Miliukov’s ‘note’ sparks a crisis

The debate inside Bolsheviks was taking place against a background of growing dissatisfaction with the government. April 18^th - which was May 1^st for most of the global workers’ movement - was met with large May Day demonstrations and strikes in every city in Russia. Once again, all the different strata of the population marched together, both the common people and the property-owners, but Trotsky notes that it was the workers that dominated. Soldiers marched alongside German war-prisoners, giving hope for the future. Nevertheless, underneath the triumphal discipline of the demonstration, the mood was tense.

“It was becoming harder and harder to live. Prices had risen alarmingly; the workers were demanding a minimum wage; the bosses were resisting; the number of conflicts in the factory was continually growing; the food situation was getting worse; bread rations were being cut down; cereal cards had been introduced; dissatisfaction in the garrison had grown. The district staff, making ready to bridle the soldiers, was removing the more revolutionary units from Petrograd. … But the root of all evils was the war, of which no end was to be seen. When will the revolution bring peace? What are Kerensky and Tseretelli waiting for?”  [Chapter Seventeen of Trotsky’s ‘History of the Russian Revolution’ ³³ ]

Trotsky notes that, against this background, the Bolsheviks were being listened to more attentively, if still with hostility from some. Indeed, the Bolshevik banners stood out more strongly on the May Day demonstration than they had on the funeral procession twenty-five days before. The Mariinsky Palace, home of the Provisional Government, was adorned with a large red streamer saying, ‘Long Live the Third International!’ However, not even the bold Bolsheviks who had put up that streamer could have imagined that the appearance of national unity was about to be split open - by, as was bound to happen eventually, the problem of the war. No other than Miliukov lit the fuse.

Encouraged by the entry of America into the war on March 23^rd, Miliukov had spoken out about his aim to seize Armenia, Constantinople, Persia and so on. This frank description by the ‘revolutionary’ Minister of Foreign Affairs of his predatory foreign policy caused alarm in the Soviets. So, on March 27^th, the government had agreed to produce a declaration saying that “the goal of free Russia is not domination over other peoples, nor depriving them of their national heritage, nor violent seizure of alien territory”. This sop to the Compromisers was rendered totally meaningless by the addition of the phrase, “nevertheless complete observance of the obligations undertaken to our Allies”. In other words, as Trotsky puts it: “We promise not to rob anybody whom we don't need to!”. However, as Lenin’s much-needed leadership was still absent at this point, even Kamenev and Stalin’s Pravda was taken in by this duplicitous declaration.

However, its content was still enough to worry the Allies. They sent alarmed messages to Petrograd, along with the supposedly ‘socialist’ traitor Albert Thomas - who had become wartime France’s ‘Minister of Armaments’. Thomas was given the job of convincing the Soviet leadership of the need for imperialist war. This panic was, of course, exactly what Miliukov had hoped for. He wanted to expose the Compromisers and force them into a situation where they had to make a clear choice between Bolshevism and imperialism. “His fundamental idea was to use the war against the revolution, and the first task upon this road was to demoralise the democracy.” [Chapter Seventeen ³³ ]

Miliukov now prepared another bombshell. The Soviet E.C. had been promised that Miliukov would send a note to the Allies confirming the March 27^th declaration. Instead, the note that he sent on April 18^th - ‘May Day’ - composed with the help of Thomas and the Allied diplomats, disavowed that declaration. It explained that nobody should have “the slightest reason to think that the revolution which had occurred entailed a weakening of the role of Russia in the common struggle of the Allies. Quite the contrary - the universal desire to carry the world war through to a decisive victory had only been strengthened”. It continued to note that the victors “will find means to attain those guarantees and sanctions, which are necessary for the prevention of bloody conflicts in the future.” As Trotsky remarks, ‘guarantees and sanctions’ “meant nothing less in the thieves’ jargon of diplomacy … than annexations and indemnities.” [Chapter Seventeen ³³ ]

Miliukov had ignored the Contact Commission and had sent the note to the Soviet E.C. only at the same time as he had sent it to the newspapers, thus giving the E.C. no time to think up excuses before the masses got to hear the news. As Miliukov had hoped, the Compromisers squirmed trying to find a way of saving face, particularly as the whole government, including Kerensky, had taken responsibility for the note. Tseretelli and Skobelev tried desperately to find good points in the note but to no avail. However, as the E.C. stalled, another force decided its voice should be heard - the masses.

The April demonstrations

On the afternoon of April 20^th, as news spread about the ‘note’, the soldiers took to the streets, 25-30,000 in total, and all armed, their bayonets holding streamers demanding the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov. The commotion soon spread to the workers’ districts, and whole factories joined the soldiers in the streets.

The sharp outbreak of the demonstration reflected the sudden realisation by the masses that the government could have been deceiving them all along. Trotsky comments how, up to now, they had given it the benefit of the doubt, especially as it included Kerensky after all. Only the Bolsheviks had been saying the government wanted the war prolonged for the sake of capitalist robbery, but hadn’t their leader come straight to Petrograd in a train from Berlin? Could it be that Lenin was right - and Kerensky wrong – all along? “Meanwhile the progressive factories and regiments were more and more firmly adopting the Bolshevik slogans of a peace policy: publication of the secret treaties; break with the plans of conquest of the Entente; open proposal of immediate peace to all warring countries.” [Chapter Seventeen ³³ ]

In an article in Pravda, Lenin declared that “the present Soviet … is faced with the alternative: either to swallow the pill offered by Guchkov and Miliukov … or to reject Miliukov’s note which would mean breaking with the old policy of confidence and adopting the course proposed by Pravda. … Workers and soldiers, you must now loudly declare that there must be only one power in the country - the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.” [ Lenin, ‘The Provisional Government’s Note’ ³⁴ ]

Lenin’s also set out the Bolshevik’s position in a draft leaflet - already quoted from in Lesson Fifteen – where he summarised the attitude of the different parties to the Tsar's war treaties. The Kadets, Lenin said, must not allow these treaties to be published since “Russian capital cannot afford to reveal its shady affairs to the public”. The Compromisers are against the treaties but still hope that with enough pressure “it may be possible to influence the capitalist government”. The Bolsheviks on the other hand understand that “the whole point is to enlighten the masses as to the utter hopelessness of expecting anything in this respect from capitalist governments, and as to the necessity of the power being transferred to the proletariat and the poor peasants.” [ Lenin, ‘Political Parties in Russia and the Tasks of the Proletariat’. ³⁰ ]

Many of those protesting against Miliukov’s ‘note’ nevertheless, for now, still supported the idea of continuing the war as far as was needed to ‘defend the revolution’. The majority simply wanted to send a warning to the government and to strengthen the position of Kerensky against Miliukov. However, some of the Petrograd Bolsheviks mistook the anger of the masses as a sign of a far more revolutionary understanding and had therefore raised the adventurist slogan of ‘Down with the Provisional Government’. The presence of this slogan had led to a strain of armed insurrection amongst the more left-wing demonstrators and attempts were made to enter the Mariinsky Palace to arrest the government ministers. The bourgeoisie tried to take advantage of the situation by escalating events into armed clashes saying that they were protecting the government against attempts to start a civil war.

April 21^st saw a new, even more powerful demonstration. Thousands of workers gathered in the workers’ districts then marched along Petrograd’s main avenue, the Nevsky Prospect, on a demonstration called by the Petrograd Bolsheviks. Meanwhile the Kadets had been issuing a special leaflet calling their counter-revolutionary supporters on to the streets and they marched onto the Nevsky with placards proclaiming, ‘Full Confidence in the Provisional Government’ and ‘Long Live Miliukov!’.

As Trotsky describes it, unlike the ‘May Day’ parades of just three days before, “No, that day was not in the least like a manifestation of national unity. Two worlds stood face to face. Two human floods - one for [the seizure of] Constantinople, one for Peace - had issued from different parts of the town. Different in social composition, not a bit similar in external appearance, and with hostile inscriptions on their placards, as they clashed together they brought into play fists, clubs, and even firearms.” [Chapter Seventeen ³³ ]

Clashes began and became more and more fierce. By the afternoon the shooting had become almost continuous. Finally, the news spread that General Kornilov, no doubt under instructions from the Kadets, was moving cannon onto the Square in front of the Mariinsky Palace ready to fire on the demonstrators.

Trotsky explains that the evening before, on the 20^th, Miliukov's plan to scare the Soviet leadership into supporting the bourgeoisie had seemed to be working. At a joint meeting of the E.C. and the Government, Prince Lvov had threatened to resign in the face of the agitation against the ‘note’. The horrified Compromisers of course drew back, readily accepted a worthless ‘explanation’ of Miliukov's note and on the 21^st had spent their time trying to persuade the demonstrators to disperse.

However, with Kornilov's guns ready, even the E.C. could now see that their own heads might now be crushed, not just the workers’ and soldiers’. They ordered the soldiers in Kornilov's hands to return to barracks, and the crisis was defused.

The outcome of the ‘April Days’

The April crisis seemed to have passed without any lasting effects. However, as an illustration of the changing balance of forces, this event set a precedent. It meant that from now on every order for the despatch of troops had to have official Soviet sanction.

The Soviet E.C. hastily met on the evening of the 21st and, having successfully held back the masses, voted by 34 to 19 to declare the matter of the ‘note’ settled. The Bolshevik, Feodorov, had gained a good deal of support when he had called for the Soviets to seize the power at a plenary session of the Soviet the evening before. Yet now the E.C.’s position was carried at the Petrograd Soviet by a huge majority.

Trotsky explains - just as Lenin did in the wording of the Bolshevik Central Committee (C.C.) resolution set out below - that the intermediate soldier mass had for a brief period swung towards the proletariat, causing the crisis, but had now swung back towards the Soviet leadership and hence, in effect, the bourgeoisie. However, as Lenin pointed out to the party, this vacillation of the petty-bourgeois layers was the music of the future. Under the pressure of events, they would continue to swing between bourgeoisie and proletariat, causing more crises. The job of the Bolsheviks was to carry on their agitation, particularly amongst the most backward layers that had supported the bourgeoisie in the April Days, until the intermediate strata swung decisively to the side of the workers.

Even if at an early stage, the experience of the April days nevertheless had lasting effects on the consciousness of the masses, accelerating the pace of events. Meetings and protests opposing the policy of Miliukov had taken place all over Russia. Just as in February itself, and in the March struggle for the eight-hour day, the April demonstration was a warning to the leadership, an example of action taken by direct intervention of the masses without the ‘permission’ of the Soviet parties.

The Bolsheviks after the April crisis

The Bolshevik party had come out of the April crisis strengthened by events, despite the adventurist policy of some of the Petrograd Committee. The party had been unprepared for the crisis, still finishing its own internal debate, and the call for the demonstration on the 21^st had not been made with sufficiently clear aims.

Afterwards, Lenin criticised the Petrograd leadership, saying: “You can overthrow one who is known to the people as a tyrant; but there are no tyrants now; the cannon and the rifles are in the hands of the soldiers, not the capitalists. The capitalists are not prevailing with violence, but deceit, and you can’t talk about violence – it’s mere nonsense. We gave the slogan of a peaceful demonstration. We wanted only to make a peaceful reconnoitre of the enemy’s strength, not to give battle. But the Petrograd Committee aimed a wee bit too far to the left. Along with the correct slogan ‘Long Live the Soviets!’ they gave a wrong one, ‘Down with the Provisional Government!’. A moment of action is no time to aim ‘a wee bit too far to the left’. We look upon that as the greatest crime, disorganisation.” [ Chapter Seventeen ³³ ]

Of course, as Trotsky explains, Lenin was no pacifist. With a different correlation of forces, the Petrograd Committee would have been entirely correct. But for now, the task was still to ‘patiently explain’. As the Bolshevik C.C. resolution on April 22^nd put it: “We shall favour the transfer of power to the proletarians and semi-proletarians only when the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies adopt our policy and are willing to take power into their hands.” [ Resolution of the Bolshevik Central Committee of 22^nd April ³⁵ ]

The party organisation had clearly not been strong enough in the April Days, but it led to vital recruitment into the party, workers transferring their names from Mensheviks to Bolsheviks. The district soviets, being closer to the factories, first showed this sharp turn to the left with the Bolsheviks finding themselves as a majority in a number of Soviets in Vyborg and elsewhere. By the beginning of May, Sukhanov estimated that a third of the Petrograd proletariat were supporting the Bolsheviks - and, of course, they were the most active third.

As Trotsky concludes: “The March formlessness had disappeared; political lines were sharpening; the ‘fantastic’ theses of Lenin were taking flesh in the Petrograd workers’ districts.” [ Chapter Seventeen ³³ ]