Who controls the garrison?

Trotsky explains that an ‘armed insurrection’ was required to secure the socialist revolution. But, even into September, the Bolsheviks were lacking active support in the Petrograd garrison. The Red Guard had also only been able to hang on to a few thousand rifles. The struggle to win the soldiers’ backing was therefore a vital one for the Bolsheviks.

After the ‘July Days’, the Compromisers had reorganised the garrison, replacing many of the most revolutionary soldiers with regiments that could be more easily relied on by the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. However, this became less certain after the defeat of Kornilov: “Distrust of the Bolsheviks was replaced by sympathy, or at the worst by a watchful neutrality. But the sympathy was not active. The garrison remained in a political sense extremely shaky and – as muzhiks are – suspicious. Aren’t the Bolsheviks going to deceive us? Will they really give us peace and land?  And since there remained in the garrison an almost completely unabsorbed minority hostile to the Bolsheviks – five or six thousand junkers, three Cossack regiments, a bicycle battalion and an armoured car division – the outcome of a conflict in September seemed doubtful” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

But the Compromisers, from their opposing perspective, feared the growing Bolshevisation of the garrison in Petrograd and in other cities. They also knew that having control of the troops could be decisive. The government decided to apply the same methods that they had used after July – to once again transfer   more revolutionary troops elsewhere. As Trotsky puts it: “Before surrendering all its rights, the Provisional Government was trying to get hold of that fundamental right of every government – the right to dispose of armed bodies of men” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

The Compromisers cleverly concealed their real motives behind the supposed requirements of military strategy. Given the loss of Riga and the Moon Sound islands, headquarters issued orders to reorganise the Petrograd units in preparation for an offensive.

The Bolsheviks decided to respond carefully in case any refusal to follow the order could be used to turn the front against the revolution. They suggested that some units could be swapped with revolutionary units from the front, but only by agreement of the soviets. But the Petrograd garrison would have none of it. They could not even consider agreeing to an autumn offensive and a harsh winter campaign.

The press predictably laid in to the ‘idle’ soldiers but the workers took the side of the regiments. The Putilov workers were the first to protest against the transfer. In turn, the soldiers began to support the idea of arming the workers. Instead of undermining the Bolsheviks, the opposition from both barrack and factory to the Compromisers’ proposal helped to draw the workers and soldiers firmly together.

The “Committee of Defence”

For some time, the Bolshevik leadership had been discussing how best to create an authoritative body to organise the insurrection. Such a committee was clearly vital but would be completely compromised if it had to report openly to the Soviet, particularly to representatives of parties hostile to the revolution. The Mensheviks, unintentionally, came up with a solution to the problem!

On October 9th, the Mensheviks put forward a motion to the Soviet calling for the setting-up of a ‘Committee of Revolutionary Defence’ to help defend the capital. The Compromisers hoped this would help create some patriotic support for strengthening the front.

To the Mensheviks’ surprise, the Bolsheviks accepted the proposal as a means of judging exactly what was needed to defend the capital and whether there really was any military justification for removing troops.

“Having snatched this dangerous weapon from the hands of the enemy, the Soviet remained in a position to turn the decision about removing troops this way or that according to circumstances - but in any case against the government and the Compromisers” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

The body, soon to be renamed the “Military Revolutionary Committee” would also perfectly suit the Bolsheviks’ requirements to have an authoritative Soviet body sanctioned to organise the coming insurrection. “On the very next day, the 10th, the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks adopted in secret session the resolution of Lenin presenting armed insurrection as the practical task of the coming days.  The Committee of Defence was included in its plans for a direct struggle for power” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet designated that the new body would be given the twin tasks of getting in touch with the relevant authorities to ascertain the military threat to Petrograd and, at the same time, of making a census of the garrison and its supplies and preserving order amongst the soldiers and workers of the city.

“The formulae were all-inclusive and at the same time ambiguous: they almost all balanced on a fine line between defence of the capital and armed insurrection. However, these two tasks, heretofore mutually exclusive, were now in actual fact growing into one. Having seized the power, the Soviet would be compelled to undertake the military defence of Petrograd. The element of defence-camouflage was not, therefore, violently dragged in, but flowed to some extent from the conditions preceding the insurrection” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

“With this same purpose of camouflage a Social Revolutionary and not a Bolshevik was placed at the head of the commission on ‘the Committee of Defence’. This was a young and modest intendant, Lazimir, one of those Left Social Revolutionaries who were already travelling with the Bolsheviks before the insurrection – although, to be sure, not always foreseeing whither the course would lead” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

Despite the opposition of the two Mensheviks on the Executive Committee, Lazimir’s proposals, drawn up with the help of Trotsky, were ratified. These allowed for the membership of the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) to include the praesidiums of the Soviet and of the soldiers’ section, as well as representatives of the fleet, the Finland regional committee, trade unions, particularly the rail unions, factory committees, party military organisations and the Red Guard. Organisations were asked to send representatives familiar with military organisation and/or with strong links with the garrison.

“The Mensheviks observed with helpless indignation that an idea advanced by them for patriotic purposes was being converted into a screen for the preparation of an insurrection. The camouflage was by no means impenetrable – everybody understood what the talk was about – but at the same time it could not be broken through” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

The Garrison and the Red Guard

In the same way that the Bolsheviks rested on the workers’ representatives in the Soviet, but nevertheless also had to be sure to have the support of the factory and shop committees, “the composition of the soldiers’ section guaranteed to the Bolsheviks the political sympathy of the majority of the garrison. But in order to get the practical disposal of the military units, it was necessary to rely directly on the regimental committees” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

With this in mind, the MRC also set up a ‘Permanent Conference of the Garrison’ made up from the regimental committees rather than the politically elected delegates making up the soldiers’ section of the soviets. This Conference became more influential than the soldiers’ section in the days up to the insurrection. Of course, the most important individuals were members of both bodies in any case.

In his article ‘The Crisis is Ripe’, Lenin had been extremely critical of the Party’s lack of detailed knowledge about the attitude of the troops to events. Now, thanks to the Garrison Conference, the Bolsheviks had a vital barometer to gauge the real moods of the garrison in the capital and its surrounding units.

On the 13th, the proposals to set up the MRC and the Garrison Conference were debated at the soldiers’ section itself. This had only recently still been friendly territory for the Compromisers but the fierce tone of the meeting showed an insurrectionary mood was developing.

Dybenko, the huge black-bearded president of the Centrobalt (the Central Committee of the Baltic sailors) opened the eyes of many of the soldiers with an account of how they had threatened to hang their commanders if their orders threatened the fleet. He concluded tellingly by saying:“ ‘They talk about the need of bringing out the Petrograd garrison for the defence of the approaches to Petrograd and of Reval in particular. Don’t believe a word of it. We will defend Reval ourselves. Stay here and defend the interests of the revolution.’ The question of removing the regiments was settled from that moment ” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

At the end of the session, with an overwhelming majority that even surprised the Bolsheviks, Lazimir’s proposals were agreed by 283 votes to just 1 against and with 23 abstentions.

“The vote meant that the soldiers’ section had openly and officially transferred the administration of the garrison from headquarters to the Military Revolutionary Committee. The coming days would show that this was no mere gesture” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

The Petrograd Soviet had also made a commitment to arm the workers’ Red Guard. However, it was the workers themselves that took the first successful initiative to obtain weapons. Trotsky recalls how a delegation came to tell him that they had visited the Sestroretsk Arms Factory to ask for supplies. The factory had agreed to honour an order if placed by the Soviet. So Trotsky made a request and received five thousand rifles that same day.

The press responded angrily to the news and the Compromisers on the Central Executive Committee announced that only they had the authority to permit any weapon deliveries. Unfortunately for Dan and Gotz - and Kerensky - the workers and soldiers were no longer recognising the authority of either the government or the Central E.C.

Manoeuvres and rumours

The Compromisers still did not seriously believe that the Bolsheviks could take power. The Mensheviks declared that they would not participate in the MRC and that, in their view, the masses were not in favour of an insurrection.

However, the bourgeoisie were starting to worry. Military commanders reported possible action being prepared by the Bolsheviks. The press grew even more strident in its warnings and threats.

Kerensky and the military tops put together a plan under which General Cheremissov, commander-in-chief of the Northern front, was also given command of the Petrograd garrison. They then summoned representatives of the Petrograd Soviet to a meeting in Pskov in order to put the demands for troop reorganisation to them in full view of the representatives of the army.

The Soviet had little option but to accept the challenge. A delegation of around twenty, half from the Soviet and half representing the regiments, was agreed. It was headed by Feodorov, president of the Workers’ Section and Lashevich and other leaders of the Soldiers’ Section and the Military Organisation of the Bolsheviks. A small number of Left SRs and Menshevik-Internationalists were also included.

The meeting in the headquarters at Pskov was arranged theatrically to put as much pressure as possible on the visitors. Around tables covered with maps, generals and representatives of the army committees stood to address the delegation. All their reports arrived at the same conclusion – that the Petrograd garrison had to be called out to defend the approaches to the capital.

As secret documents later confirmed, Cheremissov had not requested these troops, Kerensky had imposed them on his commander. Fortunately, the Soviet delegates were not fooled. As they explained to the generals, there was no shortage of men at the front, just a lack of will to carry on fighting. Sending men from Petrograd would not change that.

After this rejection, the government waited nervously to see when the Bolsheviks would act – expecting some kind of armed demonstration as in July. False rumours circulated with guards being reinforced for a supposed – but illusory – Bolshevik action on the 17th. Officers queued in front of the Winter Palace to offer their services and were given revolvers in exchange.

In reality, the growing strength of support for the Bolsheviks in the garrison meant that plans for armed battles and demonstrations were unnecessary. The soldiers weren’t viewing the situation as requiring preparation for an insurrection as much as simply waiting for a summons from the Petrograd Soviet – or the Congress of Soviets – to confirm soviet power.

This balance of forces was confirmed by the Garrison Conference held on the 18th. Only the representatives of the Ninth Cavalry Regiment, the cavalry of the Guard and of two military schools declared themselves as either against a ‘coming-out’ or neutral on the question. In favour stood regiment after regiment.

“The representatives of the Central Executive Committee, who had not long ago justly considered the Petrograd garrison the source of their power, were now almost unanimously denied the floor. In a state of impotent exasperation they left the ‘unauthorised’ assembly, which immediately thereafter  declared: No orders are valid without the countersign of the Soviet’ ” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

The commissars get to work

The next morning, on the 19th, the Central E.C. attempted to convene its own ‘lawful’ assembly of the garrison. But, to their dismay, the meeting only confirmed that an overwhelming majority of units were in support of a ‘coming out’.

Having won over most of the garrison politically, the Soviet now started to tighten its organisational hold on the garrison. This was done through the MRC appointing commissars for each unit, plus various other key institutions. They were given authority to issue orders on behalf of the Soviet.

The MRC itself did not formally convene until October 20th and, with the Compromisers boycotting it, was made up solely of Bolsheviks and Left Social Revolutionaries. Lazimir was the only SR to make any real contribution, however.

Trotsky became President of the MRC. Besides him, its chief organisers were Podvoisky, Antonov, Lashevich, Sadovsky and Mekhonoshin. Most of its decisions were made by an executive officially headed by Lazimir, though guided by Trotsky, with Sverdlov, the key party organiser who knew its cadres better than anyone else, also brought in for advice on key issues.

The commissars were largely selected from the Military Organisation of the Bolsheviks. Now around a thousand-strong, the organisation contained many of the most determined soldiers and young officers. Many had also been through the hardening experience of imprisonment after the July Days.

“The commissars recruited from its midst found in the troops of the garrison a soil well prepared. The garrison considered them its own and submitted to their orders with complete willingness” [Volume Three, Chapter Four ¹⁸].

Aided by workers’ own initiatives, the commissars began to exert control. For example, the employees of the Kromwerk arsenal asked for assistance in controlling its supply of armaments which were being assigned to junkers and various suspicious counter-revolutionary organisations. Having succeeded there, the MRC extended control of arms supplies to other arsenals and even private arms dealers, making sure weapons could only be issued by agreement of the commissars.

The printers’ union also alerted the MRC to the increase in production of Black Hundred leaflets and, again, instructions were issued that any questionable material should be brought to the attention of the MRC for their approval before

The ‘April Days’ resurface again

While Trotsky and the MRC had been battling to win the Garrison’s support, another fierce struggle was being waged between the supporters and opponents of insurrection – but this battle, behind the scenes, was within the ranks of the Bolsheviks’ own Central Committee. The main protagonists were Lenin, still in hiding now that renewed instructions had been issued by the Minister of Justice for his arrest, and, in opposition to him, the ‘old Bolsheviks’ Zinoviev and Kamenev.

Just as in the April Days, Lenin found himself in opposition to a Central Committee (C.C.) that he found too passive, paying too much attention to the opinions of the Compromisers and Central Executive Committee, and not enough to the views of rank-and-file workers.

“He branded as ‘shameful’ the decision to participate in the Pre-Parliament. He was indignant at the list of Bolshevik candidates for the Constituent Assembly published at the end of September. Too many intellectuals, not enough workers … too many new names … members of the party not tried out in the struggle! Here Lenin considers it necessary to make an exception: Trotsky, ‘for in the first place Trotsky took an internationalist position immediately upon his arrival; in the second place, he fought for amalgamation among the Mezhrayontsi; in the third place, in the difficult July Days he … proved a devoted champion of the party of the revolutionary proletariat’ ” [Volume Three, Chapter Five ¹⁹].

However, Lenin’s main concerns centred on the C.C.’s failure to plan for insurrection. As explained in Part One of these lessons on the 1917 Russian Revolution, it had taken Lenin’s struggle for his April Theses, alongside pressure from the ranks of the Party, to convince the Bolshevik leadership to break from its policy of conditional support for the Provisional Government and to prepare for socialist revolution.

However, while the ‘old Bolsheviks’ may have ended up voting for the theses, they still silently harboured the same Menshevik tendencies that had been nurtured by their long isolation – from both the masses and Lenin – during the early years of the war. These doubts began to resurface after the July retreat. On August 20th, Stalin, as editor of Pravda, published without dissenting comment an article by Zinoviev entitled ‘What Not to Do’, which argued against the preparation of an insurrection.

Lenin, without naming him directly, countered Zinoviev’s warning about the failure of the Paris Commune by writing: “The reference to the Commune is very superficial and even stupid. For in the first place the Bolsheviks … have learned something since 1871. They would not fail to seize the banks, they would not renounce the offensive against Versailles, and in these conditions even the Commune might have succeeded. Moreover the Commune could not immediately offer the people what the Bolsheviks can if they come to power, namely, land to the peasants and an immediate proposal of peace ...” [Volume Three, Chapter Five ¹⁹].

The wavering reappeared over the question of the Pre-Parliament, with the C.C. only adopting the policy of boycott under pressure from below, aided by Lenin’s letter-writing campaign directed to the party ranks. Given this history of vacillation, Lenin was hardly taken by surprise by the C.C.’s wavering on the question of insurrection just as it became the urgent task for the Party to resolve.

State and Revolution

Lenin’s comments on the Paris Commune drew from the careful study that he had completed, while in enforced isolation, to re-establish the class theory of the state. But his pamphlet ‘State and Revolution’ was no abstract work of theory; it was scientific preparation for the October Revolution.

Trotsky explains how: “driven underground, Lenin was obliged for a hundred and eleven days – from July 6 to October 25 – to cut down his meetings even with members of the Central Committee. Without any immediate intercourse with the masses … he concentrated his thought the more resolutely upon the fundamental problems of the revolution, reducing them – as was both his rule and the necessity of his nature – to the key problems of Marxism” [Volume Three, Chapter Five ¹⁹].

The petty bourgeois democrats, and even elements within Bolshevism, had long raised the objection that the proletariat would be unable to master the ‘machinery of state’. But, as Lenin wrote after the defeat of Kornilov: “Let those of little faith learn from this example. Shame on those who say: ‘We have no machine with which to replace that old one which gravitates inexorably to the defence of the bourgeoisie.’ For we have a machine. And that is the soviets” [Volume Three, Chapter Five ¹⁹].

Trotsky summarises Lenin’s conclusion that the working-class cannot simply take hold of the old state machine: “The selection of personages in the old machine, their education, their mutual relations, are all in conflict with the historic task of the proletariat. After seizing the power our task is not to re-educate the old machine, but to shatter it to fragments. And with what replace it? With the soviets. From being leaders of the revolutionary masses, instruments of education, the soviets will become organs of the new state order” [Volume Three, Chapter Five ¹⁹].

Few would read Lenin’s pamphlet before the revolution. It was published only after the seizure of power. But Lenin knew that this was vital research both for himself and for Marxism – now and in the future. Lenin even wrote to Kamenev asking him to publish the preparatory notes he had left behind in Stockholm should he be ‘bumped off’ by his enemies.

Trotsky adds that Lenin had always explained that the Bolsheviks were not ‘Blanquists’ seeking to seize power as a minority. Their task had always been to win a majority in the soviets first. However, after the July Days, Lenin feared that the Compromisers would not let the Bolsheviks get such a majority and that the Party should rely on the factory committees instead. His assessment proved unduly pessimistic but Lenin’s general approach, considering the consequences of the least favourable perspective, proved invaluable.

“As soon as the Bolsheviks had got control of the soviets of the two capitals, Lenin said: ‘Our day is come.’ In April and July he had applied the brakes; in August he was preparing theoretically the new step; from the middle of September he was hurrying and urging on with all his power. The danger now lay not in acting too soon, but in lagging” [Volume Three, Chapter Five ¹⁹].

Lenin’s Internationalism

Subsequently buried under the Stalinist bureaucracy’s attempt to justify the anti-Bolshevik idea of building ‘socialism in one country’, it’s important to understand that Lenin’s analysis was also always based on an international perspective, never one confined to Russia alone.

His letters to the Central Committee from his hiding place in Finland emphasised the growing awakening of the European working-class, not least news of uprisings in the German fleet. For Lenin, these were vital indicators that the Russian workers, having taken power, would be able to hold on to it - thanks to a victorious revolutionary movement in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe that would come to their aid.

As Lenin says in his pamphlet, completed on October 1st: ‘Will the Bolsheviks Be Able to Hold the State Power?’: “ ‘There is no power on earth which can prevent the Bolsheviks, if they do not let themselves be frightened and succeed in seizing the power, from holding it until the victory of the world-wide socialist revolution’ ” [Appendix Two to Volume Three ²⁷].

Without such an international revolution, no Bolshevik expected the soviet power to be able to hold out for long. As Lenin said later in 1918: “ ‘Of course the final victory of socialism in one country is impossible … but something else is: …   a living example, a getting to work – somewhere in one country’ ” [Appendix Two to Volume Three ²⁷], but adding later that year: “ ‘If it should happen … that we were suddenly swept away ... we would have the right to say, without concealing our mistakes, that we used the period of time that fate gave us wholly for the socialist world revolution’ ” [Appendix Two to Volume Three ²⁷].

As events turned out, a lack of strong revolutionary leadership meant that the European proletariat was unable to seize power. However, its struggle, combined with the divisions between the imperialist powers themselves, was enough to create a prolonged if fragile equilibrium that allowed the fledgling socialist republic to survive, despite its economic backwardness.

“As a result of the November revolution in Germany, the German troops were compelled to abandon the Ukraine, the Baltic States and Finland. The penetration of the spirit of revolt into the armies of the Entente compelled the French, English and American governments to withdraw their troops from the southern and northern shores of Russia. The proletarian revolution in the west was not victorious, but on its road to victory it protected the Soviet state for a number of years” [Appendix Two to Volume Three ²⁷].