[Excerpts]

The leaders of the former minority have departed to set up a separate organisation. Decisively defeated at all levels of the British and International organisation on the political and theoretical plane, they have taken the step of splitting from the most important Trotskyist organisation in Britain and the world. They will end up as a sterile little sect on the outskirts of the British mass organisations, without any decisive effect on the labour movement or the working class. But they are determined to inflict as much damage on the tendency as possible as they desert our ranks…

Their attempt to explain the alleged “degeneration” of our tendency overwhelmingly consists of a vitriolic diatribe against the leaders of the majority and their “neo-stalinist methods”.

However, the political and personal conduct of individuals in the leadership is not the reason for the dispute which broke out in the ranks of the tendency. This faction fight did not drop from the sky. History attests to the fact that conflicts within the revolutionary movement (and this conflict has been particularly embittered because of the tone and approach of the minority from the outset), even on seemingly secondary organisational questions, have their roots in politics.

The split between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks began, as is well known, over the famous “Paragraph One” of the constitution of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, defining the character, rights and duties of the members. The dispute was between the ‘hards’ and the ‘softs’. Subsequent events demonstrated that this divergence between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks was an anticipation of the future political gulf that would open up between them in the course of the three Russian revolutions that followed.

Let us recall here that when the dispute broke in May, 1991, the minority claimed that there were no political differences. The majority on the other hand argued that the roots of the differences lay in the complex objective situation nationally and internationally and in the subjective weaknesses and incapacity of the minority leaders to face up to this.

The sharp nature of the conflict, however, should not allow any comrade to shut their eyes to the great achievements of the tendency in the past in the field of theory, in which EG in particular played an outstanding role. But he was not the sole contributor to the theoretical formulation of the ideas and the implementation of these ideas within the labour movement. Other comrades on the EB and on the NEB played an important and sometimes decisive role in the dialogue and exchange of ideas without which it is impossible for even the most outstanding leaders to arrive at the correct theoretical and political conclusions. Nevertheless, in the analysis of the post-1945 developments of Stalinism and of the world economic upswing, the events in the colonial world and in other fields, EG played an important role.

Changed situation

This is not the first time that the theoretical foundations of the revolutionary movement have been laid down and heroically defended by a great pioneer or pioneers, only for these very same individuals to be found wanting in a changed situation. Such was the tragic example of Plekhanov, “the father of Russian Marxism”, who when the moment for revolutionary action arrived, was on the wrong side of the barricades.

This is not to argue – as AW actually suggested in discussions with PT and others many times – that EG could be bracketed historically with Plekhanov. We have never engaged in the abuse and crude historical amalgams which are the hallmark of the former minority. According to them, some of us are worse than Stalin, as bad as Healy, etc.

The majority leaders, in fact, hoped to continue to collaborate with EG as a valued contributor with an honoured position in the collective leadership of the tendency. This was on condition that he acknowledged that their are limitations on the capacity of any 78-year-old. It also meant recognising that the old methods of formulating perspectives and behaviour were not appropriate or acceptable in the new situation nationally and internationally.

In the past, occasional differences surfaced but agreement was generally arrived at through discussion and the inevitable give and take involved in constructing any viable Marxist tendency. The 1980s, however, saw the emergence of two increasingly divergent trends, with different methods of approach and analysis.

The growing gulf arose from the changed objective situation and the way to approach this. The former minority are political dinosaurs. They operate with outmoded formulas which no longer apply. In the post-second world war period, processes were more drawn out, more ‘predictable’. After 1950, the working out of perspectives, although by no means ever a simple task, was easier than now. A certain equilibrium existed, assisted by the existence of powerful Stalinist states. The boom of the 1980s, the emptying out of many of the workers’ parties for an historical period, and above all, the collapse of the Stalinist regimes, ushered in an entirely new, unstable period. New tasks theoretically, new problems in the field of strategy, tactics and organisation, were posed.

It became necessary to be more conditional. This did not mean that we should seek a cowardly position of false neutrality on issues. What is required is that we discuss all contingencies and then decide on the most likely variant in a given situation. This sometimes requires amending a previous position when new factors, including previously unknown factors, enter into the political equation. This has nothing in common with “empiricism”, “eclecticism” and “impressionism”, the sins attributed to us by the minority. The approach of the minority to perspectives increasingly took the form of astrological predictions.

Undialectical approach

Increasingly, EG, usually supported by AW, took an absolutely dogmatic, black and white, undialectical approach towards political phenomena, both in Britain and on an international scale. Combined with EG’s attempt to exercise a political veto over the leadership, this would have had disastrous effects for our development, unless countered. EG’s spear carriers have incredibly sought to argue that the majority was ‘saved’ from blunders by timely interventions by EG. On the contrary, the real history of the last ten years has been characterised by the increasingly dogmatic and intolerant approach of EG, usually toned down, amended, and sometimes opposed within the NEB and International by other comrades. EG and AW, in the complex new world and national situation, demonstrated an atrophy of thought processes. Old formulas were trotted out which flew in the face of current developments. A kind of veiled political struggle took place in the higher bodies of the tendency.

Comrades could object: why didn’t the present majority leaders bring this out earlier? There is a very simple reason. We had drawn the conclusion long ago that EG, and increasingly AW, on many issues took a one-sided, undialectical approach towards events. However, any attempt to publicly differ fundamentally from EG would have resulted in precisely the situation that we have faced over the last ten months. A split, because of the intolerance of EG, would have taken place at an earlier stage when the tendency was less capable of recovering from such a damaging development.

Stock exchange crash

But the latter part of the 1980s brought this veiled conflict more and more into the open. For instance, a bitter clash took place at the level of the IS and the NEB on the issue of the 1987 world stock exchange crash. PT was ill at home and was astonished to learn from other NEB members that EG, in the wake of the crash, was predicting a world economic slump, within six months, along the lines of 1929-1932. This approach was vigorously opposed by other comrades in the EB, particularly by PT and LW, and by PT, TS and BL in the International. AW slavishly supported EG.

No dialogue took place with EG. Instead there were bitter denunciations of BL, for instance, for daring to question this analysis, earning BL the reprimand from EG that he “did not understand the ABCs of Marxism.” In EB discussions PT and LW argued that the huge reserves of Japan and West Germany could allow the bourgeoisie, at the cost of storing up the difficulties for later, to temporarily bail out the American economy and thereby world capitalism. This was met by EG with bitter denunciations of this “anti-Marxist” approach.

LW, in agreement with PT, took this opposition to the level of the NEB. We pointed to the careful, balanced approach of Trotsky at the time of the October 1929 Wall Street crash. Trotsky dealt with this in The Third Period of the Comintern’s Errors, written in December, 1929, in which he advanced the prognosis that there were at that time four possibilities in the economic sphere: a slow-down in the rate of growth, a recession with a small drop in production, a severe slump, or a combination of these three! Trotsky did not come down for any one of these variants. In the minority’s eyes, he is an “empiricist” and “eclectic”!

Marxism is a science, but science is based on the analysis of real processes – not a priori predictions made with the false confidence of an astrologer. Yet it was approached in precisely this fashion by EG and AW. Not satisfied with a broad analysis of the major trends, they attempted to impose an insane timescale of six months for the coming slump. This was even carried over into the written material of EG both in Britain and on an international scale. When the long-predicted slump failed to materialise this undoubtedly disorientated a whole layer of comrades in Britain and internationally.

False method

It was a serious mistake on behalf of the majority to allow this written material to go unchallenged. Never again will a false, one-sided, dogmatic prognosis, masquerading as a Marxist perspective, be accepted.

The same false method of AW and EG was revealed in the 1988 World Perspectives document, probably the worst political document in the history of the tendency. There are other examples of where the same approach was adopted.

When the Australian comrades tentatively advanced the idea that the Hawke-led Labour government could win a third term of office in the 1987 general election (given the background of a continuation of the boom, the weakness of the bourgeois Liberal and National parties, etc), this was dismissed out of hand by EG. The Australian comrades, according to him, “don’t understand the situation”. On the basis of scant, if any, understanding of the concrete situation in Australia, the ‘line’ was that Labour would be defeated. Fortunately, the Australian comrades ignored EC’s advice.

So also did the comrades in Chile. They predicted that the then dictator, Pinochet, would accept the outcome of the 1989 referendum and the move in the direction of a limited restoration of bourgeois democracy. This was also dismissed out of hand by EG with the same arrogant, sweeping assertion that “they (the Chilean comrades) are out of touch”.

We had earlier been given advanced warning of the crude generalisations of EG and AW. The latter advanced the position that the Peronists would sweep the board in the first elections (in October, 1983) following the overthrow of the military dictatorship in Argentina. PT had raised doubts in private discussions about this scenario, given the brutal repressions of the Isabel Peron regime which had immediately preceded the installation of the military dictatorship in March, 1976. This meant that large layers of the population would initially be repelled by the Peronists. This at least opened up the possibility, particularly as it was backed by opinion polls just prior to the election, that the Radicals could win.

Again this was dismissed as impossible. Having raised doubts in private, PT publicly accepted the common position that the Peronists were likely to win. When the present dispute broke out this was subsequently used by the Spanish leadership to argue that PT had also made mistakes in the sphere of perspectives!

We do not claim infallibility. The majority leaders have made mistakes, but not the ones ascribed to us by the minority. Moreover, recently our approach has been borne out while the minority have lurched from one mistake to another. The mistake on Argentina was not so serious, because we had no forces within the country at that time. This was not the case in South Africa.

South Africa

Our section there has done heroic work in the underground, establishing important roots amongst layers of the black proletariat. The mechanical approach of EG and AW would have completely disorientated those forces which looked towards our tendency in South Africa. They merely repeated past positions in an entirely changed situation. In his analysis of the proposals for Namibian independence, EG discounted the possibility of a South African withdrawal. Other comrades, such as PT, LW and DC (Liverpool) – in a courageous intervention at the 1988 World Congress – opposed the analysis and conclusions drawn by EG and correctly argued that the South African regime could, and indeed, would retreat from direct military domination without immediately endangering its position.

The collapse of Stalinism and the change in the position of the bureaucracy towards Southern Africa; the changed balance of forces within South Africa; the imminent release of Mandela; the fear of the South African regime that if they did not bend and make concessions they would face a continuation of the revolutionary upheavals that had wracked the country; the strengthening of world imperialism in the light of the collapse of Stalinism; all these factors resulted in a drastically changed situation.

The South African ruling class and imperialism had concluded that they could withdraw from Namibia without risking the immediate establishment of a deformed workers’ state on its borders. In the light of these and previous developments, our South African leadership boldly re-examined the position. They argued that it was possible for negotiations to take place between the ANC leadership and De Klerk, thus leading to a new constitution on the basis of “one-person, one-vote”, but not black majority rule.

Arising from this, the possibility of a coalition government between the ANC, De Klerk and other forces could not be discounted. The SA comrades did not argue, nor did the majority leaders, that it was certain that such a development would take place in South Africa. It was a possibility, perhaps a probability, given the alternative of the continuation of the revolution culminating in a bloody racial civil war at a certain stage. There is no possibility of a compromise resolving the fundamental antagonism between the ruling class and the black proletariat. It is a question of a temporary stage of development, but a stage which we must take account of in our policies, strategy and tactics.

This flexible, conditional, approach was completely discounted by EG and AW. No reasoned discussion was possible because of the general denunciatory tone adopted by EG. Nevertheless, the position of the SA leadership and the present majority leaders more accurately describes the evolution of events in South Africa. It is clear that both De Klerk and Mandela are edging towards some kind of agreement along the lines suggested by the SA comrades and the majority. The outmoded ideas of the political dinosaurs who lead the former minority are totally irrelevant to understanding the complex processes in Southern Africa.

It was, however, the Gulf War which openly revealed the difference before the ranks of the tendency. On the one side, was the ossified approach of the former minority, with a mania for wanting to predict exact timescales. On the other, the more conditional approach of the majority. The changed world situation which conditions the approach of the Marxists at the present time was entirely discounted by the minority. The collapse of Stalinism, the temporary strengthening, at least ideologically, of imperialism has left a powerful imprint on events.

War reveals all that is rotten, as well as that which is durable and good. This applies not just to relations between the classes, the conduct of the ruling class, the reformists, etc. It also tests out the ideas of Marxism. And an analysis of the position of the former minority shows that their leaders were inadequate for the tasks posed by the war. EG, for instance, at one meeting after another, intoned that if war was to break out it would last for a minimum of six months and probably for two years. The leaders of the Spanish tendency merely repeated this statement parrot fashion. “A war against Iraq cannot be brief or easy… Once it starts, a war would necessarily be a prolonged and bloody affair. It could last months or even a couple of years.” (Theses on the Gulf crisis, September, 1990)

The British paper, however, never once carried this statement. Apart from EG, the EB were totally opposed to the attempt to impose EC’s calendar of events. It is true that EG, as with all the comrades, repeated Trotsky’s caution that in the bloody equation of war nothing is certain. Yet he was incapable of heeding Trotsky’s warning.

Short war

Because of the approach of the British paper, we did not pay such a heavy price. In Spain, where the ranks were fed on a different diet, this was not the case. The speedy ending of the war produced disappointment and consternation in the ranks of the Spanish tendency. We have the testimony of two young British comrades who were living in Seville for an extended period and who participated in the big anti-war movements. They witnessed the reaction of the rank and file to the ending of the Gulf War. When these comrades related to one Spanish full-timer that the British leadership had expected a short war, his reaction was: “Well, 1 wish they had told us.”

The war’s duration – totally unexpected to them – undoubtedly had certain repercussions within the Spanish organisation’s ranks which are felt to this very day. The Spanish comrades made a tremendous intervention in organising the big anti-war demonstrations. However, the tendency did not intervene in a clear, distinct, Marxist fashion, as we have sought to do in Britain on the poll tax, in Liverpool, etc. Prominence has been given to the school students’ union, but the profile of the tendency and its journal was very low. There were very few sales of the tendency’s journal and no attempt on the part of the leaders of the school students’ union to connect the anti-war struggles with that of the Spanish tendency as a whole.

Moreover, the leadership of the Spanish tendency completely underestimated the level of consciousness and receptivity to our ideas of the hundreds of thousands of youth who were drawn into the anti-war struggle. The general secretary of the Spanish organisation, speaking at the British conference in October, 1991, declared: “From our own experience of leading millions of youth and workers, we can say now the consciousness of these workers is not superior to the consciousness of the average reformist leader.” He subsequently amended this to: “Their consciousness was no higher than the reformist organisations.” The revised version is no better than the original. To put the hundreds of thousands of youth, mobilised on the streets against an imperialist war, on the same level as the pro-imperialist Labour leaders is not just wrong, it is shameful.

Spanish youth

The false approach of the Spanish comrades was underlined in the recent polemic over the mass organisations at the International meeting in November, 1991.

A Spanish EB member, Pul, declared: “In Barcelona alone, there were three demonstrations of more than 100,000 each in two weeks. So evidently there was a tremendous will to struggle and the healthy and honest attitude of the youth in comparison with the attitude of the reformist leaders, well, that was there too.

But what about the political consciousness? Due to their lack of political experience, their low level of consciousness, they didn’t support the ideas of the people who led the struggle – which is us. To be more concrete, the great majority of the youth there supported the idea of the standing army – that is to say, of changing the present army to a professional army, going from a conscript to a professional army.

The majority of them defended this reactionary idea which was also defended by the leaders of the United Left. This would be a big step back for the Spanish working class. But the youth accepted this idea simply because they did not want to do military service.”

It is quite natural that the youth would not want to be conscripted into an army to do the dirty work of imperialism. In general, Marxists prefer a conscript army to a professional army. This is because it allows each generation of workers to familiarise themselves with military training, etc. However, if a mass movement develops in opposition to conscription, depending upon the concrete historical circumstances, it would be absolutely false for Marxists to counter-pose themselves to this movement.

Conscription

In Britain in the early 1960s, attempts to reintroduce conscription were opposed by Marxists. In a situation of national oppression, refusal to serve in the army of the oppressor state would, depending on the concrete circumstances, be given critical support by the Marxists. The minority, operating with phrases borrowed from Trotsky, used at the time of the outbreak of the second world war and in an entirely different historical context, put forward a position on conscription in Britain which would have had absolutely fatal consequences if the war had taken a drawn-out character.

EG, in particular, kept on repeating that a long war would probably necessitate the reintroduction of conscription. However, he then went on to say, again, in a completely dogmatic fashion, that in this situation, we must advocate that the youth should go into the army! Intense discussion took place at the level of the EB on this issue. The clear majority of the EB disagreed with EC’s proposals and attempted to dissuade him from making these ideas public. Prominent in this task was none other than RSe.

However, his and MW’s best efforts were of no avail. At the public meeting preceding the special congress called to discuss the Gulf War in January, 1991, EG made a disastrous speech which alienated the youth and many others present. When one comrade who made the financial appeal stated, quite correctly, that, as an ex-soldier on the reserve list, if he was called up to fight in the Gulf, he would not go, this was denounced by EG who was sitting on the platform at the time.

In the course of his speech, EG blurted out the astounding statement: “If conscription is introduced, let us be clear, the youth must go into the army. Of course, (directly addressing the youth in the audience) some of you will be killed. But for every one killed, ten will take your place”! Comrades at the meeting were shocked. Many had a look of stunned disbelief. EG was criticised for these remarks by the youth and others in the pubs afterwards. Despite this, he made exactly the same statement, producing a near revolt, at the special congress the next day.

The intervention of PT mitigated the damage which EG had done once more in the course of a completely crude misinterpretation of Trotsky’s position on this issue. We pointed out that in the event of conscription being introduced, we would convene a special conference to determine our attitude. It would not by any means mean automatically that all young people would passively go into a conscripted army.

It was possible to envisage a situation where half, if not more, of the youth would refuse to be drafted. As was the case with the Vietnam war, we would then pursue a dual policy in the event of conscription being introduced. Some would undoubtedly go with their peers into the army, while others would participate, on a class basis, amongst those layers of youth who decided that they would not fight for imperialism.

EG and AW falsely compared the situation which existed at the time of the second world war with that existing at the time of the Gulf War. The outlook of the masses then was determined by the threat of invasion from a foreign fascist power, with all that would mean: the destruction of democratic rights and the workers’ organisations. In 1990-91 we were faced with a colonial war of intervention in the Gulf. If it would have become public that the Marxists were passively accepting the idea of “conscription”, it would have made it impossible for us to participate in the growing anti-war movement.

Such a movement would undoubtedly have pacifist overtones. Marxists are not pacifists. But we distinguish between the false, hypocritical pacifism of the bourgeois and reformists, which invariably acts as a cover for war, and the pacifism of the workers or peasants. Our task is not to express contempt for the “low level” of the youth, like the Spanish leadership. We start from the anti-war, ‘pacifist’ sentiments of the youth and by skilful propaganda and agitation seek to lead them to an understanding of the realities of class society and our programme on war, the army, conscription, etc. It is little wonder that with their haughty approach, revealed by comrade Pul above, they gained little from the magnificent anti-war movement they had initiated.

There are many other examples, which could fill whole volumes, revealing the political divergence which existed long before the factional struggle itself broke out. Moreover, it was not just on general theoretical and political questions, but in the field of strategy and tactics that differences manifested themselves. Not one supporter of the former minority, including its leadership of EG, RSe and AW (who played no role in the late 1970s and 1980s in the internal developments of the British organisation) exercised a significant influence in the two major mass struggles which our tendency participated in: the titanic Liverpool struggle and the mighty battle to defeat the poll tax. It was the present majority leaders who at each stage were responsible for developing the necessary tactics.

EC’s participation usually consisted of endless repetition of broad generalisations, with little or no bearing on the issues under discussion. RSe, in general, took up no independent position on any issue, organisational or political. He played a useful role in the organisational sphere, but as subsequent revelations showed, with a tendency towards the “commandist”, bullying methods he now ascribes to others….

There is nothing at all new in this. It is the fate of the Marxist leaders to face vilification, abuse and denunciations for their alleged ‘dictatorial methods’.

Lenin remarked that assorted Mensheviks “inveigh against my ‘monstrous’ centralism” (One step forward, two steps back, p 50). In the same pamphlet (p 155) Lenin declares: “We know very well from the literature of the ‘minority’ that by autocratic they mean me” (Lenin’s emphasis).

He goes on: “Comrade Axelrod and Co. were expressing the conviction that Plekhanov and all the members of the Central Committee ‘governed the party’, not in accordance with their own views of what the interests of the work required, but in accordance with the will of the autocrat, Lenin. This accusation of autocratic government necessarily and inevitably implies pronouncing all members of the governing body except the autocrat to be mere tools in the hands of another, mere pawns and agents of another’s will.”

Is there not a striking resemblance between the arguments deployed by the Mensheviks (minority) against Lenin and those used against us by our former minority? Even the same phrases surface. PT is denounced by the minority as a “Bonapartist”. Lenin was denounced by Martov, a former close co-worker of his, and far more able than RSe and Co, as a “‘Bonapartist’ of the worst type”. We consequently will not lose any sleep over the chatterings made by individuals who will merit less mention in history than Martov.

Lenin was denounced as a “bureaucrat”, as a Robespierre, etc. He knew full well that the base charges levelled against him would cut no ice with the workers. He answers his detractors in his article Why I resigned from Iskra’s editorial board: “The report of the delegate for Siberia… and Martov’s ‘Once more on the minority’ are all full of most amusing charges against Lenin of being an ‘autocrat’, of instituting a Robespierre guillotine regime (sic!).” Ditto say today’s minority about the leadership of the majority. And our reaction is the same detached amusement as Lenin. Incidentally, it is amusing to note that RSe denounces the alleged “nepotism” of the national leadership of the tendency. The dictionary definition of “nepotism” is “Undue patronage to one’s relations.” This is very ironic given that the EB of the minority organisation has two married couples on it (SJ and SN, KR and JW), two brothers (RSe and AW), and AW’s ex-partner (PW)!

It is necessary, however, to reveal the motives behind these outpourings and illustrate their dishonest methods. Moreover, from the lips of EG the charge that PT could not “tolerate differences within the tendency” will evoke nothing but laughter in the ranks of the majority. Unfortunately, there is not a member of the NEB, including RSe and AW in the past, and others like BMcK, who were not subjected to a verbal “battering” if they debated in speech or writing from the preconceived ‘line’ which EG attempted unilaterally to lay down.

Engraved on the memories of the older generation in the tendency is an incident at a national EB in the 1970s when a present supporter of the minority, BB, from Oldham, (then based in Bristol) had the temerity, along with another comrade (WJ) from the same area, to criticise EG. He had committed the unforgivable crime of praising an article by PT in the theoretical journal and characterising EG’s article on the colonial revolution as “unintelligible”.

Political veto

EG in his reply rubbished BB and WJ with the withering comment: “The trouble with the Bristol comrades is that they are thick”. This is not the only example of the brutal intolerance, the attempt to impose a political veto on all ideas except his own, which has been the hallmark of EG for as long as the older generation can remember.

On this occasion, as on many others, it was PT and other leaders of the present majority who, after the meeting, condemned EG for his behaviour. Later, BL painstakingly edited EG’s article so that it could be circulated internationally.

It is extremely distasteful to recount some of these details. Nevertheless, the distortion of the real situation in the leadership of the tendency and its history, currently perpetrated by the minority, will not go on unanswered.

For decades, leading comrades strove to work with EG, in the interests of the tendency, despite his unacceptable approach and behaviour on occasions. This put an enormous strain on comrades’ nervous systems over years and decades. But how has this loyalty of comrades to EG been repaid? By insults and denunciations of them as “gangsters”, “Stalinists”, “bureaucrats”. We have not and will not stoop to the same level. However, what is absolutely clear, by their documents, their speeches, and the hysteria which they direct against the majority, is that they have completely lost their political bearings. The charges levelled at the majority leaders will have not the slightest effect. Lenin, was posthumously blamed, by all kinds of shallow “theoreticians”, for the monstrous crimes of Stalinism…

The degeneration of the Bolshevik party had clear material foundations. It arose from the isolation of the Russian revolution, the cultural backwardness of that society, the delay of the world revolution and given these factors the inevitable crystallisation of a bureaucracy which found its expression within the party in the person of Stalin. Not even this shallow former minority is suggesting, it is hoped, that the same material foundations exist here in Britain.

Insofar as they make a feeble attempt to trace the objective roots of our alleged degeneration, it is over the period of the last ten years. It is not at all accidental that they have lighted on this time-frame. It is precisely in this period that the tendency began to break out of the limits of a propaganda group. The limited propagandist and discussion-group outlook which still afflicts the present leaders of the former minority was left behind as we began to engage for the first time in mass work.

During the last ten years, we organised and led the mighty battle in Liverpool as well as the poll tax struggle. It was in this period that we made a magnificent contribution to the miners’ strike. It was within the last ten to 12 years that we were able to use the youth organisation to penetrate ever-wider layers of the youth and the proletariat in Britain. This intervention would not have been possible without combating the circle mentality which afflicted many comrades in the period preceding the late 1970s and 80s.

We had many who were quite comfortable to sit in Labour Parties, debating and passing resolutions. They were in every sense of the term “resolutionaries” rather than revolutionaries. The prospect of mass work, of “dirtying their hands” in reaching new layers of the proletariat outside the “traditional organisations”, undoubtedly frightened many of these “Marxists” who gradually distanced themselves from the organisation. Their loss was more than compensated for by the new, combative elements who were drawn into the ranks of the tendency.

In their heart of hearts, the former minority leaders, as their present whimperings demonstrate, did not like the new political complexion of the organisation. They did not, of course, object to the larger organisation and therefore bigger audiences for their speeches and articles. But the need to present Marxist ideas in a new and quite different fashion from the preceding period in order to attract and hold these layers was a difficult and increasingly irksome task for them.

We hear much from them about the need for “theory”. The present majority leadership have made not a little contribution to the development of the tendency in the realm of theory. However, the perception of EG and AW of theory and the role of “theorists” was that of “master and pupil”. Other comrades were merely empty vessels, receptacles into which these theoreticians could pour their “ideas”.

Pressing questions

This approach, of course, cut no ice with the majority leaders when set against the background of the increasing incapacity of these theoreticians to answer the pressing questions of contemporary politics in Britain and internationally. It was left to others to rearm the tendency in the complex new situation confronting us.

Does this mean that the present leadership has made no mistakes? “Show me someone who has made no mistakes and I’ll show you a fool.” Of course, there have been many mistakes by the present leadership on perspectives, on the likely tempo of events, on the possibilities of various strike movements, on events internationally. But in the discussion on all the big events of the last decade, nine times out of ten, right was on the side of the present majority…

In the aftermath of the miners’ strike, the majority of the NEB concluded that, given the economic upswing, the objective situation would not be the most favourable period for the development of the tendency. We therefore sought to readjust the tendency’s sights, including targets, to correspond more to the reality facing the tendency.

This did not mean that we should passively adapt to this “objective” situation as BMcK, a prominent supporter of the minority, consistently argued. In essence, he believed that until the boom had exhausted itself very little was possible either on the industrial or political plane and it was therefore necessary to sit tight and raise our “level of understanding” in cosy branch meetings and discussion groups.

Favourable period

The minority in toto have now gone over to this position. We, on the contrary, argued that although this was not the most favourable period in history, there were still big possibilities inherent in the situation.

Moreover, it is entirely false, one-sided and undialectical not to recognise that even in a boom huge clashes between the classes can take place. The passive, quiescent position of BMcK would have led to the conclusion that we should not have participated in the Liverpool battle or the mighty poll tax struggle. Both these struggles, it should be remembered, took place during an economic upswing. However, the attempt of the present majority leadership to introduce the necessary readjustments in targets, and in streamlining the organisation, met with the brick wall of resistance, precisely from EG.

We were accused of “underestimating” the capacity of the proletariat to struggle, accommodating ourselves to a temporary economic conjuncture, etc. However, reality intruded into the blinkered world of EG and the pressure within the ranks necessitated a readjustment. EG, although still insisting that we were in, if not the most favourable period in history, at least one of the most favourable periods, was forced to bow the knee to this pressure.

It was, however, the present majority leaders who proposed the necessary readjustments at the NEB. This was met with a sigh of relief on the part of the comrades in leading positions in the regions…

We will produce a proper objective history, a political history of the tendency. [See for instance Rise of Militant – editor] We will produce written material for the rearming theoretically and organisationally of the forces of Marxism for the battles to come.

In the last eight months, we have been compelled to turn inwards, to devote an excessive proportion of our efforts to answering the arguments of the minority and too little to the necessary involvement in the labour movement, the penetration of the new layers of the proletariat, and so on.

This must now come to an end, following their desertion from our ranks. The vast majority of the time of the tendency will now be devoted to politically clarifying and sharpening the understanding of the marvellous cadres we have assembled under our banner. We face an exciting period, both in Britain and internationally. The approaching general election provides us with the opportunity to reach fresh layers of the proletariat. No matter what the outcome of the election, an entirely new and disturbed period will open up in Britain and on an international scale.

We must aim to win and integrate the fresh layers of the proletariat. We must strengthen our base in the trade union, the industrial field, and to consolidate and involve in the tendency the excellent Black and Asian contacts who have been drawn towards us. We must step up the marvellous work undertaken particularly in the last six months in the women’s field. In this way, we will prepare for the theoretical and organisational extension of the forces of Marxism.

Peter Taaffe, 29 January 1992