We have had extensive debates within our organisation on the national question, especially in relation to Ireland, Israel\/Palestine, ex-Yugoslavia, former USSR and Eastern Europe, and of course Scotland. We have applied the ideas of Marxism, and especially those of Trotsky, in a dialectical way to the concrete, contemporary problems in these situations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\nOur analysis on these questions inevitably has practical consequences for perspectives, programme, strategy and tactics. We cannot accept, therefore, that issues of theory and perspectives are any less important than in the past. They may not be exactly the same “battle lines” which divided the left in the past. But they are nevertheless still important points of difference between us and other left groups. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Such differences may be pushed into the background for a time, especially when there is an urge towards collaboration in campaigns, a common election platform, and so on. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that in any broad formation there will be political differences with the emergence of different political trends (as there were in the anti-poll tax campaign, in the Liverpool council struggle, etc).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is not to say that we discuss key political issues from the point of view of establishing “ideological purity”. It would be counter-productive to allow the clarification of perspectives and programmatic issues to form a barrier to attracting new forces, to become so many “Berlin Walls” around our organisation. We have to combine political debate and clarification with a reaching out to new layers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the recent period, we have done this in both Scotland and the rest of Britain (through the anti-water privatisation campaign, the YRE, the Justice campaign, the Liverpool dockers, Scottish industrial disputes, such as Timex and Glaciers, etc). In most of these campaigns we have worked together with “other left forces”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
We made it clear, for instance, that we were eager to participate in the Socialist Labour Party (SLP), when that was first announced in November 1995, provided it took the form of an open, inclusive party that allowed different groups and trends within it. When it was clear that the SLP was not going to develop in this direction under Scargill’s leadership, we took the initiative in trying to form local Socialist Alliances, and comrades in some areas are still participating in this work, although the forces involved are extremely small at the moment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is false to counterpose the struggle for political clarity to a struggle to reach wider layers of workers and youth. In their two documents, the Scottish Militant Labour EC refer many times to Lenin’s struggles to open up the Bolshevik Party to radicalised workers moving towards revolution. Both during the 1905-06 revolution and the 1917 revolution, Lenin fought politically against sections of the party leadership who were still basing themselves on outdated formulas. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
He struggled to reorientate the party towards the revolutionary processes which were unfolding. But at no time did Lenin abandon a struggle for theoretical clarity or minimise the need for building a revolutionary party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the period between 1905 and 1917, for instance, Lenin fought against the ideas of Bogdanov, an influential leader of the Russian Social Democratic and Labour Party, who attempted to reconcile Marxism with various non-Marxist ideas. This involved Lenin in a re-examination not merely of political issues, but of the philosophical foundations of Marxism. In 1908 Lenin published his book, ‘Materialism and Empirio-criticism’, a substantial contribution to Marxist philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the years immediately before the first world war (1914-18), Lenin was also involved in an intensive theoretical debate over imperialism (with Bukharin, Hilferding, Luxemburg, etc). Again, this was not a purely ideological issue, let alone a quibble about formulations. The theoretical issues had a crucial bearing on perspectives and programme. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
For instance, Karl Kautsky, one of the leaders of the German social democracy, argued that capitalism had now developed into a form of “ultra-imperialism”, according to which the interpenetration and interdependence of the main imperialist powers ruled out the possibility of world war. At the same time, exponents of the Kautsky school argued that the continued development of imperialism would allow the ruling class to maintain the upper layer of the working class, the so-called “aristocracy of labour”, in a privileged position, which would reinforce the social barriers standing in the way of revolutionary developments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When Lenin returned from exile in Switzerland to Petrograd in April 1917, there was a crisis in the Bolshevik Party (see Bold Step, 29). A section of the Bolshevik leadership (Kamenev, Stalin, etc) advocated critical support for the Provisional Government formed on the basis of the February revolution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Headed by Lvov and later Kerensky, this was composed of bourgeois liberals and ‘moderate’ socialists, who were incapable of ending the war, carrying out a radical land reform, etc. Lenin, on the contrary, advocated that the Bolsheviks, through the soviets, should lead a struggle for the workers and poor peasants to overthrow the Provisional Government, take power into the hands of the workers, and carry through a fundamental social change. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
There was an intense political struggle within the Bolshevik Party over strategy and tactics. However, the April Theses, the programme issued by Lenin on his arrival was not merely concerned with policies, strategy and tactics: it reflected a profound change of perspectives, from the old ‘outdated’ idea of the ‘democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants’ (i.e. acceptance of a bourgeois-democratic stage before socialist revolution came on to the agenda) to a struggle for workers’ power or ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ (in effect, the perspective of permanent revolution advocated by Trotsky since 1905). Incidentally, in the April Theses (point 10) Lenin also raised the call for a new, revolutionary International.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lenin did face a struggle against the ‘Old Bolsheviks’ who were clinging on to ‘outdated formulas’ as the Scottish Militant Labour EC document (Bold Step 29) says. He relied “for political backing for his revolutionary tactics and strategy upon that layer of radicalised new members who flooded into the party in 1917” (29), but he also relied decisively on rank-and-file Bolsheviks and wider layers of workers previously educated and organised by the party. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
But the fact that Lenin was forced to launch a political struggle against the “Old Bolsheviks who claimed to be the guardians of Marxist orthodoxy”, did not mean that he simply counterposed mass struggle to theoretical clarity or to the need for a well-organised party. On the contrary, the strategy and tactics of Lenin and Trotsky were based on the theoretical clarification of the revolution as it unfolded, whereas the Old Bolsheviks tried to cling onto old theoretical formulas which were falsified by events.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Inevitably, Lenin was frequently accused of ideological hair-splitting, of placing ideological purity above the practical needs of the movement. For Lenin, however, ideas and perspectives were an indispensable guide to action, and the linking of clear ideas with bold revolutionary action required the building of a revolutionary party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
II. WHAT IS A REVOLUTIONARY PARTY?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The question has been raised implicitly in the Scottish Militant Labour EC document and explicitly in some of the discussions: Is it still possible, in this post-Stalinist period, to build a revolutionary party of the type envisaged by Lenin and Trotsky? The collapse of the Stalinist regimes not only discredited the Stalinist caricature of the ‘socialist society’, but also discredited the grotesque totalitarian caricature of the revolutionary party. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
For instance, the concept of ‘democratic centralism’, which in the hands of the ruling bureaucracy became in reality ‘bureaucratic centralism’, which turned the party into an instrument of totalitarian rule, means that the term can no longer be used. We still defend the essential features of democratic centralism, but it is now better to use the term, ‘democratic unity’, emphasising that the democratic rights of members must be safeguarded at all times. (see Short Thesis on the Revolutionary Party by Peter Taaffe, Members Bulletin 28, April 1998)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For a Bold Step Forward (82) itself poses the question: “What is a revolutionary party in the present era?” But nowhere does it explicitly address this issue (though the Scottish Militant Labour EC’s subsequent proposals make it clear that they are advocating a broad party rather than a revolutionary party). <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Clearly, it is not a question of whether or not the party includes the term ‘revolutionary’ in its name, at least in the context of Britain in the present period. Under present conditions, as we have explained elsewhere, it would be a mistake to use the name ‘revolutionary’ or to advocate ‘revolution’ in our programme as opposed to advocating ‘a socialist transformation of society’. This is an issue of presentation, not of political substance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the Scottish document states that “we believe there are fundamental differences of approach” (3) involved in this debate. We would ask the Scottish comrades: Is this a difference about the possibility in this period of constructing a revolutionary party based on democratic centralism? During the debate at the Scottish Militant Labour Conference in Glasgow on 28\/29 March, it was raised that, since the collapse of Stalinism, it was no longer possible to build a revolutionary party of the type envisaged in the past. Does the Scottish Militant Labour Executive take this position?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The document also states that “the [British] EC reply, we believe, artificially counterposes the concept of a revolutionary party to the idea of a broad socialist party in a rigid and undialectical fashion.” (16) But what is the Scottish Executive’s concept of a revolutionary party?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For a Bold Step Forward (2) amends the statement in the first document (Initial Proposals, para 20) that it would be a mistake “to turn back the calendar and return to the strategy of building an independent Marxist organisation in isolation from the rest of the left”. This now becomes “building a Marxist organisation independently of the rest of the left”. But this raises even more questions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Is the Scottish Militant Labour EC arguing that it is no longer possible or desirable to build an organised tendency based on a distinct theoretical tradition and programme, operating on the principle of democratic centralism, whether as a separate party or within a broader formation? This is what we have always meant by the term “an independent Marxist organisation”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish document accuses us of falling into “the trap of rigid formalism”. (67) The comrades say “there is no such thing as a chemically pure revolutionary party”. (16) The development of the Marxist movement internationally, they say, “is not solely a history of arithmetical progression. At different stages, fusions, mergers, and amalgamations have been carried out in order to enlarge the active forces of socialism and to expand the influence of Marxist ideas.” (5)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But who is arguing for a “chemically pure” revolutionary party? When we win fresh layers to our organisation, through propaganda work and campaigning activity, many of them join on the basis of our fighting approach and the immediate issues. Winning them to our rounded-out programme and methods of party-building is a process which takes place over a much longer period. This is especially true in the current period. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, the bigger our organisation grows, the more different trends among the radical, active layers of the working class and youth will be reflected by trends within the party. The crucial point is that democratic unity provides a framework within which differences can be debated throughout the party. Decisions on policy, strategy, tactics, etc, can be taken on the basis of democratic discussion, making it possible to unify the party in action around decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, we also seek to win recruits, either individually or in groups, from other organisations, on the basis of agreement with the key points of our programme, not necessarily on every issue. This has, in fact, been the experience of several Committee for a Workers’ International sections in the recent period. We have also made it clear that we do not believe that a mass revolutionary party can be built in a linear way, solely through “arithmetical progression”. We recognise the possibility of fusion with other revolutionary trends.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When it is a case of a group joining our organisation, whether it is through them merging into our organisation or through a formal fusion, it has to be on the basis of a principled agreement. It would be absurd to demand a hundred percent agreement on all issues. Nevertheless, it is essential to draw up a balance sheet of points of agreement and points of disagreement, and attempt to resolve the issues. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
There has to be agreement on key contemporary issues of perspectives, programme, orientation and strategy, otherwise, as experience has demonstrated many times, a fusion will rapidly lead to a new split or fragmentation. In the recent period, a number of groups have joined different sections of the Committee for a Workers’ International, notably the group (formerly in the French USFI section) which formed the Committee for a Workers’ International’s new French section, and also the groups from USFI and the International Socialists who recently joined the Belgian section.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These cases clearly represent a growth of our revolutionary organisation through the merging or fusion of other groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Alternatively, a revolutionary organisation may decide to join a broader formation or come together with other parties and groups to form a new, broad organisation. The possibility of this tactic was posed before us in Britain when Scargill announced the launching of the Socialist Labour Party in November 1995. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
We welcomed the prospect of a new socialist party which could have brought together left parties and groups, trade union activists, and radical sections of the new social movements and single-issue campaigns. Because of his role in the 1984-85 miners’ strike, Scargill had the personal authority among activists and much wider sections to launch such a party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In our view, such a formation would have been possible on the basis of a broad anti-capitalist programme and commitment to class struggle. An essential condition for our joining, however, would have been a constitution which allowed the democratic participation of different groups, tendencies, trends, etc, on lines similar to the United Left in Spain. Unfortunately, Scargill from the outset imposed a highly centralised and extremely undemocratic constitution, which we predicted would doom the SLP to becoming a neo-Stalinist sect. This has been amply borne out by the splits in the party and the defections which took place at its recent conference in December 1997.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We certainly do not make a fetish of organisational forms. For instance, our small Brazilian section worked for a period in the PSTU (Partido Socialista de Trabalhadores Unificado), a left split-away from the PT (Partido Trabalhadores) which included in its ranks important sections of militant workers and youth. This was done of the basis of an agreement with the PSTU leadership, which was also discussed and agreed by the Committee for a Workers’ International International Executive Committee. Even though the PSTU is affiliated to another International, the LIT (Liga Internacional de Trabajadores), it was agreed that our comrades would continue as a section of the Committee for a Workers’ International, hold their own meetings, and produce a Committee for a Workers’ International bulletin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As we have made clear in our letter (Clarification of Proposals for a Scottish Socialist Party, 2 April), we are not opposed in principle to “the unification of existing forces of the Scottish Socialist Alliance (and, as far as possible, other socialist forces) into a more tightly-knit and cohesive party structure…” (49) <\/p>\n\n\n\n
What we do say, however, is that we have to be clear on the character of such a new formation. In our view, the strategy being proposed by the Scottish Executive (that is, the transformation of the Scottish Socialist Alliance into a new Scottish Socialist Party, with Scottish Militant Labour merging into it) would produce a broad organisation, not a revolutionary party. Nothing in the Scottish Militant Labour EC’s For a Bold Step Forward convinces us otherwise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The comrades are arguing that the new formation they are proposing would be “a hybrid organisation containing elements of a revolutionary party and elements of ‘some broad formation’.” (67) But, in our view, the new formation would only become a revolutionary party if the “elements of a revolutionary party” within it constituted a politically cohesive, organised Marxist tendency actively working to win the other elements to the project of building a revolutionary party, on the basis of support for a Marxist programme, commitment to building a party based on the principles of democratic unity, and affiliation to our International. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This would be viable only as a short-term strategy, as was the case with the US Trotskyists merging with the Musteite AWP. Cannon and Trotsky did not set out to build a new “hybrid” or “transitional” party. Their overriding aim was to transform the new formation into a revolutionary party as quickly as possible. They adopted the strategy because they believed that it could be carried through to success in a short period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC’s document, however, says that there would be a “drawing together of our existing internal organisation and the Scottish Socialist Alliance” (115), that is the merging of our revolutionary forces with broader elements. Moreover, this is clearly not envisaged as a short-term strategy. The Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades accept that “we are still in a preparatory period rather than a revolutionary period. Consequently, the construction of a party of socialist revolution will be a more protracted process.” (40) Such a hybridisation, with the effective dissolution of our organisation into a broader, “transitional” organisation, would inevitably result in a qualitative dilution of our revolutionary tendency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unfortunately, unless they were actively working with the short-term strategy of transforming the new formation into a revolutionary party within a short period, the numerical predominance and experience of our comrades would not ensure the revolutionary character of the new formation. In reality, its character would to a decisive extent be determined by the broader forces involved and the need to accommodate them politically and organisationally. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The programme of the Scottish Socialist Alliance, which the comrades say would be the basis of the new Scottish Socialist Party, is completely inadequate as a programme for a revolutionary Marxist party (as we will explain more fully below). Moreover, the broader forces, the Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades say, would not accept immediate affiliation to the Committee for a Workers’ International, which, in our view, reflects the political distance between ourselves and those forces, notwithstanding agreement on many immediate issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades also say that the merger they propose would require “an organisational compromise” (115), without explaining what they mean. But it is obvious that it would be necessary in a newly formed, broader Scottish Socialist Party to ensure the representation of various groups and even individuals coming into it, probably far in excess of their real forces and political weight. This would be a necessary tactic in the development of a broader socialist formation, but from a revolutionary point of view it would be essential for there to be the counter-balance of an organised Marxist tendency fighting to develop the new formation in a revolutionary direction. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It would be a serious mistake to believe that non-Scottish Militant Labour forces would not exert a diluting political influence in a new party, especially when electoral campaigns will be to the forefront in the next year or so. It is inevitable that centrist and left-reformist elements, even if they are currently sympathetic to a general Trotskyist position, will reflect even stronger centrist, reformist, and nationalist trends under the pressure of the events that will unfold in the next few years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
According to the laws of political genetics, the hybrid formation being proposed could have only one result: a looser, broader organisation. It is not a question of quantifying exactly how loose or how broad it would be: it simply would not be a revolutionary organisation. Yet the comrades, according to their proposals, would have dissolved our Marxist forces into a looser, broader formation, abandoning the political instrument essential to the construction of a small revolutionary party as preparation for a future mass revolutionary party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The AWP\/Muste example<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Referring to the experience of the fusion between the Trotskyist Communist League of America (CLA) and the American Workers Party (AWP) in the USA in 1934, the Scottish comrades are arguing for the idea of a transitional organisation. However, as we explained in our first reply (17 March, Members Bulletin 27), the situation in the US at that time was very different from the current situation in Scotland. The AWP may well have been a “political menagerie”, but it contained within its ranks a section of the most militant industrial workers, including those responsible for the mighty Toledo Auto Lite strike and activists involved in massive unemployed workers’ struggles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Internationally, it was a period of revolution and counter-revolution, with the approach of a new world war after the seizure of power by Hitler in 1933. In the USA itself, there was a tremendous radicalisation following the Great Depression of 1929-31 and the election of Roosevelt on his New Deal programme in 1932. A series of sit-down strikes and violent clashes with the state that prepared the way for the rise of the CIO, a mass trade union organisation of the unskilled workers which grew from around a million to 3,700,000 in less than two years. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The militant working-class ranks of the AWP were moving towards revolution, while a section of its leadership (notably Sidney Hook) were moving towards the position of the CLA and the Fourth International. The leadership of the CLA, with Trotsky’s support, took a calculated risk in fusing with the AWP because they estimated that they could quickly win the majority of its ranks to a Marxist position, not by steaming-in on the issues and hounding all opposition, but through common work and political struggle. Trotsky and Cannon insisted that the merger should take place on the basis of support for the Fourth International, and (as the comrades point out), while flexible on organisational questions, Cannon was intransigent on questions of the programme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 1936 the new formation (the merged CLA and AWP), the Workers Party of the US, entered the Socialist Party, whose right wing had departed. A number of former AWP leaders, including Muste, left the party. The US Trotskyists won several hundred socialist youth from the Socialist Party before their expulsion in 1937 and the founding of the Socialist Workers Party in 1938. In response to explosive, fast-moving events, the US Trotskyists followed a series of essentially short-term tactics in order to win the maximum possible forces amongst workers involved in struggle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is very different from the present situation in Scotland. The Scottish comrades themselves make the point that conditions are not the same as in the tumultuous decades of the 1920 and 1930s (40) “We are still in a preparatory period rather than a revolutionary period. Consequently, the construction of a party of socialist revolution will be a more protracted process.” (40) They also say “we are [not] on the verge of creating either a mass revolutionary party or a broad, mass socialist party in Scotland. The forces which we are working alongside and discussing with are relatively small, although not insignificant.” (41)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is not feasible, in our view, to envisage the construction of a “hybrid” or “transitional” party, combining features of a revolutionary party with those of a broader party, over a prolonged period of time. A revolutionary party has a number of essential features. There is room for flexibility of organisational form. But if the essential political features of our organisation are diluted by being merged into a broader formation then that new formation will not have the character of a revolutionary party. It is not a question of the comrades’ intentions, or of their combined knowledge and experience: it is a question of the political logic of what they are proposing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The essential features of a revolutionary party, in our view, are the following: It must be based on a revolutionary programme; it has to be organised on the genuine principles of democratic centralism, reformulated as democratic unity; it has to combine active (non-sectarian) involvement in the class struggle with the development of Marxist cadres to form the revolutionary core of the party; and it has to be an integral part of an international revolutionary party, currently the Committee for a Workers’ International. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Depending on the conditions it operates under, a revolutionary party may be a separate organisation or it may be a distinct ‘open’ organisation within a broader formation. Another variant is that of a distinct ‘entrist’ tendency within a mass social-democratic or Stalinist party, a tactic followed under various conditions in the past but generally not applicable in this period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish EC, however, is arguing that Scottish Militant Labour should be merged with the Scottish Socialist Alliance (115), that the entire apparatus, paper, etc, of Scottish Militant Labour should be handed over to the new Scottish Socialist Party (Initial Proposals, para 22), and that Scottish Militant Labour branches will be merged into Scottish Socialist Alliance branches – and they are arguing that the new formation will still be a revolutionary party. They say that the majority position of the existing Scottish Militant Labour leadership and its “150 years’ collective experience of the Marxist movement” will prevent any dilution of the Scottish Socialist Party’s revolutionary character. Moreover, they argue that “a core of experienced and tested Marxist activists will be capable of influencing and guiding the broad membership of this new party…” (22)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There is no justification, in our view, for the Scottish EC’s claim that our position reflects “pessimism” or “lack of confidence in the leadership of Scottish Militant Labour” (15). It is a question of a profound disagreement over strategy, where a mistake, in our view, can lead to disastrous results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is not a question of the intentions or the experience of Scottish Militant Labour comrades. It is a question of the political logic of what the Scottish Militant Labour EC is proposing which will inevitably emerge in the course of events. Of course, it is true that “organisational arrangements cannot by themselves guarantee that any national leadership will be up to the task posed by history”. (30) Nevertheless, the essential principles of a revolutionary organisation have to be given organisational form in order to ensure that they continue to operate as the foundations of the party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Programme<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC says “our ideology is treated much more seriously than was the case in the past…” (74) “We have established our programme as the programme of the emerging left in Scotland.” (55) “Taken together, all of the programmatic documents of the Scottish Socialist Alliance constitute nothing less than a detailed transitional programme for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of workers’ power, updated and applied to the concrete conditions that exist in Scotland.” (60) “Within the Scottish Socialist Alliance there are now no differences of opinion on advancing a full-bloodied socialist programme.” (78)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The argument of the Scottish Militant Labour EC is that the programme of the Scottish Socialist Alliance is a revolutionary programme, that the Scottish Socialist Alliance programme will be adopted by the new Scottish Socialist Party, and therefore the new Scottish Socialist Party will be a revolutionary party. We do not accept this logic. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Even if it can be assumed that the new Scottish Socialist Party, involving new forces, will virtually automatically accept the Scottish Socialist Alliance programme, that in itself will not guarantee the revolutionary character of the new party. A transitional programme drawn up for one conjuncture (as we have explained in our letter, Clarification of Proposals for a Scottish Socialist Party, 2 April, para 15) does not constitute the full programme of the revolutionary party, which is a body of ideas and the accumulated experience of the Trotskyist movement. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is not a question of seeking to erect ideological walls for potential new recruits to jump over. But it is necessary to recognise that winning broad, new forces to a transitional programme is not the same as winning their adherence to the programme of Trotskyism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We also made the point in our first reply that formal adherence to a socialist programme does not, in itself, guarantee consistent support in practice for Marxist policies, strategy and tactics. There is a long history in the workers’ movement of centrist leaders, who wavered between reform and revolution, formally adhering to a socialist programme while disastrously reverting to reformist policies when facing a decisive struggle. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
We are not putting this forward, as the comrades claim, “as a kind of double insurance policy” (61). The point we were making was that the formal adherence of a variety of broader forces to our current programme will not ensure their continued support for our policies when they are tested by events. In the context of international affiliations, the Scottish comrades themselves say that “others in the Alliance… do not clearly understand the political differences that exists on the left internationally; nor do they understand the necessity for separate organisations which appear, at least on the surface, to have broadly similar aims and objectives.” (146) <\/p>\n\n\n\n
But the same point, surely, applies to some of the issues that arise in Britain and Scotland? In a revolutionary party, democratic centralism provides a unified structure for debating and resolving political issues posed by events, and for maintaining the political cohesion of the party. In a broad organisation, this is much more difficult, as past experience has demonstrated many times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
With regard to the Scottish Socialist Alliance Constitution, the Scottish Socialist Alliance Charter for Socialist Change, and the Scottish Socialist Alliance Manifesto, we do not accept, however, that they constitute the kind of “detailed transitional programme for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of workers’ power” (60) necessary for a revolutionary party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Point 2 of the Aims and Objectives of the Constitution agreed by the Scottish Socialist Alliance Founding Conference (April 1996) states: “The Scottish Socialist Alliance stands for the socialist transformation of society”. The Charter for Socialist Change (agreed by the Scottish Socialist Alliance National Council, March 1997) contains many good transitional demands, supported by propagandist arguments and agitational points. But it is hard to see how the Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades can argue that it is a rounded-out transitional programme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Much more space, for instance, is given to environmental issues, animal rights, than to the crucial question of control of the economy. Under the heading ‘The Economy, Work, Income and Pay’, the Charter has a single paragraph on ‘The Economy’ which reads as follows: “Renationalisation of the public utilities under democratic control. Nationalise the major industrial and commercial firms, banks, insurance and finance companies. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Develop socialist planning for social need and environmental protection. Cancel the debt which is devastating house building at home and inflicting misery and famine abroad. Use the funds from the financial sector to rebuild the economy.” The Charter then immediately moves on to the 35-hour week, minimum wage, welfare, and workers’ rights. There is no reference to workers’ control and management, and no mention of the demand for compensation only on the basis of proven need.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These are, of course, illustrative examples but, in our view, they indicate the Charter’s general character. Such limitations are not critical in the case of an action programme for a broad alliance. But it is quite a different thing to argue that it is a rounded-out programme for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of workers’ power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Charter, moreover, is predominantly a programme for Scotland. Apart from the points on self-determination in the section on ‘Scottish Self-Government’, the document makes no reference to England and Wales. The short section on Ireland is included as a ‘Discussion Document’ (although we are informed that a new policy statement has been adopted, which we have not seen). There are also short sections on Europe and Internationalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the section on Europe, the Charter calls “For a new democratic, cooperative Europe. For European-wide cooperation around socialist policies that put people first. For example, for a European-wide agreement to reduce working hours and a minimum wage set to the European decency threshold.” It also calls for “non-compliance with the terms of the Maastricht Treaty on EMU” and “For the building of European-wide socialist dialogue, activity and cooperation, such as support for the European March for Jobs.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The section on Internationalism is also extremely weak. It starts:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n “We actively promote international solidarity of working and oppressed people to resist the injustices and barbarism of global capitalism and imperialism. We are part of the struggle for a peaceful, cooperative, democratic international socialist system.” <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Under ‘Solidarity’, the section calls for total opposition to <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“the US and other western governments using their armed might to intimidate and attack other countries… We support all democratic movements of peoples fighting against the injustices of dictatorship and inequality.” <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
The sections on ‘Aid’, ‘Debts’, and ‘Trade’, are very weak. Even allowing for the need to use popular language, the section does not highlight the key role of the working class internationally and the need for class solidarity to support struggles for the overthrow of capitalism and landlordism and for the establishment of workers’ power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There will inevitably be weaknesses and mistakes in material produced under the pressure of events, including our own. This is one thing. The Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades, however, are arguing that the Scottish Socialist Alliance programme will be the programme of the new Scottish Socialist Party and that this will be a key factor in ensuring the revolutionary character of the new formation. But the Scottish Socialist Alliance’s programmatic statements fall far short of constituting a rounded-out Marxist programme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The document (Bold Step, para 112) says that in the new Scottish Socialist Party “we will probably want to insist on a more clear cut policy on socialist independence, given the increasing intensity of the national question.” We are not sure what this means. Does it mean that the comrades will advocate that the new Scottish Socialist Party will adopt the policy recently adopted by the Scottish Militant Labour Conference?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If “within the Scottish Socialist Alliance there are now no differences of opinion on advancing a full-bloodied socialist programme” (78), why do the comrades not support the tactic of transforming Scottish Militant Labour into a new Scottish Socialist Party, with a campaign to win the other elements in Scottish Socialist Alliance and wider forces (outlined as Option 1 in our letter)? <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, if the Scottish Socialist Alliance programme is accepted as the programme of the left in Scotland, why would it not be possible for the comrades to formulate a more developed, rounded-out transitional programme as the basis for unity discussions? This would not be a question of imposing preconditions, or of “searching for issues” with potential allies, but of boldly using our political authority and track record to raise the consciousness of the forces coming into a new formation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
If, on the other hand, the Scottish comrades adopt the tactic of working in a broad new formation (Option 2), then, of course, it would be possible to accept a more limited programme for the new formation, while maintaining a rounded-out Marxist programme for our own tendency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Democratic unity<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We consider that democratic centralism, or democratic unity, is an essential requisite of a revolutionary organisation, applied in a flexible way with the emphasis on democratic debate in this period. The Scottish Executive Committee, however, does not clearly spell out the organisational principles of a new Scottish Socialist Party, and we would like clarification. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“To achieve that type of merger [‘drawing together our existing internal organisation and the Scottish Socialist Alliance’], it is likely that an organisational compromise will be required; we cannot realistically expect to impose the current structure of Scottish Militant Labour upon the new party, even if we wanted to.” (115) <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
But what kind of “organisational compromise” do the comrades envisage? A compromise would undoubtedly reflect political differences on questions of party structure: what are the arguments likely to be? (Unfortunately, the statement in the more recent Scottish Militant Labour EC’s proposals that the “idea of democratic unity” will be incorporated into the constitution of a new Scottish Socialist Party, without going into the specific structures, does not answer these questions.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The document says that the Scottish comrades would <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“insist on a proper branch structure which provided political education and co-ordinated campaigns, recruitment, fund-raising, etc. We would obviously also argue for tighter political cohesion than currently exists within the Scottish Socialist Alliance, including a commitment to ‘unity in action’.” (113) <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Would this be based on democratic centralism? If not, how will “unity in action” be achieved?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Correctly rejecting the “monolithic type of structure” of the SLP, the comrades say <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“we should argue for a more open structure which, as well as allowing for affiliation of trade union organisations, will also guarantee the right of tendencies, factions and other groupings to exist and to produce their own publications and circulate their own material.” (114) <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
According to the proposals in the Scottish Militant Labour EC’s Initial Proposals for a New Scottish Socialist Party, there was no definite proposal for our tendency to continue to exist with a clear political identity, a democratic structure, and resources (apparatus, full-timers, journal, etc) of its own. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In our letter of 2 April (para 18) we asked for clarification of what resources the Scottish Militant Labour EC would propose for our tendency within a broader Scottish Socialist Party. The Scottish Militant Labour EC document (49) refers to “the unification of the existing forces of the Scottish Socialist Alliance (and, as far as possible, other socialist forces) into a more tightly-knit and cohesive party structure”, and calls for “the redirection of our existing apparatus towards the single-minded task of building such a party.” (49) <\/p>\n\n\n\n
But how can our comrades dedicate themselves to the “single-minded” task of building “such a party” when the new formation will, in reality, be a broad party, and not a revolutionary party? Our comrades would still have the task of building a revolutionary tendency within it. (Again, the more detailed proposals now produced by the Scottish Militant Labour EC do not, in our view, provide the basis for the strengthening of our tendency in Scotland or lay the basis for a viable section of the Committee for a Workers’ International.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Party building<\/p>\n\n\n\n
“We would also insist,” says the Scottish Militant Labour EC document, “on a proper branch structure which provided political education and co-ordinated campaigns, recruitment, fund-raising, etc.” (Bold Step, 113) This is building up the party, but it is not the same as building a core of cadres who have thoroughly assimilated the ideas and methods of the revolutionary organisation, and are themselves capable of independent intervention in the class struggle, taking initiatives, and themselves recruiting new forces to revolutionary ideas. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Developing a core of revolutionary cadres is not primarily an organisational task, but fundamentally a political task, which requires a cohesive ideological core to the party. At the same time, revolutionary ideas have to be translated in a practical way into consistent organisational practices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish comrades accept that “our internal structures have been affected by ‘the enormous demands of campaigning activity, election campaigns and so on’.” (86) But this problem will not simply be overcome by merging two organisations into one. It requires a conscious approach to party-building and the development of cadres.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
III. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The other essential feature of a revolutionary tendency is the need to be an integral part of a revolutionary International, a party of world revolution. This requires an organisational structure, with its own democratic procedures, which will enable comrades to participate in the political life and activity of the International<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As we have already commented (EC letter, 2 April) none of the options suggested at the end of the Initial Proposals document, in our view, give proposals which would concretely ensure the continued participation of the Scottish comrades in Committee for a Workers’ International. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
While the second document, For a Bold Step Forward, puts forward a series of arguments as to why it would be impossible for a new Scottish Socialist Party to affiliate to the Committee for a Workers’ International in the short term, it does not clearly or concretely deal with the question of how the comrades will participate in Committee for a Workers’ International (119).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If the new Scottish Socialist Party is conceived as a revolutionary party (a transformation of Scottish Militant Labour, drawing in Scottish Socialist Alliance and other forces), then part of the process should be comrades campaigning for immediate affiliation to the Committee for a Workers’ International. If a decision on affiliation had to be left for a short period after the founding conference, for say six months or a year, to allow time to convince the whole membership, nothing would be wrong with that, provided the aim was affiliation in a short period of time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If, however, the strategy adopted is to transform the Scottish Socialist Alliance into a new Scottish Socialist Party, which, in our view, would unavoidably be a broader party, then we would have to maintain a Committee for a Workers’ International organisation within the new formation. In the Scottish Militant Labour EC’s second document, the comrades say more definitely that one option would be <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“forming within a Scottish Socialist Party an organised formation (whether it be called a tendency, a platform, a society or whatever) which would be part of the Committee for a Workers’ International; which would promote the ideas, literature, etc of the Committee for a Workers’ International; which would ensure the continuation of at least the existing level of financial support for the Committee for a Workers’ International; and which would organise meetings, etc with Committee for a Workers’ International speakers.” (119) <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
This goes a bit further than the formulations in the Initial Proposals document, but, in our view, are still totally inadequate. Nevertheless, we would emphasise the need for a Committee for a Workers’ International group to have its own democratic structure, regular branch meetings, its own resources, full-timers, a members’ bulletin and a public journal. It should actively recruit to the Committee for a Workers’ International group and campaign within the Scottish Socialist Party for Scottish Socialist Party affiliation to Committee for a Workers’ International.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The document refers again to <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“the other alternative we posed, albeit in a roundabout way (‘the new party would become the vehicle… for maintaining British-wide and international links’), was that the new party itself may affiliate to the Committee for a Workers’ International.” (Bold Step, 120)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
But the suggestion was so “roundabout” that it was not at all clear what was being proposed. Another “possible variant”, wrote the comrades, <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“is to throw everything into the new party, which would become the vehicle… for maintaining British-wide and international links.” (Initial Proposals, para 25) <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
The document had already stated that the proposition “of affiliation to the Committee for a Workers’ International as a precondition for any merger” would be “unacceptable to our organisation” and “others in the Alliance would at this stage resist the idea of becoming the Scottish section of Scottish Militant Labour’s international organisation.” (Initial Proposals, para 24)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades accuse us of “bare-faced scaremongering” (120), but the whole emphasis of the Initial Proposals document was on the problems of raising the question of Scottish Socialist Party affiliation to the Committee for a Workers’ International, without any clear proposals for overcoming the problems. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The second document (para 145) suggests we misquoted the Initial Proposals document. But it is difficult to understand how it can be claimed that our quote was out of context. The statement said: “In addition, the idea of the new party itself having an open relationship with several or more international organisations has been posed. In the long term, a broader regroupment on the left in England and Wales and on an international scale could begin to resolve this dilemma.” (Initial Proposals, para 24) Surely the comrades can recognise, on reflection, the alarm that this raised amongst our comrades throughout our International?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Our international organisation is the Committee for a Workers’ International. In the recent period, through both the International Secretariat and a number of sections, we have had friendly discussions, exchange of documents and visits, etc, with a number of other international organisations. We continue to have friendly discussions with USFI (United Secretariat of the Fourth International), but there is no question in the foreseeable future of moves towards fusion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
We maintain friendly contact with the DSP (Democratic Socialist Party) in Australia, which works through a loose network of organisations in Asia. We continue to have discussions with the LIT (Liga Internacional de Trabajadores), which is based mainly in Latin America. We have opened discussions to explore the possibility of fusion with the UIT (Unidad Internacional de Trabajadores) group, whose forces are also based mainly in Latin America, with some forces in Europe. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Any possibility of fusion with the UIT internationally, however, is at best some way in the future. While exploring the possibility of international regroupment, including in the shorter term some kind of federation of international groups, our commitment is to building the Committee for a Workers’ International.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unfortunately, it is a matter of fact that many comrades internationally read the formulations in the Initial Proposals document as meaning that the question of the Scottish Socialist Party’s international affiliation would be postponed to some time in the future. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Meanwhile, the new Scottish Socialist Party would maintain links (an “open relationship”) with a number of international organisations, postponing the question of affiliation until such a time as there was an international regroupment. That may not be what the Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades intended, but it was certainly an understandable interpretation of what was written.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades complain that we do not understand the difficulties surrounding the issue of the Scottish Socialist Party’s international affiliations, and are not assisting them to address them. However, on the basis of the statements made in the Scottish Militant Labour EC’s two documents we consider that they are making a serious mistake on this issue. Of course we want to assist in resolving the problems, but it is a question of clarifying the issues and the arguments, not of formalism or of scaremongering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades reject as “formalistic” our point that the problem of securing agreement for Committee for a Workers’ International affiliation “precisely points to the underlying political differences that still exist.” (121) But the Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades’ arguments are somewhat contradictory on this point. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
They say there is “a serious possibility” of a sizeable Scottish Socialist Party having “a clear revolutionary programme” (108). Again, “the existing programme and policies of the Alliance will almost certainly be accepted as the political basis of a new Scottish Socialist Party” (112); and “the programmatic documents of the Scottish Socialist Alliance constitute nothing less than a detailed transitional programme for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of workers’ power…” (60)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the other hand, the document says, “others in the Alliance… do not clearly understand the political difference that exists on the left internationally.” (146) Given the importance of the questions of perspectives, programme and strategy which have been discussed in the Committee for a Workers’ International in the recent period, this raises important questions. Some of the others in the Scottish Socialist Alliance and forces outside could surely be won to our position on the basis of discussion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
With others, however, there are almost certainly underlying political differences, which will emerge later. It is important that these are put on the agenda for discussion in an attempt to resolve the differences. While they may appear remote at the present time, differences at an international level on perspectives, programme, strategy and tactics, will sooner or later have repercussions for work in Scotland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We do not agree with the point made in the document in connection with this issue. “Peter himself has informally and tentatively pointed out that most ordinary workers would require a magnifying glass to discern the political differences between ourselves and the SWP.” (147) <\/p>\n\n\n\n
But (even if this is an accurate quote) the fact that most ordinary workers do not, at the moment, understand the differences does not mean to say that the differences do not exist, or are merely trivial. Differences over programme, strategy, methods of involvement in workers’ struggles, which distinguish our tendency from trends like the SWP, obviously have practical repercussions – for example, over tactics in the anti-poll tax struggle or tactics for building a left within the trade unions. When they begin to have an effect on day-to-day struggles, then the apparently obscure political differences have practical consequences which are of concern to ordinary workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Rejecting the idea that it is political differences that are a serious obstacle with regard to Committee for a Workers’ International affiliation, the comrades rely on a number of other arguments against the possibility of early affiliation to Committee for a Workers’ International: The Committee for a Workers’ International does not have sufficient authority at this stage. There is “a residue of suspicion of London-based political leaders” amongst “a layer of activists who work closely with Scottish Militant Labour”. In any case, affiliation to the Committee for a Workers’ International is not critical at this stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The authority of the Committee for a Workers’ International<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It goes without saying that the Committee for a Workers’ International does not have the same authority as the Third or Communist International, the Comintern, which was founded on the basis of the Russian revolution. (123) It is also true that, at this stage, the Committee for a Workers’ International does not have the same authority as Trotsky’s International Left Opposition in the 1930s or the Fourth International in the first few years after it was founded in 1938. (135) But isn’t this equally a problem for every section of the Committee for a Workers’ International?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We have to build up the authority of the Committee for a Workers’ International, both on the work of the different sections and also through developing the Committee for a Workers’ International’s political authority and capacity for international campaigns. Without in any way exaggerating our influence, we can say the Committee for a Workers’ International has already achieved a lot. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fact that a number of international groupings and organisations in various countries are actively seeking discussions with us, including discussions on collaboration and the possibility of fusion, is testimony to the Committee for a Workers’ International’s ability to work out clear perspectives in the period since the collapse of Stalinism. This is the collective work of our sections, coming together through the International Executive Committee, World Congresses, and also International Schools. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
We have also built up enormous authority with militant workers in various countries, through our solidarity campaigns. In the last year or so alone, the Committee for a Workers’ International has played an important role in providing international support for the Merseyside dockers, Danish bus workers, and for Bangalore transport workers, in addition to campaigns against the imprisonment and repression of socialists in Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Proletarian internationalism means that we strive to build revolutionary parties in every country as integral sections of a world party of revolution. This is vital, not merely for international solidarity, but to ensure a consistent internationalist approach and to clarify ideas, policies, strategy, etc, through collective international discussion and decision making.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We do not agree with the Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades’ comments about the formation of the British Communist Party or the position of the US Trotskyists in the 1930s on the question of international affiliation. The CPGB’s acceptance of the programme and statutes of the Communist International, including the 21 conditions of membership, cannot be dismissed as a mere formality. It was the political and ideological basis on which the new Communist Party was formed from various parties and groupings. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fact that the party did not live up to its commitment (or the fact that it later degenerated under the influence of Stalinism, for that matter) does not mean that the principles on which the party was founded were irrelevant. In the case of the Communist League of America’s merger with the American Workers Party, the position of Cannon and the CLA leadership was that it should be on the basis of affiliation to the Fourth International.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The document’s point about the SWP’s lack of formal affiliation with the Fourth International (FI) (136) is not at all valid. The US Socialist Workers Party played a vital role in the International Left Opposition and in the Fourth International when it was formed. In fact, in that period the SWP was the most politically influential component of the FI. The Voorhis Act, of course, made formal affiliation politically impossible. But the reality was that the SWP functioned to all intents and purposes as a fully-participating section of the FI.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
“London-based leaders”:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The most disturbing argument put forward against calling for immediate Committee for a Workers’ International affiliation, however, is the following: <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“At this stage, the Committee for a Workers’ International does not possess the authority in Scotland that Scottish Militant Labour possesses; nor does the Socialist Party. For a layer of activists who work closely with Scottish Militant Labour there remains a residue of suspicion of London-based political leaders. This in turn partly reflects attitudes and, in some cases perhaps, even prejudices – linked to the national question – which extend into all sections of society in Scotland.” (132)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
The first question to ask is: Why does the Committee for a Workers’ International not possess the authority in Scotland that Scottish Militant Labour possesses, when Scottish Militant Labour is part of the Committee for a Workers’ International and should, as part of its work, be building the influence of Committee for a Workers’ International?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In paragraphs 124-132, the document argues that, in effect, the position of Scottish Militant Labour in relation to Committee for a Workers’ International is “exactly the opposite” of the relationship of the British Socialist Party to the Communist International in 1920. The British Socialist Party, the comrades argue, did not have the authority to unite the left into a single party. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The merger which produced the Communist Party of Great Britain was only possible on the basis of the success of the Russian revolution and the appeal of Lenin and the Communist International. The position today is “exactly the opposite”. (124) Scottish Militant Labour has “significant authority” among wide layers of workers, trade unionists, single-issue campaigners, and even activists within the LP, SNP and SLP, while the Committee for a Workers’ International, it is strongly implied, has little or no authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But the question which immediately arises is: Why is that “the Committee for a Workers’ International does not possess the authority in Scotland that Scottish Militant Labour possesses”, when Scottish Militant Labour is part of Committee for a Workers’ International, and part of its work should be to build the influence of Committee for a Workers’ International? The position of the British Socialist Party, the biggest of the organisations which merged to form the CPGB, was different. Whatever its strengths and weaknesses, the British Socialist Party (BSP), was of course not a section of the Communist International, which was only launched in 1919.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The document (126-131) reviews the “track record” of struggles on which the authority of Scottish Militant Labour is based. We do not need to be convinced: Scottish Militant Labour has an impressive record of campaigning activity and support for workers’ struggles. The question is, why has Scottish Militant Labour not used its authority over a period to build up the authority of our International, the Committee for a Workers’ International? <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Is it because of “a residue of suspicion of London-based political leaders” among “a layer of activists who work closely with Scottish Militant Labour”? (132) Given the context in which this comment is made, we can only assume that it applies to the Committee for a Workers’ International as well as to the Socialist Party. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This suspicion, the document says, “partly reflects attitudes and, in some cases perhaps, even prejudices – linked to the national question – which extend into all sections of society in Scotland.” (132) But surely it is precisely the dangers of “attitudes” and “even prejudices” linked to the national question – in other words the dangerous pressure of nationalist attitudes – which underline the need for an internationalist approach and integration in the Committee for a Workers’ International.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We believe that the Socialist Party (and previously Militant and Militant Labour), along with the International Executive of Committee for a Workers’ International, which frequently discussed Scotland, has consistently adopted a sensitive attitude to the national question in Scotland. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the 1970s we supported the call for devolution, demanding a Scottish Assembly with real economic and social powers, against many on the left (including some within our own ranks) who opposed this as a concession to nationalism – which did not prevent some of them later switching to a nationalist position. In 1991-92 we argued strongly in favour of the Scottish Turn against opposition within our own ranks. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This was a strategic reorientation towards an independent organisation, Scottish Militant Labour. The tactical turn recognised the special position in Scotland, especially the militant mood of the Scottish working class, reflecting both the intensified social crisis and the growing demand for autonomy or independence for Scotland. The leadership of Militant Labour took the initiative of proposing that Scottish Militant Labour should be an autonomous unit within the all-British organisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We have continually discussed the national question with the Executive of Scottish Militant Labour. In recent months there has been a discussion within Scottish Militant Labour and the Socialist Party, and we both agree that developments now pose the need for us to raise the demand for an Independent Socialist Scotland. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The EC of the Socialist Party, however, has raised several points which we consider are insufficiently developed in Scottish Militant Labour’s material. Briefly they are as follows: Despite the currently growing support for independence, the mood of workers and other strata can fluctuate as events develop and perspectives have to take account of this. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Under the Blair government, British capitalism has conceded a Scottish Parliament but the British ruling class will ruthlessly resist steps towards independence and it would be a mistake to assume that independence will be achieved in the next few years. While we have to fight for independence, linking it to a policy for the socialist transformation of society, we have to warn workers of the severe limitations of independence under capitalism and combat inevitable illusions. We will be at the forefront of the struggle for self-determination, while at the same time combating nationalism and any national prejudices within the workers’ movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is imperative, because of the national question, for the leadership of both Committee for a Workers’ International and the Socialist Party to show great sensitivity to national sensitivities in Scotland. On the other hand, we believe it is vital for comrades in Scotland, while fighting for an appropriate programme for self-determination, to fight against nationalism and national prejudices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC document acknowledges: <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“To be fair to the British EC, Scottish Militant Labour has up until now been given a great deal of latitude to work out our own tactics, policies, initiatives, etc. We believe that has resulted in a generally healthy situation in Scotland; and we would certainly hope that whatever organisational arrangements are finally agreed, this is the type of relationship that will continue.” (144) <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
In our view, the approach described here reflects the general approach not just of the British EC but of the International Secretariat and the International Executive Committee of Committee for a Workers’ International.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the document also says: <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“People with whom we are trying to collaborate politically do not at this stage accept the authority of the Committee for a Workers’ International leadership or their right to intervene in the fashion that the comrades have described.” (143) <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
To intervene in what fashion? Described by who?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unfortunately, the document misrepresents comments that were made by Tony Saunois at the recent National Committee and by Lynn Walsh in an informal discussion. The crucial point being made by Tony was that we regard our sections as component parts of a world party of revolution, and key questions of programme, tactics, strategy, and organisation arising in the sections, especially at crucial conjunctures, are the collective concern of the International. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Of course, it would be absurd to suggest that either the International Secretariat or the International Executive Committee should be involved in every discussion and every decision. But on key issues, when a new policy or strategy is proposed, then it is a matter for discussion by the International Secretariat, the International Executive Committee, and if necessary the World Congress. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ability of the International Secretariat to intervene and discuss issues depends entirely on the political authority of the leadership, which can only act with the support of the International Executive Committee. Of course, if some of our allies in Scotland do not accept the political authority of the Committee for a Workers’ International then they will not accept our internationalist tradition of collective international discussion of key issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lynn Walsh did not “effectively accuse the leadership of Scottish Militant Labour of dishonest political behaviour…” or suggest an independent Scottish section of Committee for a Workers’ International “under the close supervision of the international leadership.” (141-142)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The comment made by Lynn in an informal meeting with Alan and Frances, in which he expressed surprise at the proposals put forward in the Initial Proposals document, was that the International Secretariat has far more information about developments and discussions in most sections of the International than the British EC has about developments and discussions in Scotland. Unfortunately, we consider this to be a factual statement. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lynn did suggest that the Scottish organisation should become an independent section of the Committee for a Workers’ International, a proposal which he first raised for discussion with Alan and Frances on a visit to Glasgow in June 1997. Such a step, in the view of Lynn and other members of the British EC and the International Secretariat, would be a logical extension of the present autonomous status of Scottish Militant Labour within the all-British organisation, and a recognition of the extent to which the national question has developed in Scotland. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Such a step, which should be discussed in the International Executive Committee, would be an unusual, if not unprecedented step, in the history of the International, given that Scotland is not yet a separate state. The fact that we raised the proposal some time ago shows the importance we attach to recognising the national sensibilities in Scotland. When we raised the proposal for a separate Scottish section in 1997, Alan said that he welcomed the proposal. Unfortunately the comrades made no concrete response until the production of the Initial Proposals document.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At no time did anyone say or imply that a Scottish section of Committee for a Workers’ International should be “under the close supervision of the international leadership”. (142) As part of the Committee for a Workers’ International, a Scottish section would have the same democratic rights and duties as every other section.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The International Secretariat does not intervene in an arbitrary or heavy-handed manner. Neither the International Executive Committee nor the sections would accept that. However, we are committed to building a world party of socialist revolution. We recognise that we are still in the preliminary stages of this task. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Nevertheless, we do not accept the policy of some other international groupings, like USFI, which now adopts a stance of “non-intervention in the sections”. Their International adopts general statements on the world situation, but takes (at least in theory) no position on developments within its different sections. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This, in our view, is an abandonment of the method of Trotskyism, and is a recipe for disorientation, fragmentation, and disintegration of their organisation. Nor do we accept the approach of the DSP leadership in Australia, which is to build up a “network” of socialist and radical organisations, which meet for discussions and collaborate in solidarity campaigns, but do not take collective, internationalist responsibility for developments in the various organisations within their network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Is international affiliation crucial at this stage? The last-resort argument of the document is that it will not make a big difference if the question of the new Scottish Socialist Party’s international affiliation is postponed for a period. It throws in the fact, which we have already mentioned (para 136), that after 1940 the SWP was not formally affiliated to the Fourth International because of the Voorhis Act of 1940. This point is without substance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The document also states: “Even the Bolsheviks’ international links were with the discredited and reformist Second International.” (137) But that was the Marxist International until 1914. It was not merely discredited in 1914, it collapsed with the outbreak of the first world war, when the right-wing reformists in the different sections patriotically supported their own rulers in the imperialist war. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the period before 1914, however, Lenin and his collaborators engaged in a struggle between revolution and centrism\/reformism within the International, collaborating with the revolutionary left in the German, Polish, and other parties (Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jogiches, etc) against the centrist and reformist wing (Bernstein, Kautsky, Adler, etc). The weakness of the revolutionary wing of the Second International, despite the formation of mass Communist Parties after 1918, played a significant part in the defeat of the revolutions that broke out throughout Europe after 1917. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 1915 Lenin, working with a group known as the Internationalists, played a leading role in the Zimmerwald Conference (held in Switzerland), attended by 38 delegates from eleven countries, which was an attempt to rally the anti-chauvinist, internationalist left. The Zimmerwald Left also participated in the Second International Socialist Conference held in Kiental in April 1916. This refutes any suggestion that Lenin placed little emphasis on the need to build an International in the period immediately preceding the October 1917 revolution. Point 10 of Lenin’s April Theses in 1917 was as follows: “We must take the initiative in creating a revolutionary International, an International against the social-chauvinists and against the ‘Centre’.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC document also states: “Here in Britain our organisation evolved independently of any international organisation, particularly in the period 1964 to 1974, the year that the Committee for a Workers’ International was formed.” (137) This is true, but it is not the whole truth. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Our organisation was outside any International because we were expelled from the USFI in 1965, for conducting a principled political struggle against the false policies and methods of the USFI leadership. But we immediately began the task of building a new International, devoting considerable time and resources to searching for and winning co-thinkers in other countries – the essential preparatory work which allowed for the formation of the Committee for a Workers’ International in 1974. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
We worked on the fundamental assumption that it is not possible to build a viable Marxist organisation in any country without an internationalist approach, and that an internationalist approach requires an international organisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades, in our view, have not addressed the vital political issues that we are raising. It is not good enough to allege that we are proposing “arid schemas” (159-163), that we are demanding “rigorous adherence to a standardised procedure” (139), that we have succumbed to an illusion that there can be “organisational guarantees against disintegration” (163), or that we are attempting to lock away the Scottish comrades in “an organisationally pure prison cell”. (182) This is really name-calling, not political argument.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IV. ELECTORAL STRATEGY<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
In our first response to the Scottish Militant Labour EC’s Initial Proposals, we commented that “the reasons being put forward [by Scottish Militant Labour EC] to justify these new proposals are primarily electoral” (Letter, 17 March, para 9), not “purely electoral”, as Scottish Militant Labour’s second reply says (97). This is a matter of fact: the arguments put forward in the first section of Initial Proposals are predominantly electoral.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The document says that “1999 will be a decisive year for the socialist left”, with “three separate sets of elections… during the first half of 1999: the local council elections… the first elections to the new Scottish Parliament… and the Euro-elections…” (para 2) <\/p>\n\n\n\n
If the socialist left fails to make a breakthrough in these elections, it argues, “the advance of socialism could be slowed down”; while socialist victories, particularly the achievement of a toe-hold in the new Scottish Parliament, “could dramatically accelerate events”. (para 3) <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC’s proposals for a new Scottish Socialist Party are premised on the imperative of avoiding “two or more socialist parties… stand[ing] in opposition to one another”, which could lead to “a unique historical opportunity [being] criminally squandered”. (paras 4, 5)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The argument of the Scottish Militant Labour EC is, in essence, that if the British EC opposes their proposal for a new Scottish Socialist Party it must be because we do not recognise the importance of these forthcoming elections or the need to strive for a unified election platform. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The crucial issue in our view, however, is not the importance of fighting election campaigns or the desirability of a broad socialist platform, which we fully recognise, but the character of the new party which is being proposed. The need to fight these elections does not require us to dissolve our own organisation into a broader formation. We accept the need to contest elections on a socialist platform, but we do not accept the need to dissolve our organisation. There is no necessary, logical link between the two proposals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Surely there is no doubt about our position on fighting elections? Since the Scottish Turn in 1991 and the Open Turn in England and Wales in 1992, we have contested a series of parliamentary, European Parliament, and local elections. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Fighting elections, in this period, is a vital way of reaching wider layers of workers with socialist ideas and policies. Campaigning work in elections, moreover, is an important way of making contact with the fresh, scattered layer of workers and young people who are questioning capitalist conditions and are open to socialist ideas if they are presented in the form of a fighting programme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We also recognise that there can be advantages in fighting elections as part of a broader socialist platform. The coming together of significant left socialist forces, left trade union forces, and the most radical elements in single-issue campaigns on a unified election platform could have a greater impact than the different left elements fighting the elections separately. We certainly do not dispute that “election results and successes” have an important impact in the eyes of the broad masses of the working class. (106)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In any such election platform, we would fight for the boldest possible socialist programme. But this would not be a pre-condition for our participation. An anti-capitalist programme, with some key class demands, could play an effective role in raising the consciousness of broad sections of workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is the position we took when Scargill first raised the call for a Socialist Labour Party. We welcomed the prospect of a unification of left forces on the basis of a radical anti-capitalist programme, pointing to the effects it could have through fighting elections and other campaigning activity. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This possibility, as we have argued elsewhere, was thrown away because of the narrow, undemocratic structure Scargill imposed on the SLP, which unfortunately rendered it incapable from the outset of unifying a significant section of left forces or of appealing to newer, fresher layers looking for radical change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the case of Scotland, we have made it clear that we are not opposed in principle to an attempt to establish a unified election platform. As we explained in our letter (Clarification of Proposals for a Scottish Socialist Party, 2 April) this, in our view, could take either the form of a new Marxist Scottish Socialist Party working to form a broader platform with other socialist forces, or of the formation of a broad Scottish Socialist Party, in which we continue to play a role as an organised Marxist tendency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We also recognise that winning seats on local councils and especially in parliament is an extremely important lever for the development of socialist consciousness amongst wider layers of workers. This will be especially true in the case of the Scottish Parliament, given the heightened developments which will take place in Scotland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the need for Marxists to reach out to wider layers in elections campaigns and through gaining public positions, is only one side of the equation. What is the point of reaching wider layers, if we don’t draw new layers into our own ranks, developing them into politically conscious activists, into Marxist cadres? The need to develop a socialist consciousness amongst wider layers cannot be counterposed to the need to build a party consisting of conscious revolutionaries. The two tasks go hand in hand. The strengthening of the revolutionary party is a prerequisite for the development of broader socialist forces in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC argues that the growth of a revolutionary party is not merely an arithmetical progression. This is quite true. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
But neither is the growth of anti-capitalist, socialist consciousness amongst the mass of workers an arithmetical progression. If the socialist left is able to chalk up big successes in the various Scottish elections next year, even winning one or two seats in the Scottish Parliament, that would undoubtedly be a big step forward. But even if the Scottish Militant Labour Executive’s most favourable scenario was to be borne out, it would surely be an illusion to believe that such a breakthrough would guarantee the steady growth of socialist consciousness amongst the workers in Scotland. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
There will inevitably be twists and turns on the part of different left groups, as well as ebbs and flows of the mood of different sections of the working class. This is why we need a politically coherent organisation, a revolutionary party. Such a party can orientate to events, responding with appropriate policies, strategy and tactics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC say that we “have a lightminded attitude to the electoral possibilities that are posed”. (106) But our point is that even if there is no element of exaggeration at all in the comrades’ estimate of the potential that exists, even if their most favourable scenario is borne out, it does not justify the dissolving of our party into a broader formation. This would be a political disarming, undermining the capacity of Marxism to respond to future events.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Of course, Marxists in Scotland should attempt to occupy the most strategically important ground in advance of next year’s elections. An Scottish Socialist Party should attempt to unify the maximum possible forces, putting itself in a strong position to demand negotiations with other left forces to secure an electoral coalition or pact (102). This is one thing, but it is quite another to argue that the potential gains of the Scottish Militant Labour EC’s strategy are so great that it justifies the dissolving of our own organisation. This is a false method.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In all our activities we should strive for the maximum possible gains. At the same time, in our perspectives we have to have a realistic appraisal of likely developments, anticipating a number of different outcomes. In our view, the Scottish Militant Labour EC’s appraisal of the likely gains are one-sided, to say the least. For instance, we consider it is unlikely that in the event of a split in the Labour Party in Scotland all the departing lefts, or even a majority, could be won to an Scottish Socialist Party, whatever form it takes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The aim of unifying left forces on a common election platform does not necessitate the dissolving of our organisation. As we have suggested (Clarifications, etc, 2 April) there are two options. One is a Marxist Scottish Socialist Party, drawing in existing Scottish Socialist Alliance and some other new forces, working for building an electoral alliance with other forces. The other (Option 2) would be for a broad Scottish Socialist Party, with Scottish Militant Labour under a new name continuing as a component part of the new formation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Why are both these options ruled out in favour of a looser, broader Scottish Socialist Party into which Scottish Militant Labour would be effectively dissolved? In the sections headed ‘Electoralism’ and ‘Electoral Pact’, the Scottish Militant Labour EC puts forward two points: First, rejecting the idea of “a mass recruitment drive” under the banner of the Scottish Socialist Alliance, they say, “unless our existing apparatus, including our branches, our full-time apparatus and our paper are directed towards that goal, then it would have only a limited impact.” (103) Second, they say: “There is a persistent discord between the public tasks that rest on the shoulders of our organisation and the internal demands of maintaining and building our ‘independent organisation’.” (104)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The clear implication of this is that, whether we are talking about the Scottish Socialist Alliance or a new Scottish Socialist Party, that “public tasks” (election campaigns, anti-cuts campaigns, etc) should take priority over “internal demands” – that is, politically integrating new recruits, educating and developing cadres, developing an internal political life essential to ‘democratic unity’, sustaining a politically and organisationally coherent organisation, building up strong internal structures, finances, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades effectively accept our point that there is now “quite a weak internal situation (in Scotland) in terms of the development of cadres, organisational structures, and finance”. (86) They point to the difficult objective situation in the last period and the complicated consciousness following the collapse of Stalinism. These are factors that have affected most sections of the Committee for a Workers’ International. Nevertheless, there is also the subjective factor of what priority is given to developing the organisation’s internal life, a systematic approach to recruitment, education, finances, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The comrades say that though the organisation is weaker numerically than it was five or ten years ago, its specific weight on the left and within the working class generally has increased. But the Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades say, quite wrongly, “We understand that they [the British EC] disapprove of the emphasis that we have placed on mass work, including leading campaigns, intervening broadly in elections, etc.” (93) Not at all! We applaud Scottish Militant Labour’s public activities. But we think it is completely mistaken to counterpose public activity to the task of developing cadres and the internal life and structures of the organisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This section is headed ‘Campaigns and Cadres’. But the only reference to cadres is: “It is almost a truism of Marxist politics that cadres are shaped not just by ideas, but also by activity and involvement in the broader struggles of the working class.” (95) Of course, cadres are developed through struggle, but the development of cadres does not merely depend on “an interest in theory and ideas” (which the comrades refer to, para 94) but on the development of an internal political life, the structure of debate and decision making – ‘democratic unity’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Scottish Militant Labour EC comrades attribute the problems to the problem of running two organisations, the Scottish Militant Labour and the Scottish Socialist Alliance in the past period. But the clear implication of their argument is that it is impossible in this period to combine public campaigning activity with cadre-building – that is, with the tasks we have always associated with building a revolutionary organisation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Thus they are arguing for the Scottish Socialist Party to be a looser, broader formation, a “hybrid” or “transitional” formation. They say that the forces of Scottish Militant Labour would be a significant force, if not the dominant force within the new party. But they give no proposals of how cadres will continue to be developed in the new party. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet without a bigger force of cadres we will not necessarily be able to achieve electoral breakthroughs and we certainly would not be able to translate potential electoral breakthroughs into a more firmly-based advance of socialism.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Reply to the Scottish Militant Labour Executive’s For a Bold Step Forward From the Socialist Party EC, 5 May 1998 Introduction None of the arguments put forward in the Scottish Militant Labour Executive’s For a Bold Step Forward (or in further documents which we have just received) convince us that what the Scottish Militant Labour […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10,63,65,68,66],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-494","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-authors-classical","category-debates-in-marxism","category-scotland","category-socialist-party-executive-committee","category-the-scottish-debate-2000"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/socialistworld.net\/theory\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/494","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/socialistworld.net\/theory\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/socialistworld.net\/theory\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/socialistworld.net\/theory\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/socialistworld.net\/theory\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=494"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/socialistworld.net\/theory\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/494\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":504,"href":"https:\/\/socialistworld.net\/theory\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/494\/revisions\/504"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/socialistworld.net\/theory\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=494"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/socialistworld.net\/theory\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=494"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/socialistworld.net\/theory\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=494"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}