common work. Joint meetings of the leadership are now planned fortnightly instead of monthly. Until now only one meeting has gone ahead.
Joint leaflets are brought out on various issues. These are in general written by Gerard and then send to GR for amendments.
Since the summer school there also has been proposed by the GR cdes to discuss every aspect of the work of both organisations (also in areas where there is no joint work) openly at leadership level.
On the paper the present timing is to have a first joint issue in two to three months, with the same joint editorial board for both the paper and the magazine. When asked how he saw that in practice, what point of view they would put forward in the paper on e.g. international issues such as Northern Ireland, he said that on most of these issues there are at present differences of opinion within GR, so he didn’t see the problem with one more differing opinion being added.
15. He raised that he had a problem with the way the CWI leadership intervened in France, calling it patronising and stressing his own experience with re-groupment both in the Lambertist movement and with La Commune. He was “shocked by the insinuation of fractional work in Germany” in the last letter in response of the resolution of the UIT IEC. When asked about his opinion on the political stand of the Berlin ex-minority he said he didn’t know about that, as the political documents (in German) were never translated.
16. For him the main reason for the need and the urgency of unity between GR and La Commune is that it would be the only positive development in the French Trotskyist movement and therefore would attract a whole layer of new people. He gave the example of Jose Perez, one of the leaders of the ’95 strike movement, who told him at the La Commune congress that in the case of unification with GR he would consider to join.
17. The discussion with Nathan (NC member responsible for La Commune youth work) started of as an exchange of experience on anti-fascist work. La Commune comrades will start YRE work next month. He stressed that as far as that aspect of the work was concerned there were no differences of opinion between GR and La Commune. First campaigning issue will be state repression. When asked why they didn’t start a campaign against the FN, that is extremely strong in this region of France, he stressed that they portray the FN as an extreme-conservative party, that only can become fascist after a major workers’ defeat. Therefore the main enemy at present is the state. YRE is meant to expand the anti-racist work they at present do mainly through SEUL, the student union La Commune has set up in December ’95 and controls in Montpellier. In the April-May issue of La Canonniere (the monthly of SEUL, edited by Nathan) the following is said about the March regional elections: “After the regional elections the papers, the TV and the politicians didn’t stop to stress the danger the parry of Jean-Marie Le Pen represents and the importance of its electoral progress. But, if you have a closer look, this doesn’t seem to match the truth. With 3,270,118 votes, he loses 100.000 votes compared to 1992. In many of its old strongholds this development is undeniable… apart from Var and Vaucluse, where they control the councils of Orange and Toulon. In Bouches-du-Rhone they lost 0,5%. On the other hand the media ignore the growing abstention, that has reached 42%, with another 4,6% ‘blank voters’ and another 4,225,000 voters not on the voters lists, this means about 51% (21,482,092 voters). These figures show we shouldn’t overestimate the real importance of the FN and of the other institutional parties.” In the centre page article of the same issue of La Canonniere, ‘How to really fight racism and the FN’, a list of 11 demands is put forward, none of which even mention the FN.
18. Nathan raised that on the rest of the youth work there did were “important differences” of approach between GR and La Commune that still had to be sorted out. As an example he gave the student work -La Commune has set up SEUL and uses it to go in open confrontation with UNEF and UNEF-ID, the traditional student unions, while the cdes. of GR work inside these unions.
19. Pablo, international. FTer of the UIT and also present at the CWI summer school, was more negative about the school than Gerard. He said he thought the CWI leadership made a mistake in taking up the Scottish comrades so hard. He refused to comment on the political issues, and stressed that the International has to give national sections the room to make mistakes and to go through the experience with them. If you raise differences the way it was done at the school in his view working together would be hard in the future. He disagreed with the concept of international democratic centralism put forward during the school.
20. The last morning Fuentes asked for a discussion with Gerard and Pablo present. Obvious language difficulties (Spanish/English/French – none of those present understanding all three of the languages) made the discussion rather basic. First thing he stressed was that I had to bring over a report of the school and the proposal for a joint solidarity campaign with the Russian miners to the CWI International Centre. Another proposal is a campaign on Kosovo. I told him they should raise these proposals themselves with our International Centre.
21. He then wanted to start a discussion on what happened in Germany and started of with saying he didn’t agree with the “insinuations” in the last letter in reply to their resolution. When asked about his opinion on the political issues, he said there surely were differences of opinion but that if their German cdes thought these were surmountable, it wasn’t up to the UIT to intervene. He stressed their will for further joint work and discussion and gave France as an example of how this process should develop. He asked me repeatedly what my opinion and that of the Belgian organisation was on the issue of re-groupment in general and more in particular the possibility of fusion between the CWI and the UIT and asked Gerard (in Spanish, while the discussion was in English) to make sure he had my address or the address of the Belgian organisation. He stressed that the UIT wanted to “continue the process” but that the CWI seemed to have changed its attitude to a certain extent. I didn’t comment on these questions.
22. The question of a fusion of the two internationals, and whether or not there were important political differences, is an issue that has been raised in informal discussions quite a few times by most of the people present at the school.
KH, BELGIUM, 1 SEPTEMBER 1998
Some Comments on KH’s Report on the UIT Summer Camp by Murray Smith, France – 11 September 1998
These remarks concern only questions of fact and detail. The political issues in relation to the UIT and La Commune will be dealt with in the document which is being prepared for the end of this month. None of the following is meant as a criticism of KH: the mistakes were probably due to misunderstandings or incomplete information.
On point 2: On the reason for the absence of the Spanish comrades: according to the comrades of La Commune, they didn’t attend in protest against the presence of our ex-comrades from Berlin.
On point 4: Renaud didn’t attend for financial reasons. If it hadn’t been August when most other leading comrades were on holiday we would have found cither the money or a replacement.
Point 13: “Since the CWI summer school…” Actually we made no new proposals for joint work after the summer-school. At the NC of the GR on 20-21 June, although no written resolution was adopted, there was general agreement on four axes for taking forward our collaboration with La Commune: fortnightly joint EC meetings, joint fractions in the different areas of work, progress towards a common press and the launching of a joint discussion bulletin. We presented these points to La Commune at a joint EC meeting on 22 June and they were agreed.
Subsequently joint EC meetings were held on 6 July, 20 July, 3 August and after the holiday break, on 7 September. The question of these meetings discussing every aspect of the work of both organisations wasn’t particularly proposed by the GR, it was mutually agreed.
On the paper no firm decision has yet been taken on the timing.
Joint leaflets are not in general written by Gerard and then sent to GR for amendments. They are usually written by one person, sometimes two, not always the same, and then shown to the leading comrades of both organisations for amendments.
APPENDIX C:- CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CWI AND UIT ON GERMANY
LETTERS FROM SAY EC (CWI) TO SOCIALIST LEAGUE (UIT)
6 MAY 1998
Dear comrades,
We write this letter after we have read the joint declaration of SL (UIT section in Germany – IS) and SI (Socialist Initiative, a Berlin group that split away from SAV, the CWI section in Germany – IS).
Of course in general we have no problem with you cooperating or having any arrangements with the SI.
But your declaration with SI has to be seen in a context of the future relationship between SAV an SL and we are surprised that you seem not to think that it is necessary to inform us about a change in your attitude towards SAV. We think that this is a problematic method and ask ourselves by now whether your former proposals for cooperation with the perspective of a fusion had a principled political basis.
During the CWI summer school in 1997 you proposed to join SAV immediately and pushed very much for such a step. We then emphasised that a thorough discussion about the political fundamentals of our two organisations is a precondition for such a step. Then you correctly pushed for a quick meeting between the leaderships. This meeting took place in October and a positive balance sheet was drawn by both organisations and written evaluations were produced. Both evaluations which contained an assessment of the other organisation were published in SAV’s membership bulletin. On that meeting we agreed to meet again as soon as possible. But since then you are not only not pushing anymore for a further meeting, you did not even react on our proposals for a date.
We ask you: what has changed in the politics, programme, perspective and method of SAV, that your interest has gone back? Which new knowledge do you have about SAV? How can you suddenly have the assessment that SAV is in a crisis and of which character is that crisis, as you have not seen it like that a few months ago.
We get the impression that your attempts to join SAV were not based on principled political considerations but on the wish overcome the isolation of a groups of five members. You followed the debate within the Berlin SAV very closely. Up to now we do not know your political assessment of the way the debate developed. If we accepted you in summer last year as SAV members, would you have left now and formed a new organisation?
We think that these questions are very important given the international discussion between UIT and CWI. We are also interested to hear, whether the international UIT leadership agrees with you action.
From our point of view nothing has changed in our attitude to the discussion. You were invited to the political part of the SAV national committee meeting after the SI was already formed in April. We still are interested to continue the discussion process and the cooperation and to see whether a fusion between the CWI and UIT is possible. But we are interested in a political assessment form you of the debate within SAV and of the document “For an other course” which the now SI put forward in January.
Given the declaration with SI and the fact that you never proposed to us to launch a joint paper or a liaison committee, we have to assume that you consider your agreement with SI as qualitatively bigger than with SAV. As our assessment of SI is that a decisive characteristic of this group is that they are not prepared to offensively raise a socialist banner and build a revolutionary socialist party and that there is an astonishing contradiction between talk and action in this group, this would of course mean it is necessary for us to rediscuss the relationship between SL and SAV again.
With socialist greetings
SASCHA STANICIC
ON BEHALF OF SAV NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Reply from Socialist League (German section of the UIT) to SAV (CWI), 27 May 1998
Dear comrades,
We have received your letter, dated 6 May 1998.
Although, we would have preferred to first talk to you personally to find a solution to the difficult situation and the problems you raise. Since there has been no answer, so far, to the proposal that was- made to your leading comrade Aron A, and since we are running out of time, we would for the present like to try to answer in written form as follows.
Shallow and not directly involved observers could allege that the agreements made between the SL and your former comrades from Berlin, now SI, represent the peak of a clever manoeuvre and fractional activity made by the SL. You know, that that is not the case and you don not raise any accusation of this kind in your letter. At this point we would like to state clearly that this agreement is a strictly internal document between the two organisations and therefore you are the only organisation that has received a copy of the German version and a copy of the Spanish translation for the CWI.
You also know that for now almost a year we have focused a great part of our energy onto the task of contributing something to help avoiding the split within the Berlin branch of the SAV and to help solving the political differences within the organisation. Nevertheless we owe you a declaration of our position and of our understanding of what has happened in written form. This is even more necessary since some questions and formulations in your letter could certainly lead to misunderstandings.
It is true, as you stated, that we are a small group and therefore, like bigger groupings, we are not in the least protected against having made mistakes in our previous development/process. Because of that we have tried from the very beginning, as soon as we learned about the growing problems within the Berlin branch, to discuss these and possible solutions with leading comrades on local, nation-wide and on international basis. Judged afterwards, it might have been a mistake that we have only discussed the problems verbally instead of putting the discussion on paper.
Some preliminary remarks: Despite of our failure in preventing the split, we will engage us with all our energy in turning this split into a temporarily set-back in the process of approaching each other and of checking possibilities for a future fusion of our organisations and Internationals according to the spirit of the declaration of Barcelona. Not only do we judge you as a revolutionary organisation, but also we wish to retain our privileged position and to establish our relations even further, to continue discussions, joint-work and common activities. A small example for that would be, that our comrade Hakan D., works council member at Siemens-Bosch-Hausgeraetewerk, spoke at the ABB-meeting on the 13th May you organised, as well as sponsoring the meeting along with SAV-comrades.
Premature characterisation
The leaderships of SAV and CWI agreed quite early with us that the situation in the Berlin branch was dominated by a long-lasting polarisation which even tended to deepen. Without giving a statement about the origins of this polarisation, fact is that it has been an internal problem within the SAV. The history of this internal differences has started long before we started to work together with the SAV. When we addressed the comrades of the new SI, but also at SAV Berlin aggregate, City Committee and NC, and at the SAV February 1998 Cologne Conference, we always spoke in favour of having a discussion on a political basis among comrades and revolutionaries. After all, the new period following the collapse of Stalinism and facing the deepening crisis of the world capitalism raises a number of questions and issues to discuss, which have to be raised and afford a lot of patience and understanding. Among other things, we always pointed out that the differences between the CWI and the UIT were a lot bigger than the differences within the SAV, but that we still considered a fusion on basis of principles to be necessary and possible, while a split within the SAV would not be justified.
The split within the SAV was an expression for the fact that, in our opinion, on both sides wrong characterisations of the “other side” were established, stood against each other, were consolidated and finally led directly to the present pitiable consequences.
One example of these premature characterisations was the one you made about the new SI in the letter to us: “Our judgement of the new SI is, that it is a major characteristic of this group, that they won’t be willing to offensively raise a socialist banner and build a revolutionary party and that there is an amazing contradiction between the way this group talks and the way this group acts.” With such a premature judging and behaviour, which might be caused/explained by the heat of the traumatising fraction-battle, you won’t help to improve the poisoned climate in the short term, to re-establish the confidence and to convince the comrades of the SI to re-join the SAV soon. We do admit, that our agreement with the SI would be build on sand if your judgement would turn out to be correct. So far we don’t have this impression. But even if you were right it would be justified to try to test them and draw a conclusion afterwards.
Regarding the “crisis of the SAV”
You are criticising us for talking about a crisis within/of the SAV. But to describe the situation of the Berlin branch – one of the biggest and most important branches of the whole SAV – as a crisis in an internal protocol between the SL and the SI, definitely does not constitute an attack on the SAV. On the contrary, we have always argued that the discussions within the SAV should be regarded as a legitimate part of a worldwide discussion within the avant-garde, aimed at overcoming the crisis of the leadership of the proletariat. Under these circumstances they should be dealt with openly but also in a responsible way.
We have not, as you put it, “all of a sudden reached the conclusion, that the SAV was in a crisis”, but we have discussed the polarising situation in Berlin with Sascha S. in Gent (during the 1997 CWI European School) already and later during the (January 1998) students congress in Berlin, and also with other leading comrades, among others Aron A, Bob L, Tony S.
(…) The crucial point is that the agreement for a cooperation between the SL and the SI should not create a barrier for the process between CWI and UIT. This is reflected in the two only public mentioning of the CWI, given in the paper “Was tun!” (what to do!) published by SL and SI together, which were, without exception, positive ones: (namely on) our joint intervention at the (April 1998) Euromarch conference in Brussels, and a report on the release of the CWI comrade lonur.
Why did we want to join the SAV?
We have never denied that we are only a very small, a really tiny and unimportant group. But still our wish to join the SAV did not occur because of a feeling of loneliness. Basically we considered it to be legitimate, after getting to know the SAV as a revolutionary organisation with a very positive dynamic and functioning democracy, (and) despite of remaining differences, to build a joint organisation as quickly as possible to be able to fulfil our duties in the class struggle even better. None the less since it would have been a possibility to contribute to the approaching of our two international tendencies. However, we had to realise that our pressing towards a quick joining – a fusion in the original sense of the word would have been impossible because of our smallness – was a mistake, because the CWI and the SAV had to think this was to early and hasty a step. That is why we stopped further pressing and put our concentration on a continuing and parallel development of the local, national and international process.
We are not that presumptuous to believe that we could have been able to prevent the split within the Berlin branch if only we would have been allowed to join the SAV. None the less we would have been in a much better position to try it from inside the SAV than by constantly having to appeal from outside. Anyway, we can strictly deny the question if “we would have also left the SAV and launched a new organisation at that point”. We still consider the split within the Berlin branch to be a sad, avoidable and hopefully reversible event.
Last but not least we are aware of our national and international responsibility. The building of a new group containing of no more than 30 ex-SAV comrades is a big nothing compared to the building of a common international revolutionary organisation of CWI and UIT and perhaps some other sectors.
Our interest in the SAV and the CWI has by no means become smaller. To keep this process open and to make it possible, is one of our main statements in this agreement between SL and SI, it is even a preliminary condition to it. At the same time has the SI agreed to abandon all public attacks against the SAV, not even to give an explanation for their resign.
Tries without success
It is not true that we didn’t react on your proposals for dates. The problem was that you, just like we, only had quite limited time to spend and that you wanted the following meeting to take place in Cologne and with Hakan, who, because of trade union activities, could not attend.
Thomas C. has attended almost every NC meeting (except during the UIT World Congress) and the (February 1998) SAV Conference in Cologne. There he made the proposal to Bob L, that on the next IS meeting of the CWI he should argue in favour of the building – if not of an alliance and a common paper -then of an alliance-committee at least in Berlin, publishing of common leaflets and a supplement to the paper of the SAV. We chose to make such a careful step forward, in the light of the numerous other activities such as preparations for the coming general election campaign and the difficult situation in Berlin, to prevent our proposal from being again judged as pressure. We made an agreement in Cologne to organise a meeting between the SAV and the SL leaderships after the (early March) International leadership meeting of the CWI and the UIT, which unfortunately was postponed, has taken place.
One of the best experiences we had with the SAV was that we as a small group were approached with such a big amount of trust, that we could attend meetings of the leadership, of the membership and conferences. The publishing of our balance in the SAV-membership-circular set a good example.
As we said to Aron A, who agreed with us on this, we often had the impression that the SAV would not present the national and international approachment of our two organisations offensively to the public. As distinguished from the papers of other sections there was no mentioning of the common activities on the subject of Jose Rainha, the declaration of Barcelona, the intervention in France etc. Our attendance of the German Conference was only briefly mentioned in the paper in then sentence: “Greetings from befriended organisations were delivered by representatives of the SL, the VSP and the RSB”, the two last mentioned are Mandelites.
All of this is legitimate, we were prepared for waiting long and having patience with the process. But, comrades, with the background already described, what were we supposed to do when finally, despite our efforts, the SAV-internal dynamics could not be slowed down and the “Berlin Opposition”, after the (March) visit by Tony S, decided to split from the SAV and the CWI and then afterwards proposed to build a organisation together with us?
In Buenos Aires we already had a very open talk with Tony S about the situation and the dynamics in Berlin. Among other things we briefly discussed the problem, that a part of the “opposition” had similar political positions with us and would even like to join the SL. When Tony S came to Berlin a meeting between the SL, him, two SAV NC members (Gaetan and Aron) was called, but it was not possible to seriously discuss solutions to the problem. This was mainly because of an emotional quarrel between those comrades and one member of the opposition, who had been invited by the SAV, took place.
At the moment the split had become inevitable, we talked to Sascha S on the telephone and asked for advice and proposals, how to deal with the situation. He said, not unjustly, that he had to discuss the subject with the Berlin leadership first. We agreed that our presence at the SAV NC meeting in April would not make any sense. Firstly, because we were only invited for the political part, which was a discussion on the program for the general elections. Secondly, we thought it would be more important that at least the SL could take part in the conference on the Euromarch, which took place at the same time in Brussels, to give more weight on the agreed cooperation of CWI and UIT to intervene.
As one can easily tell from this incomplete summary of activities, we, being a small group, undertook great efforts to find a solution together with the leaderships of CWI and SAV. Nobody feels as sorry as we do that these efforts didn’t have any success.
Some conclusions:
There are three points we want to make clear:
1) We do not, as you put it, “consider the agreement with the SI to be of far-reaching quality in comparison with the things in common with the SAV”. Only that the SI has made a concrete offer to immediately build an alliance-committee, to immediately publish a joint newspaper, to carry on with and gradually increase the activities we’ve had together, and to organise a discussion process, which should aid to the building, as soon as possible, of a common revolutionary organisation. The politics of the SAV does lead towards the same result, but with a far slower rhythm, something we have to respect.
2) It is important, from our point of view, to base the co-operation with the SI from its very beginning on a clear, principled, formal agreement in written form, which leaves no room for misinterpretation, in particular concerning the process of approach between the CWI and the UIT, and which is immediately handed over to the SAV and the CWI. There was a general agreement in considering the CWI and the SAV as being revolutionary organisations and to abstain from publicly attacking or trying to split people from these organisations. As far as we know, the SI has sent a proposal for such an agreement to you.
3) We welcome statements like the following you made: “As far as we are concerned, nothing has changed in our position regarding the process of discussion… We are very interested in continuing this process and in figuring out possibilities for further cooperation…”
This is important, not only for the international process. It hints to a possibility to limit the harming and traumatising consequences a split always has, and thereby to create better conditions for building the necessary socialist-revolutionary workers party, in which revolutionary tendencies with different traditions and experiences can be assembled.
It is worth mentioning, that the split in Berlin has done away with the mutual paralysis on both sides and that the SI as well as the SAV have restarted to work on daily political issues with full power. It is positive that both groups still worked together on the important mobilisation activities for the hospital section of the OTV-Network.
For a new start!
There is more to it than just the clarification of the Berlin episode. The alliance between revolutionary socialists, the merger of Trotskyist organisations, which, through intervention in the class struggle, try to win the advanced layers for the building of the party of the world-wide socialist revolution, is a strategic target, and all other considerations have to be subordinated to it. The most conscious layers of the working class and of the youth demand from us, correctly, co-operation and alliances, and not splitting or narrow minded quarrelling. The merger of our two moderate but revolutionary nuclei, after all the most dynamic, if not even biggest tendencies of international Trotskyism, would play a big part, not only in Germany but internationally. A principled merger of the UIT and the CWI would be more than just their forces added together. It would be more than the synthesis of different traditions and experiences, more than a documentation of maturity, more than a better weapon to meet the increased challenges and possibilities of the class struggle. It could become a centre of attraction for new layers of working people and youth, that tend towards a socialist revolution. At least it would be seen with sympathy.
Facing our responsibility, how can we find a solution to this complex situation? We take up the main part of your letter, dated 6 May, and repeat the proposal made to Aron A on 1 May and again on 19 May, to call a meeting between SAV and the SL as soon as possible. During this meeting, the possibilities of formally establishing the process of discussion and the co-operation between the SAV, the SL and the SI and to publicly document it through creating an alliance-committee, starting joint interventions, common leaflets, paper supplements or whatever other mechanisms you think would be suitable.
From our point of view, an alliance-committee to express the loyal and open discussion and cooperation among revolutionaries would be the best way to climb a new step/reach a new niveau of relationships between our organisations.
Hoping, that we have succeeded in destroying all suspicions/uncertainties and that we have contributed to a new start between our two organisations, we remain with socialist greetings
THOMAS CRAMER
IN THE NAME OF THE SOCIALIST LEAGUE
From UIT International Secretariat to SAV EC and CWI IS, 6 June 1998
Dear comrades,
The aim of this brief is to respond to your request for a clarification about the SL actions with regards to the SAV. We are doing so with the wish to reach the most possible clarification what allows us rid ourselves from any misunderstanding that may have arisen from this incident and with the goal of being able to re-establish the best possible co-operation in Germany and clear up the way for carrying on with the common task that the UIT and the CWI designed to explore the conditions for unification between both our organisations.
We are totally convinced that our comrades from the SL never encouraged a polarisation inside the SAV and even less the outcome that was produced. We arc also convinced that our comrades did not establish a relationship with the SAV in order to provoke a factional struggle but rather to give one more step forward towards building a revolutionary party.
We agree with our comrades from the SL when they say that the split of the SAV is a regrettable outcome which is completely alien to the will of the SL. It is also our opinion that the SL has not changed its opinion about the SAV, nor its willingness to reach an agreement.
From the reports of our comrades in the SL. we understood that the discussions that were developing inside the SAV were of the same kind as those that are developing inside other revolutionary parties, and even of the same kind as those that develop inside the UIT parties. We are in a stage in which differences on how to act and intervene in the class struggle inevitably emerge. We have learned, after several crises in the past years, that it is about licit differences that are caused by a new world situation that was open with the fall of Stalinism. And we learned that we have to try to sort them out – within our possibilities – in a common, principled framework.
Having learned about the course the situation inside the SAV was taking, we pointed out to our SL comrades that what is fundamental for the IS and the UIT is the relations with the CWI and they – who are the ones who decide the policies in their country should keep this framework for any relation they established.
For this reason, the UIT did not reach any political or organisational agreement with the IS and stated to its SL comrades that every relationship with the new split group from the SAV should be established on a three-condition basis: a) make the split comrades clear that we do not share the outcome that turned out and therefore we do not accept any characterization being done that changes the revolutionary character of the SAV; b) given that basis neither any public attack nor a factional struggle should be carried out on the SAV; c) our claim about the international framework established by the relationships between the CWI and the UIT.
We believe that the relations that were established between our German section and the split comrades have been conducted on the basis of these conditions; the SAV has been claimed as a sister organisation, there have been no public attacks and no factional activity, and’ the relationship between the CWI and the UIT has been claimed.
Our comrades from the SL, 1 like ourselves, are open to take mistakes that may have been made into consideration. We think that more emphasis could have been made on the need for holding a meeting with the leadership of the SAV to evaluate the new situation. We believe that this case, like some others, can be overcome. And on our part we consider the proposal to form a liaison committee can allow us to resume political relations.
Doubtlessly, the impasse produced in our international relations has contributed to these misunderstandings. And on our part we believe that if we are able to overcome this situation we will place ourselves in better conditions to carry on with the common work in Germany and other countries. The IEC of the UIT, which is to meet next July, will make a more specific proposal about the steps that in our opinion should be taken so that we can resume our international relations. Meanwhile, we should carry on with the practical co-operation on the class struggle ground, as we have been doing in the last months with fruitful outcomes.
We acknowledge that the leaderships of the SAV and the SL were the first to get in touch and establish political relations which led to an approachment between the CWI and the UIT. After that, both international organisations assumed from the beginning that a new and complex, but extremely encouraging and necessary process was being started. The difficulties that have arisen should not make us change this idea, and we hope these clarifications will contribute to it.
Fraternal regards,
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, UIT
Letter from CWI IS and SAV EC to UIT IS, 1 July 1998
Dear Comrades,
We have studied both the UIT IS’s 6 June and the SL’s 27 May letters concerning the situation which has arisen in Germany.
Unfortunately, we do not think that either reply fully deals with the issues or answers the questions raised in the SAV EC’s 6 May letter regarding the new relationship between the Socialist League (SL) and Socialist Initiative (SI), the Berlin grouping which split away from the CWI. In particular we note that the absence of a concrete answer to the SAV EC’s direct question “what has changed in the politics, programme, perspective and method of SAV that your (the SL’s) interest has gone back?”
The CWI has always believed that the only basis for a successful fusion between different currents is firstly securing a principled political agreement on the issues of programme, perspectives and tasks, and secondly establishing trust and confidence between comrades from different backgrounds.
As a result of the meeting between us in Barcelona in October and November 1997 we jointly issued a public declaration which announced that “a period of collaboration and discussion between both organisations… has opened up… This is taking place with the objective to explore the possibility of unifying our two organisations”.
In our discussions we explained that we did not expect 100% agreement between us on all issues. But politically, an agreement for a fusion cannot be based upon generalised political phrases which can, in fact, hide important disagreements regarding concrete situations and the questions of how revolutionaries should proceed.
The UIT IS’s letter, while implying disagreement with the SI’s split, avoids making any political characterisation of the disputed issues in Germany. This is surprising given that the UIT comrades have been aware for some time of the debate and, via the SL comrades in Berlin, actually participated in it. Indeed on 29 January 1998 Pedro F had a personal discussion with Bob L in London on the situation in Berlin. PF then said that he was not sure about all the disputed issues, particularly in regard to the SAV standing in the coming 1998 Bundestag election. However PF, correctly in our view, commented that “it seemed that the Berlin opposition (now the SI) did not emphasise enough building the party”. Given that comrade PF later visited Berlin in April, when presumably he would have had the opportunity to examine the disputed issues for himself, we are surprised at this absence of any political comments in the UIT IS’s letter.
In the first months of this year, as the Berlin controversy reached its peak, the SL’s interest in discussing with the SAV EC appeared to change. It is not a question, as the UIT IS writes, that “more emphasis could have been made on the need for holding a meeting”. The fact is that the SL did not even reply to the SAV EC’s proposal for a second leadership meeting. The SL now writes that the particular date the SAV EC suggested was not suitable, but this is not a reason why an alternative proposal could not have been made.
Despite participating in many of the local and national discussions involving the Berlin opposition, the SL refused to politically comment on the issues, apart from generally supporting the idea of calling for a “Workers List” in this year’s Bundestag election. But even on this question it is not clear whether the SL simply thought that this was a good idea in abstract or whether they opposed the SAV standing in the current situation when there is no sign of any basis of support for such a “Workers List”.
The SL now writes that “we have focused a great part of our energy into the task of contributing something to help avoiding the split within the Berlin branch of the SAV and to help solving the political differences within the organisation”. Leaving aside the slightly patronising tone of the SL’s letter we have to say that fundamentally the SL still does not comment on the broader political issues which came up in the debate.
But the “proof of the pudding is in the eating”. Now the SL is producing a joint journal, Was Tun!, with the SI whose content seems to show that there now is political agreement between the SL and SI.
This new journal is a precise example of the political mistakes of the former Berlin opposition. Apart from other questions, generally this journal does not use the transitional method as it does not raise the question of changing society. The journal does not describe itself as a socialist paper, rather a “paper for employee’s politics”. This reflects the policy of the SI grouping. When the SI members were still in the SAV the one branch which they controlled, Berlin Wedding, decided not to sell the SAV paper to or produce a SAV leaflet for the workers involved in a struggle in the AEG/AMC factory, instead organising solidarity action simply as “activists”.
Only in one small Was Tun! article, which describes the SI and SL, is the word “socialism” actually used. In the main political article, “For a different policy! For Workers Lists!”, there is no mention whatsoever of the need for the expropriation of the capitalists and a planned economy, despite the fact that the authors mention the Communist Manifesto. In other words it seems that the SL agrees with the SI that a transitional programme does not have to raise the question of nationalisation or socialism. If this is the case, then it is easier to understand why the SL lost interest in discussing with the SAV EC. Furthermore the article, while calling for “Workers Lists”, does not put forward any concrete position or steps that activists should take towards the coming Bundestag election.
The SL write that they hope to establish co-operation between the SAV, SL and SI. While naturally in the course of the concrete class struggle we can co operate, that is something different from a broad political process examining the possibility of fusion.
The new SL/SI journal Was Tun! has a different political method compared to that of the CWI. This different approach has also been seen in the OTV (public sector and transport union) where the SI opposes attempts to build an organised opposition id the trade union bureaucracy.
Furthermore, our experience of the SI is that they were an increasingly disloyal opposition when they were still in the SAV. The main political leader of the SI, Thomas B, refused to attend either the 1997 or 1998 SAV Conferences and refused to stand for re-election to the SAV NC in 1997, preferring to lei others debate the issues nationally. From 1997 onwards leading members of the Berlin opposition attempted to politically justify their refusal to fully paricipate in fund raising for the SAV. After their defeat at the 1998 SAV Conference the Berlin opposition cut their membership dues and then split. Given this behaviour, the SI members cannot be simply readmitted into the SAV.
After this experience with the Berlin opposition, Lenin’s comment “At all events, a split is better than confusion, which hampers the ideological, theoretical and revolutionary growth and maturing of the party. and its harmonious, really organised practical work” (Left Wing Communism, Appendix One) fully applies to the SI for the coming period.
If we are going to continue working towards establishing both political broad agreement and mist between members of the CWI and UIT, then we have to rapidly work to clear up any questions which come up.
Unfortunately, we do not think, despite writing about further steps to develop our relationship, that either the UIT IS or SL letters do this with regard to our recent experience in Germany.
Comradely greetings,
CWI IS, SAV EC
Resolution adopted by the IEC of the UIT, July 1998
Resolution about the CWI
To propose to the leadership of the CWI the formation of a Liaison Committee of their leadership and ours to:
1. To organise campaigns based upon the world class struggle explaining the need to respond at an international level by:
Developing international solidarity with the big workers’ struggles, such as support for the Russian miners’ strike and General Motors in the USA.
To take forward the coordination of the workers’ vanguard against the trade union bureaucracy, that has already taken place with the dockers: specifically in Europe the need for a meeting of the workers of the East and West as we have proposed in the meeting of the Euromarch.
Solidarity with the workers and popular movements against the governments that are applying neo-liberal plans and measures of the IMF. The international support for revolutions such as Indonesia, the struggles of the Albanians in Kosovo. In Europe, the struggle against the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties.
The denunciation and mobilisation against Imperialist aggression.
2. The Liaison Committee is also to retake the initiative in organising political discussion of differences and agreements between our organisations and the production of a Bulletin of Discussion with the objective of continuing to explore the political and programmatic basis for unification.
3. In this framework, the IEC considers that the actions of our German section, in respect to the SAV, to be a political mistake. As a result, the responsibility of this mistake is assumed by the IS of the UIT.
This mistake has consisted in reaching a political agreement with the comrades that have carried through a split with the SAV without having firstly fully informed (UIT emphasis) the SAV and the leadership of the CWI about the situation.
But it must also be seen that this mistake was in the framework of a political principle and not factionalism towards the SAV. Because the agreement is principally based for the common intervention in the class struggle to obtain the construction of a revolutionary party, considering that the SAV is a revolutionary organisation and with the commitment of not making public attacks against it or working in a factional manner towards it.
Drawing a balance sheet of this mistake, the IEC considers that, when confronted with the fact that the comrades that today form the Socialist Initiative have proposed their incorporation into the UIT, it is necessary to inform the CWI and its German section with a view to have an interchange about this new situation. The IEC, that declares itself favourable to the request for affiliation of these comrades, at the next meeting of the IEC, considers that the SAV and the CWI should not be faced with an accomplished fact.
The IS invites the leadership of the CWI to our cadre school at the end of August in Montpellier.
Letter from the CWI IS to UIT, 31 July 1998
Dear Comrades,
Thank you for the copy of the resolution that was carried at your recent IEC meeting concerning relations with the CWI and the situation that has arisen in Germany.
Unfortunately, this resolution fails to answer any of the political issues that we raised in the letter sent to you by our IS and the EC of the SAV on I July 1998. It also still does not answer the points raised in the letter sent by the SAV on 6 May 1998.The split from the SAV by a disloyal group who then formed the SI posed important political questions as well as questions of procedure and method.
These political issues include the questions of building an opposition to the bureaucratic leadership of the OTV public sector trades union, the question of the SAV standing candidates in the forthcoming German election and the attitude towards the SPD. In addition to these issues, is the attitude of the SI members towards the building of a revolutionary party and their total lack of loyalty to the SAV.
The SAV has given a clear political characterisation of the small forces involved in the SI. The IS of the CWI agrees with the conclusions reached by our German comrades. Neither your German section or the UIT IS has commented on this and have evaded replying to the political questions outlined above. In our opinion this is a wrong method.
At the same time, you have not commented upon the factional behaviour of the leadership of the SL in its discussions with the SI members when they were still members of the SAV. Comrades Thomas of the SL attended factional meetings of former SAV members before they split. He did this without discussion with the SAV leadership and after agreeing in discussion with SAV EC members not to continue to do so.
The CWI and the SAV have asked the SL and the UIT for a full political explanation of the conduct of your IS and German section. This request was made again to the UIT representatives who attended the CWI school in Germany. Unfortunately, the resolution that you have sent us once again fails to do this. We can only express our disappointment at your response so far to this question. The SAV will also communicate its view to you on these issues. We again await a full political reply from the UIT and the SL on all the questions that have arisen in Germany on this matter.
Comradely,
TONY SAUNOIS, FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT.
From the SAV EC to the UIT IEC, 31 July 1998
Dear comrades of the UIT,
We want to express our disappointment about the resolution which was adopted by the UIT IEC. We do not consider this resolution as a political answer to the questions we raised in our previous letter and especially in our long discussion with the two UIT representatives at the CWI European School.
We understand that you consider the actions of your German group as a mistake of procedure. But you do not answer the political questions we have raised.
We still do not know how the UIT or Socialist League assess the political documents and speeches at our national conference (which we published in our membership bulletin) by the now SI during the factional struggle (do you agree with SI that SAV conducts an ultra-left policy in the movement?).
How you assess the disloyal behaviour and break of revolutionary discipline and democratic centralism carried out by the now SI members when they still were members of SAV.
How you assess the reflection of this attitude towards democratic centralism in the resolutions which were put forward by the now members SI members at our national conference concerning the constitution of SAV.
How you assess the discussion on the question of an election call in Germany and the fact that SL and SI see it as a possibility to call for a SPD vote.
And how you assess the independent candidature of SAV in some west German constituencies (as you hopefully know the election call of SAV is to vote PDS with the decisive second vote – in order not to have a sectarian position and to make clear that we want to get rid of the Kohl government – but to stand SAV candidates in some constituencies in west Germany for the first vote which is the vote for the candidate in the constituency in order to raise the profile of SAV and recruit to our party).
How you assess the actions of a leading SI member at the Berlin meeting of the public sector union opposition group (‘Netzwerk’) where he spoke against the need for an opposition inside the union and defended parts of the bureaucracy.
How you assess the first issue of the joint paper of SL and SI and the fact that it does not call to build the opposition in the public sector union.
These are some of the important political questions you do not comment on although your representatives at the CWI European School promised answers to these questions.
You also do not answer some questions about the procedure of SL we have raised, like the fact that from the beginning the comrades from SL almost exclusively attended those branch meetings of SAV which were dominated by the now SI and did not attempt to have an equal discussion process with those Berlin SAV members who represented the national majority position or the fact that comrade Thomas from SL attended factional meetings even after he agreed to myself as and SAV EC member not to do that any more, or the fact that a joint public meeting was organised with a Mandelite organisation without approaching SAV to be an equal organiser of that meeting.
We cannot be satisfied with the general statements in this resolution and your previous letter. The only basis for a future closer collaboration between SL and SAV is political clarity about the position of SL concerning the posed questions and clarity about where SL differs with SI, especially given the situation that the UIT IEC seems to agree to the incorporation of SI into the UIT. This would obviously make the SI group the majority of the German section of UIT. Given our experiences with that grouping and our assessment of the political direction into it develops we could not agree to steps for a closer collaboration at this stage. Fraternally,
SASCHA STANICIC, SAV EC